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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE 
BY 
ARTIDIATUN ADJI 
December, 2006 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. James R. Alm 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 The theme of this dissertation is Ricardian equivalence, and its objective is to 
examine the effects of government debt on private consumption expenditures (Essay 
One), on interest rates (Essay Two), on the current account balance (Essay Three), and on 
individual intertemporal decision-making (Essay Four). The effects of government debt 
are important if debt is neutral (e.g., if “Ricardian equivalence” holds), then a 
stabilization program that is based on demand management policy to curtail fiscal deficits 
will not be operative. On the other hand, if debt is not neutral (or if Ricardian equivalence 
does not hold), then deficit finance may induce private consumption, boost interest rates, 
crowd out investment, and retard economic growth.  
Essay One contributes to the existing literature by taking into account the nature 
of liquidity constraints in a developing economy in an aggregate consumption function. 
Previous empirical tests on Ricardian equivalence have not considered the role of a 
dominant resource aspect of a country. Essay Two and Essay Three incorporate a 
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dominant resource aspect in Indonesia by estimating the oil-macroeconomic relationship. 
Furthermore, Essay Three takes into account the role of capital inflows by including debt 
securities. Essay Four uses experimental economics methods to examine the role of 
distortionary taxes on Ricardian equivalence.  There have been only a few studies that 
use an experimental approach to examine the effect of deficit spending on consumption 
expenditures, but these existing experimental studies ignore the role of distortionary taxes 
in affecting subjects’ consumption-saving decisions and focus on the presence of 
liquidity constraints, myopia, and uncertainty on future income. Essay Four contributes to 
the Ricardian equivalence literature by taking into account distortionary taxes in a 
Ricardian institution by levying taxes on savings in an intertemporal individual 
consumption-savings decision in laboratory experiments. 
By utilizing the aggregate consumption function and the Euler equation 
consumption function, Essay One shows that  Indonesian consumers tend to behave in a 
non-Ricardian way. Public debt most likely will lead to crowding out of investment, and 
will retard capital accumulation and economic growth. The extent to which individuals 
perceive government expenditures as complements for their consumption is substantial. 
An increase in government expenditures will increase the marginal utility of private 
consumption and has an expansionary effect on aggregate demand. The complementarity 
between private consumption and government expenditures may be partly due to the 
allocation of government subsidies to basic goods and services such as electricity, fuel, 
fertilizer, health centers, and education. Liquidity constraints may cause consumption to 
have an excess sensitivity to income. The short-run and long-run aggregate consumption 
function estimates show that income affects consumption, indicating that consumers 
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follow a “rule of thumb” of consuming their current income. A high ratio of public debt 
to gross domestic product (GDP) in Indonesia may also be the culprit of the excess 
sensitivity of private consumption to income.  
Due to low salaries in the formal sector, employees have been engaged in 
moonlighting activities, mostly in the form of self-employment (e.g., opening retail stores 
or services). This phenomenon may help to explain why private credit−which amounts to 
29 percent of GDP−fails to explain consumption behavior. Most loans are made for 
investment rather than for consumption.  
Consumers’ behavior is insensitive to taxation, which perhaps is due to the fact 
that tax enactment is not explicitly revealed in Indonesia (e.g., price tags in the 
supermarket include the sales tax, and employees are only informed about their after-tax 
net wage instead of their gross wage). The share of tax collections to GDP averages only 
about 15 percent. There is still a large portion of the population who do not pay taxes or 
who pay far below what they should pay. The fiscal authority needs to focus more 
attention on alternative financing, i.e. taxation, whose system is essential to be enhanced. 
Essay Two shows that by excluding oil prices, deficits and debt significantly 
increase the real interest rate, thereby invalidating Ricardian equivalence. The evidence 
shows some preference for debt and deficit over government expenditures as 
determinants of interest rates. Inclusion of the oil price weakens the Neoclassical results, 
providing more support for the Ricardian paradigm. Deficits no longer increase interest 
rates, yet debt still significantly increases interest rates. This result reflects a loss of 
momentum for the Indonesian government two decades ago to decrease its dependency 
on debt. The government could have used the windfall oil revenue to pay off foreign 
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debt; instead, the windfall was spent on import-intensive infrastructure development 
projects, in order to build domestic industry and to subsidize rice and petroleum products. 
The importance of oil prices in the interest rate estimation suggests that in modeling the 
Indonesian macroeconomy, the oil sector should be incorporated. The non-stationary 
nature of the stock of debt implies the failure of intertemporal budget balance to hold, 
indicating that the debt-financed deficit is unsustainable.  
Essay Three shows that around 80 percent of the estimation results provide 
support for the Neoclassical view, a result that is consistent with the twin deficits 
hypothesis. The long-run estimates indicate an almost one-to-one relationship between 
the government budget and the trade balance, while the short-run estimates show a 
smaller magnitude. When capital inflows are included, the twin deficits phenomenon is 
less pronounced in the short-run and disappears in the long-run. An increase in the oil 
price statistically and significantly improves the trade balance in the short-run and in the 
long-run.  
Essay Four shows that subjects fully anticipate an increase in future taxation by 
increasing the amount bequeathed in one-to-one correspondence to the increase in debt. 
Even under a Ricardian institution, the distorting nature of taxes on savings alters 
subjects’ consumption-savings decisions. The equality of the change in bequests and the 
change in deficit spending is not attained under the savings taxes treatment, invalidating 
Ricardian equivalence. In line with the results of Essays One, Two, and Three, which 
suggest the vital need to enhance the taxation system, the results of Essay Four entail the 
importance of taxes on interest income in Indonesia.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The effect of government debt on the economy has been the subject of an on-
going debate in economics. Neither theoretical synthesis nor empirical evidence provides 
unambiguous results. The vast literature on the implications of deficit finance has been 
wrought with disharmony and indistinctness. There are basically three schools of thought 
that present differing conclusions on this issue: the Neoclassical, the Keynesian, and the 
Ricardian paradigms. 
According to the Neoclassical view, debt finance has a different effect on the 
economy than tax finance. Government budget deficits will increase consumption by 
shifting taxes to the future generations. If the economy is at full employment level, saving 
must decrease due to an increase in consumption. Interest rates then have to rise to return 
the capital market to equilibrium. Consequently, deficit finance will crowd out capital 
accumulation, which in turn will retard economic growth. A deficit may also increase 
current consumption at the expense of future consumption, retard exports and stimulate 
imports through currency appreciation, push the monetary authority to print money, and 
create government default on debt under unserviceable deficits. Individuals will bear the 
burden in the current period due to increased government borrowing. Future generations 
will bear the burden of paying the involuntary taxes necessary to service the debt 
principal and the interest, and will receive a smaller capital stock from the current 
generation (Alm and Barreto 1999; Bernheim 1989). 
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According to the Keynesian view, if implemented at the right time, deficit finance 
will positively affect the economy. The size of a deficit depends on discretionary tax and 
expenditure decisions, as well as economic performance. During a recession, government 
spending automatically increases and government revenue automatically decreases, since 
there is an automatic stabilizer in the government budget. The automatic changes in the 
deficit stimulate the economy during recessions and repress it during expansions. 
Keynesian economists argue that deficits do not need to crowd out private investment. An 
increase in aggregate demand will raise the level of investment due to an increased 
private investment profitability. The Keynesian view assumes that some economic 
resources are idle, and that a large proportion of individuals are myopic or liquidity 
constrained. Myopia and liquidity constraints may cause aggregate consumption to have 
an excess sensitivity to changes in income. If the government invests in productive 
capital, the deficits will cause a substitution of public capital for private capital, and the 
burden on future generation declines. According to Alm and Barreto (1999) and 
Bernheim (1989), if public capital is more productive than private capital, there will be 
improvement in future generations’ welfare.  
According to the Ricardian view, deficits financed by either debt or taxation are 
economically equivalent.  Under the assumptions of an infinite horizon, non-distortionary 
taxes, a lack of liquidity constraints, farsighted and altruistic individuals, and a perfect 
capital market, a current tax cut will not yield an increase in consumption since non-
myopic individuals will regard this policy as an increase of taxes in the future. Deficit 
finance, therefore, is only considered as a shift of current tax obligations to the future. 
Aggregate demand is unaffected, and the economy is indifferent between the financing of 
    
 3
tax versus issuance of public debt, a concept that birthed the term “Ricardian 
equivalence,” named after David Ricardo who first stated the proposition.1 Barro (1974), 
in his seminal paper, “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?”, reintroduced the 
equivalence proposition in  a modern economics route, although he failed to mention 
Ricardo’s work until Buchanan (1976) discussed it.  
According to Ricardian equivalence, government bonds represent a future tax 
liability. An increase in taxes used to retire government debt will not affect private 
consumption. If individuals can freely borrow or lend at a certain rate of interest, they 
will be indifferent to a one dollar tax increase used to retire a one dollar debt instrument 
paying the interest rate. Similarly, holding government expenditures constant, a tax cut 
and a budget deficit today imply higher future taxes to service government debt and its 
interest in the future. A farsighted, rational individual will not regard a tax cut today as an 
increase in wealth. Since no net wealth has been created by the issuance of government 
bonds, individuals do not alter their consumption. Instead, private saving will increase to 
meet the need for an increase in future taxation. Budget deficits or the decline in public 
saving will be accompanied by an equal increase in private saving, leaving total saving 
unchanged. Ricardian equivalence therefore implies that the financing scheme of 
government expenditures is irrelevant. However, the change in the level of government 
expenditures is relevant. A tax cut today that is accompanied by an expected cut in future 
government expenditures will stimulate consumption via its effect on permanent income 
                                                 
1 Ricardo (1820) stated [as quoted from  Ricciuti, Roberto. 2003. Assessing Ricardian equivalence. Journal 
of Economic Surveys 17, no. 1: 55-78.], “In point of economy, there is no real difference in either of three 
modes: for twenty millions in one payment, one million per annum forever, or 1,200,000 for 45 years, are 
precisely the same value; but people who pay taxes never so estimate them, and therefore do not manage 
their private affairs accordingly. We are too apt to think that war is burdensome only in proportion to what 
we are at the moment called to pay for it in taxes, reflecting on the probable duration of such taxes.” 
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(Barro 1974, 1989; Bernheim 1989; Elmendorf and Mankiw 1998). Since Barro’s 1974 
paper, academic debate on deficit finance has become intense.  
These diverse views yield very different policy implications. In a Ricardian 
economy, a fiscal financing scheme is irrelevant; only the level of government 
expenditures matters. The government can, therefore, pursue debt-financing without 
crowding out private investment and impeding economic growth. Demand management 
policies to restrain budget deficits will be irrelevant. On the other hand, if the economy 
behaves as is predicted by the Neoclassical paradigm, deficit finance should be conducted 
with caution, and the fiscal authority needs to shift gears to enhance taxation.   
Although supported by only a few economists, Ricardian equivalence has been 
prominent in the deficit finance literature. In his comprehensive survey on Ricardian 
equivalence, Seater (1993) provides a bridging conclusion that, although it is nearly 
impossible for Ricardian equivalence to hold exactly, the equivalence may describe the 
world as a close approximation. In addition, Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998) argue that 
Ricardian equivalence is important since it offers a theoretical benchmark, providing a 
starting point for analyzing the effects of government debt on the economy. The role of 
Ricardian equivalence can be compared with the role of the Modigliani-Miller theorem 
on the irrelevance between debt and equity finance for firms. Although only a few 
finance economists believe that debt and equity financing are irrelevant, the Modigliani-
Miller theorem provides a starting point for firms’ financing decisions. Analogously, in a 
world with imperfect competition, economists utilize the Arrow-Debreu general 
equilibrium model, which assumes a perfectly competitive market.  
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Although economies, especially developing ones, do not possess the idealized 
conditions underlying Ricardian equivalence, academic research on the equivalence 
proposition is imperative since it offers insight into the deficit finance analysis. Research 
on Ricardian equivalence has been performed from various distinct angles, and 
theoretical debate has concentrated on the validity of its assumptions. The prevalence of 
Ricardian equivalence has been examined by relaxing its restrictive assumptions, 
considering realities such as capital market imperfections, uncertainty, myopia, and 
distortionary taxation. Under its relaxed assumptions, public debt may affect the 
economy. Examination of these relaxed assumptions suggests that exact Ricardian 
equivalence will not hold (Elmendorf and Mankiw 1998; Seater 1993). Indirect tests of 
the underlying assumptions have also been carried out empirically, with ambiguous 
results. 
Direct tests of the equivalence proposition have been performed by examining the 
implications predicted by the Ricardian paradigm, for instance whether aggregate 
consumption, interest rates, and current account balances are unaltered by public debt.  
There has been a rich literature on direct tests of Ricardian equivalence in developed 
countries; however, such tests are not conducted in developing countries nearly as often. 
Ricardian equivalence implies that fiscal switching between debt and taxes will not have 
any effect on macroeconomic variables such as private consumption, interest rates, and 
the current accounts. Despite enormous quantitative evidences on the implications of 
Ricardian equivalence for macroeconomic variables, the overall results are inconclusive.  
It is important to observe empirical research on the implications for Ricardian 
equivalence on a case by case basis. For example, Indonesia has been experiencing 
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budget deficits, and government debt comprises a significant proportion of gross 
domestic product (GDP). The objective of this dissertation is to examine the effect of 
government debt on the Indonesian economy. Some characteristics of the Indonesian 
economy, such as its dominant resource aspect and the nature of borrowing constraints 
and capital flows are incorporated. The first three essays focus on direct tests of 
Ricardian equivalence in Indonesia. The essays empirically test predictions from 
Ricardian equivalence: whether government debt affects consumption (Essay One), 
interest rates (Essay Two), and the current account balance (Essay Three). The 
effectiveness of fiscal financing depends on individuals’ behavior. Whether individuals 
recognize intertemporal trade-offs or comprehend an increase in future debt repayment 
liabilities, and whether individuals are altruistic or whether individuals operate 
intergenerational transfers can be inspected by setting up a laboratory experiment (Davis 
and Holt 1993). There have been only a few experimental studies on Ricardian 
equivalence (Cadsby and Frank 1991; Ricciuti and Di Laurea 2003; Slate 1995). Those 
previous studies focus on uncertainty, myopia, and liquidity constraints. Among the 
assumptions underlying Ricardian equivalence, deviations from lump sum taxation have 
not been taken into account in exploring its prevalence. The fourth essay is expected to 
contribute to existing literature by looking at a specific aspect of Ricardian equivalence: 
testing its prevalence under distortionary taxation in an experimental laboratory.  
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II presents Essay 
One, the consumption test of Ricardian equivalence. Both the ad-hoc approach of the 
aggregate consumption function and the rational expectations approach of the Euler 
equation consumption function are estimated. The imperfect nature of the capital market 
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is taken into account. This essay also analyzes the substitutability/complementary nature 
between private and public expenditures. Chapter III delivers Essay Two, the interest rate 
test of Ricardian equivalence. Chapter IV displays Essay Three, the current account test 
of Ricardian equivalence. Chapters III and IV are expected to contribute to the existing 
literature on the prevalence of Ricardian equivalence by taking into account a dominant 
resource aspect of the country, oil. Chapter V presents Essay Four, the experimental test 
of Ricardian equivalence under distortionary taxation. Chapter VI concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
 ESSAY ONE: ARE INDONESIAN CONSUMERS RICARDIAN? 
 
Introduction 
 
The inadequacy of government revenues to cover its outlays has classically drawn 
attention in the public finance literature. Theoretical and empirical debate on the effect of 
fiscal policy on the aggregate demand throughout the economy has been marked by 
acrimony and ambiguity. The Ricardian view suggests that the way the government 
finances its budget does not affect the economy. The Ricardian equivalence proposition 
states that under a set of specific circumstances (e.g., infinite horizons, perfect capital 
market, rational and farsighted individuals, certainty on future income, and non-
distortionary taxation), government finance of expenditures by debt versus taxation has 
equivalent effects on the economy; that is, debt and tax finance are equivalent. The 
equivalence proposition was named after Ricardo who was the first in stating that, “In 
point of economy, there is no real difference in either the modes…taxation versus 
issuance of public debt.” This proposition was rediscovered in the context of modern 
economic theory by Barro in his 1974 seminal paper, “Are Government Bonds Net 
Wealth?” In Barro’s framework, intergenerational transfers will act as an operative chain 
that converts finite horizons into infinite ones. An increase in taxes used to retire 
government debt will not affect private consumption. Individuals will anticipate an 
increase in future taxation by bequeathing wealth to their children in order for them to be 
able to pay the future increase in tax. If individuals can freely borrow or lend at a certain 
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level of interest rate, they will be indifferent to a one dollar tax increase that is used to 
retire a one dollar debt instrument paying the interest rate. Hence, the consumption 
decision will be unchanged, and tax and debt-financing will have an equivalent effect on 
the economy. 
On the contrary, according to the Neoclassical view, government expenditures 
that are financed by tax collections will affect the economy differently if the expenditures 
are financed by issuance of government bonds.  In the Neoclassical perspective, budget 
deficits will increase consumption by shifting taxes to the future generations. If the 
economy is at full employment level, saving will have to decrease due to an increase in 
consumption. As a result, interest rates will then have to rise to return the capital market 
to equilibrium. Therefore, deficit finance will crowd out capital accumulation and in turn, 
will retard economic growth. In summary, the Neoclassical view believes that debt-
financing will increase consumption. 
The Keynesian view posits that deficit finance has a positive effect on the 
economy. A current tax cut will increase the aggregate demand by a significant amount 
due to the assumption of myopic individuals possessing a high marginal propensity to 
consume. As a result, national income will increase and will generate the typical 
Keynesian multiplier effects. Therefore, capital accumulation would not be adversely 
affected since national income rises with the deficit finance. Instead, deficit finance, if 
implemented at the right time, will generate a positive impact on the economy.  
These three different views yield different policy implications. It is important to 
inquire the extent to which the Ricardian equivalence holds or does not hold on an 
empirical basis. The objective of this essay is to examine the effect on interest rates of 
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public debt in Indonesia. Public debt has played dominant role in the government budget. 
It is important to study the effect of government debt on the economy since, if debt 
neutrality exists, a stabilization program based on demand management policy to curtail 
fiscal deficits will not be operative, and policy prescription revision is needed. On the 
other hand, if government debt affects the economy, the way the government finances its 
outlays does matter. In this case, deficit finance will induce private consumption 
expenditures, increase the price level, boost interest rates, crowd out private investment, 
and retard economic growth. Therefore, empirical investigation on the effect of 
government debt on the economy is essential. Specifically, this essay investigates the 
following questions: (i) is public spending a substitute for private consumption, and (ii) is 
private consumption sensitive to the method of fiscal financing, i.e. tax versus debt 
financing?   
The first question deals with the expectations of the private sector concerning 
fiscal policy. The private sector’s perceptions may influence the effects of public 
spending financed by present tax revenues. If the private sector perceives public spending 
on consumption-type goods as a substitute for its current consumption, then an increase 
in taxation will decrease private expenditure. If the private sector perceives public 
spending on investment-type goods as a substitute for its future consumption, then private 
expenditure will be less affected. 
This issue has important policy implications. If public spending is a good 
substitute for private consumption, fiscal policy will be offset by the private sector. 
However, if public spending is a poor substitute for private expenditure, then temporary 
increases in public spending will have an expansionary effect on the aggregate demand, 
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even if Ricardian equivalence were to hold. If individuals regard public spending as a 
complement for private spending, then expansionary fiscal policy will have an 
expansionary effect on aggregate demand. Complementarity between private and public 
spending implies effectiveness of fiscal policy. 
The second question relates to the possible existence of Ricardian equivalence. If 
the private sector does not consider public debt as net wealth, and hence, the choice of 
public financing between current taxation and debt issuance becomes irrelevant to 
aggregate demand determination, then a macroeconomic stabilization program based on 
demand management policies to cut public sector deficits becomes impotent. It is 
expected that Ricardian equivalence does not hold in Indonesia due to the characteristics 
of developing countries found in Indonesia, such as uninformed individuals and an 
imperfect capital market. However, the extent to which Ricardian equivalence does not 
prevail and the extent to which fiscal variables such as debt and tax affect the economy 
are important to address.    
This essay empirically examines the aggregate consumption function, which has 
the advantage of being less restrictive (Feldstein 1982; Kormendi 1983; Bernheim 1988), 
as well as the Euler equation consumption function, which incorporates rational 
expectations optimizing framework (Aschauer 1985; Gupta 1992; Ghatak and Ghatak 
1996), by utilizing Indonesian annual time series data. The Euler equation consumption 
function has an advantage over the aggregate consumption function since the estimated 
model is built on a micro-foundation of the consumers’ intertemporal optimization 
problem. The drawback of the Euler equation approach is that, unlike the aggregate 
consumption function, it needs to impose several restrictions in order to obtain an 
    
 12
observable consumption function, such as the imposition of a constant real rate of return, 
the specification of a certain form of utility function, like the quadratic utility function, in 
order to aggregate the Euler equation across individuals. Seater (1993) points out that 
many researchers are skeptical about the estimation results derived from the aggregate 
consumption function and therefore prefer the Euler equation approach.  
Empirical evidence from industrial countries appears to be inconclusive. In 
developing countries with liquidity-constrained consumers, underdeveloped financial 
systems, distorted capital markets, repressed financial systems, and uncertainty faced by 
private agents regarding the incidence of taxes, many of the considerations necessary for 
debt neutrality to hold are unlikely to be valid. In this case, deficit finance will retard 
economic growth. The economic crisis faced by Indonesia in 1997-1999 will be taken 
into account. It is suspected that the economic crisis aggravated the presence of liquidity 
constraints in Indonesia, thus leading to non-neutrality results. By estimating the 
aggregate and the Euler equation consumption functions, this essay will also be able to 
identify whether private consumption is a substitute or a complement for public 
expenditures. If there is no substitution between the two, then under a rational 
expectations framework, consumption will follow a random walk, leading to neutrality 
results. Substitutability between private and public spending implies that the 
effectiveness of an expansionary fiscal policy may be offset by a decrease in private 
consumption. On the contrary, complementarity between the two will lead to an effective 
fiscal policy. By knowing the nature of the substitutability or the complementarity 
between private and public spending, the direction of fiscal policy can be set more 
optimally.      
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The results indicate that the constrained parameter estimates differ from the 
hypothesized parameter values, thereby rejecting the joint hypothesis of rational 
expectations and debt neutrality. This observation is supported by the Wald Test, 
statistically rejecting the Ricardian equivalence and rational expectations hypothesis. 
Public sector deficits seem to have an expansionary effect on aggregate demand. Finite 
horizons and liquidity constraints have the potential to induce an excess sensitivity of 
private consumption to current income. The estimates of the aggregate consumption 
function show that there is evidence of rule-of-thumb behavior of consuming current 
income, designating the excess sensitivity of consumption to income. However, the Euler 
equation estimates lend some support for the random walk pattern of consumption 
behavior. The findings also suggest that private and public spending are complements. 
Therefore, fiscal expansion will have an expansionary effect on the aggregate demand.  
The rest of this essay will be organized in the following manner. Section Two 
presents the survey of literature: theoretical, empirical (both direct and indirect tests), and 
survey studies. Section Three discusses the theoretical framework, the models, and the 
time series properties. Section Four delivers historical data on Indonesia. Section Five 
presents the analysis of the results. Finally, Section Six concludes. 
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Survey of the Literature 
Survey on Theoretical Debate 
The theoretical debate on Ricardian equivalence has been focused on the validity 
of its assumptions: (1) infinite horizons, (2) perfect capital market, (3) rational and 
farsighted individuals, (4) certainty, and (5) non-distortionary taxation. Table A1 in the 
Appendix summarizes previous theoretical studies on Ricardian equivalence. Theoretical 
examination on the violation and modification of the assumptions, such as progressive 
taxation, imperfect capital market, bequest motive, the “joy of giving,” and uncertainty 
has been conducted and provides results that tend to support the notion that Ricardian 
equivalence is almost impossible to hold exactly. See, for instance, Abel (1985) and 
(1986), Bernheim and Bagwell (1988), Andreoni (1989), Weil (1989), Hayford (1989), 
Trostel (1993), Pemberton (1994), Strawczynski (1995), Rebelein(1998), and Reiter 
(1998). However, Seater (1993) argues that Ricardian equivalence may hold as a close 
approximation.  
Survey on Empirical Debate 
 Empirical studies consist of surveys on indirect evidence and on direct evidence. 
The survey on indirect evidence summarizes tests of the underlying assumptions of 
Ricardian equivalence. The survey on direct evidence summarizes evidences on the 
aggregate consumption function and the Euler equation consumption function. This work 
is summarized in Table A3 in Appendix A. 
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Survey on Indirect Evidence: Tests of Underlying Assumptions 
  The most widely conducted test of Ricardian equivalence is the examination of 
the underlying assumptions for the equivalence, such as the presence of infinite horizons, 
the absence of liquidity constraints, short-sighted individuals, and the uncertainty of 
future income and taxation. More detailed illustration of the empirical evidences is 
presented in Table A1 in Appendix A.  
1. Infinite horizons. 
 Graham and Himarios (1996) re-estimate Evans’ (1988) derivation of Blanchard’s 
(1985) model of finite horizons. Evans tests whether or not consumption is affected by 
wealth. If wealth has a significant effect on consumption, then consumers possess finite 
horizons and treat government bonds as net wealth. Using U.S. quarterly data 1947.2-
1985.4, Evans’ results cannot reject Ricardian equivalence and cannot support 
Blanchard’s alternative model of finite horizons. Using different measures of wealth by 
taking into account the available information on the market value of corporate equity held 
by households, Graham and Himarios find conclusions that are contrary to those of 
Evans. Strong non-Ricardian results are found and are consistent with a model of finite 
horizons. Evans (1991) argues that Ricardian equivalence may be a good approximation 
even if individuals possess finite horizons. He finds that a portion of individuals are 
liquidity-constrained and that the equivalence still holds in Blanchard’s model with 
liquidity constraints and without an annuity market. Therefore, Ricardian equivalence 
may constitute a useful paradigm since the absence of some of its underlying assumptions 
does not appear to adversely affect the neutrality results. 
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In further work, Evans (1993) develops a model that nests Ricardian equivalence 
and Blanchard’s (1985) model, using them to test Ricardian equivalence for 19 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries for the 
period 1960-1988. The estimated deviation from Ricardian equivalence is similar to what 
is expected in the presence of a perfect capital market and in the absence of an altruistic 
bequest motive. 
Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) estimate the role of intergenerational transfers in 
aggregate capital accumulation. Intergenerational transfers account for a vast majority of 
aggregate capital formation in the U.S. In a framework of a steady state growth model, a 
decrease of one dollar in transfer stock will decrease total wealth by less than a dollar if 
the steady state rate of interest is greater than the steady state growth rate. Lord and 
Rangazas (1993) examine the situation in which households are bequest-constrained, but 
generations are linked by an altruistically motivated human capital investment. Deficits 
can have real effects by shifting the consumption possibility frontier outward for bequest-
constrained families. The wealth effect will increase consumption, whereas the 
substitution effect, due to diminishing returns to human capital investment, will decrease 
the return on investment of parental consumption, since greater investment is required to 
maintain a given level of after-tax wealth for the children. The calibrated model of 
bequest-constrained households shows that a deficit will reduce the children’s after-tax 
wealth, despite the presence of altruistic human capital transfers. 
2. Perfect capital market. 
Rockerbie (1997) utilizes a modified form of Evans’ (1988) test for Ricardian 
equivalence to incorporate liquidity-constrained consumers. The results strongly support 
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the presence of liquidity-constrained consumers at 40 percent. However, its presence 
does not affect the Ricardian results for U.S. annual data 1946-1991. Zeldes (1989) 
examines whether or not the presence of liquidity constraint affects consumption.  The 
results show that in general liquidity constraints affect food consumption behavior in the 
U.S.  
Heathcote (1999) examines whether the presence of liquidity constraints may 
explain the real effects of temporary tax changes by using a simulated series. Liquidity 
constraints accompanied with the absence of insurance markets imply large short-run real 
effects of temporary tax changes, even in the presence of lump sum taxation and infinite 
horizons. Low income individuals are highly sensitive to changes in the tax level, since 
their ability to smooth out consumption is limited by borrowing constraints. Meanwhile, 
high income individuals behave in a more Ricardian way, adjusting their savings due to 
changes in temporary taxes.   
3. Rational and farsighted consumers.  
Poterba (1988) examines whether or not consumers are forward-looking by 
analyzing U.S. fiscal policies in the 1970s and 1980s. He finds that consumption 
responds to temporary income tax shocks by more than the permanent income and life-
cycle hypothesis suggest. The 1975 tax rebate suggested that a one dollar increase in 
transitory income will increase spending by about 20 cents. Meanwhile, when there is a 
tax announcement, consumers do not adjust consumption in anticipation of tax changes. 
The rationale for this result is that perhaps a portion of the population is myopic or faces 
liquidity constraints that prevent them from adjusting consumption.  
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 Wilcox (1989) examines the impact of changes in social security benefits on 
consumption. An increase in benefits implies an increase in future tax liabilities; 
therefore, individuals will not change their spending behavior. Barro (1974) argued that, 
although the change in benefits constitutes a surprise, rational and farsighted individuals 
will not alter their consumption decision since they recognize that the increase in benefits 
implies an increase in future taxation that individuals in the future or their descendants 
will have to bear. The empirical evidence shows that fully anticipated increases in social 
security benefits lead to a large increase in consumption expenditures, invalidating 
Ricardian equivalence.  
4. Certainty. 
 Slate, McKee, Beck, and Alm (1995) test Ricardian equivalence under uncertainty 
about the repayment of public debt by using an experimental method. Ricardian 
equivalence does not hold when the probability of debt repayment is low, but it tends to 
hold when the debt repayment probability is somewhere between moderate to high. 
Bequests from current to future generations increase with the increase of the debt 
repayment probability in order to enable future generations to pay the burden of the debt. 
Pemberton (1994) assesses whether or not the combined assumptions of operative 
intergenerational transfers, pure altruism, and certainty on future income are plausible.  
Pure altruism alone can hold if there is a market for life-time annuities. Certainty alone 
can hold when individuals behave as if they were subjectively certain about future 
income. Since the observed values refer to the case in which bequests explain an 
important portion of total wealth accumulation, it implies that bequests cannot be fully 
explained in a Ricardian way.  
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5. Non-distortionary taxation. 
Cardia (1997) tests Ricardian equivalence using a series generated from a model 
that nests the equivalence and an alternative model with a finite horizon and/or 
distortionary taxation. The results are inconclusive. Although she finds that distortionary 
taxation has an effect on consumption, Ricardian equivalence is difficult to reject. 
Meanwhile, in a model with finite horizons, changes in lump sum taxation do not have a 
significant effect on consumption; however, Ricardian equivalence is easier to reject. 
Abel (1986) shows that the presence of a nonlinear tax on bequests will invalidate 
Ricardian equivalence. Progressive wealth taxation leads to the failure of Ricardian 
equivalence. In general, Ricardian equivalence will not hold when there is a nonlinear tax 
on savings, wealth, or income accruing to savings.  
Survey on Direct Evidence: Aggregate Consumption Function 
Two of the most cited studies of aggregate consumption function in testing 
Ricardian equivalence are the ones conducted by Feldstein (1982) and Kormendi (1983). 
Feldstein finds that changes in fiscal variables can have a substantial effect on aggregate 
demand. The most robust rejection of the Ricardian equivalence is the significant 
coefficient on the government transfer variable. However, Seater (1993) argues that 
Feldstein’s results are subject to the possibility that the business cycle component in the 
transfer may be significant as a business cycle indicator instead of as an indicator of the 
genuine effect on consumption. 
Kormendi (1983) presents a consolidated approach to estimate the consumption 
function and finds support for Ricardian results. He models consumption-saving behavior 
based on individuals’ rational expectations of the effects of fiscal policies. He argues that 
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the standard approach does not incorporate the individuals’ rational perceptions. A 
consolidated approach nests previous tests of Ricardian equivalence. The results provide 
support for the consolidated approach, which is consistent with Ricardian equivalence. 
Kormendi’s consolidated approach received a series of comments and replies from 
Modigliani and Sterling (1986; 1990), Barth, Iden, and Russek (1986), Feldstein and 
Elmendorf (1990), Graham and Himarios (1991; 1996), Graham (1995), and was updated 
again by Kormendi and Meguire (1986; 1990; 1995). 
Barth, Iden, and Russek (1986) explore the sensitivity of Kormendi’s (1983) 
results by estimating different time periods and by decomposing the measurement of 
government debt into federal, state, and local components. Although the partition of 
government debt provides less support for the consolidated approach, the null of the 
consolidated approach cannot be rejected. Kormendi and Meguire (1986) interpret Barth, 
Iden, and Russek’s (1986) results by conducting Chow tests, the results of which show 
that their marginal significance levels indicate that Barth, et al.’s results are supportive of 
the consolidated approach.  
Modigliani and Sterling (1986; 1990) criticize Kormendi’s  (1983) specification 
as being inconsistent with the life cycle hypothesis or with the Ricardian equivalence 
hypothesis. They impose some restrictions, and their results support the restrictions. Their 
evidence indicates that consumption is affected by taxes, government expenditure, 
wealth, and private claims on the government. Kormendi and Meguire (1986) relax the 
restrictions imposed by Modigliani and Sterling, and their results reject the restrictions. 
 Feldstein and Elmendorf (1990) find that by excluding World War II years, 
increases in taxes have a substantial effect on consumption and that an increase in 
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government expenditure has no effect on consumption, contradicting Ricardian 
equivalence. They argue that Kormendi’s results that favor the Ricardian equivalence do 
so because of the inclusion of the World War II years. These were years marked by 
shortages, rationing, and patriotic appeals to self-restraint that induced an abnormally 
high rate of saving at the time when there were extremely large government budget 
deficits. Kormendi and Meguire (1990) reply that Feldstein and Elmendor’s non-
Ricardian results do not stem from excluding World War II years but come from 
problems in their data construction.  
Graham and Himarios (1991) test the issues raised by the consolidated approach 
against an alternative hypothesis that allows consumers to be myopic. The results 
strongly reject the consolidated approach. There is evidence that consumers are partially 
myopic with regard to taxes and government expenditures. Graham (1995) re-specifies 
Kormendi’s consolidated approach by decomposing income and taxes into the 
components that accrue to labor and by decomposing government fiscal variables into 
federal, state, and local components. The results violate Ricardian predictions. Kormendi 
and Meguire (1995) develop an original method of assessing the effects of a broad-based 
specification search in the debate on the consolidated approach, and the results indicate 
that the consolidated approach delivered in 1983 is fully robust to 16 years of data 
addition and to revisions of variable definitions. Seater and Mariano (1985) estimate a 
permanent income consumption function. Their results are consistent with a permanent 
income theory that is generalized to include the Ricardian equivalence proposition. Table 
A2 in Appendix A presents a more detailed illustration of the exchange on the 
consolidated approach.  
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Survey on Direct Evidence: Euler Equation Consumption Function 
Studies on consumption behavior using the aggregate consumption function have 
been criticized by those in support of the rational expectations approach. Lucas (1976) 
argues that the aggregate consumption function will not be useful in evaluating the 
effects of alternative policies (Campbell et al. 1989). Hall (1978) provides a solution to 
Lucas’ critique by forming an Euler equation consumption function that obeys the first 
order conditions for optimal consumption for rational and farsighted consumers. For the 
case of industrial countries, the estimation of the Euler equation consumption function 
usually yields results that are consistent with the equivalence proposition, whereas the 
evidence for developing countries yields mixed results.  
Aschauer (1985) pioneered the use of the Euler equation.  He decomposes 
effective consumption into public and private components. His study yields evidence on 
the joint hypothesis of rational expectations and Ricardian equivalence and on the 
substitutability of government expenditures for private consumption. Government 
expenditures appear to decrease private consumption in the range of 23 to 42 percent, 
consistent with Kormendi’s results. 
The utilization of the Euler equation has dominated the test for Ricardian 
equivalence since the late 1980s. Evans (1988) utilizes the Euler equation to estimate a 
model that nests Ricardian equivalence and Blanchard’s model of finite horizons. The 
estimation shows that a tax cut does not appear to increase consumption expenditures. 
Evans (2001) shows that the Euler equation relates the growth rate of consumption to the 
rate of the interest rate, wealth plus assets, and social security wealth. He finds that social 
security affects the U.S. economy. Evans (2003) uses the same approach in a study of 17 
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OECD countries, and finds that social security increases consumption. Evans (1993) 
follows his own procedure in 1988 to test Ricardian equivalence in 19 OECD countries, 
and he finds weak evidence against neutrality when each country is estimated 
individually and strong evidence against equivalence if pooled data are estimated. 
Chakraborty and Farah (1996) also use the Euler equation consumption function to 
investigate whether the private sector has a shorter planning horizon than the public 
sector in 5 OECD countries: Canada, France, Germany, U.S, and U.K. The results 
indicate that consumers do not have a shorter planning horizon than the government. 
Haug (1990) derives the Euler equation for a permanent income model with income 
uncertainty, and finds that, if the World War II years are included, the joint hypothesis of 
permanent income and Ricardian equivalence is not rejected, but if the war years are 
excluded, Ricardian equivalence holds only when the rate of return is measured by the 
stock market return.  
Himarios (1996) shows that alternative solutions to the Euler equation test of 
Ricardian equivalence may give rise to different empirical results when liquidity 
constraints are ignored. He estimates three models: Evans (1988), Haque and Montiel 
(1989), and Hayashi (1982). Under the assumption of a perfect capital market, two out of 
three models cannot reject Ricardian equivalence. Estimating the same models but 
allowing for an imperfect capital market, he finds similar results. Leiderman and Razin 
(1988) estimate a stochastic intertemporal model of consumption behavior for Israeli 
data, and they find that the data do not reject restrictions implied by Ricardian 
equivalence. Their framework allows for a channel that gives rise to a departure from 
Ricardian equivalence: the presence of finite horizons and liquidity constraints.  
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Khalid (1996) modifies the model developed by Leiderman and Razin (1988) to 
analyze the validity of Ricardian equivalence and its sources of deviation in 17 
developing countries. The results support Ricardian equivalence in 12 countries. The 
source of deviation from Ricardian equivalence in the remaining 5 countries (Israel, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, and the Philippines) is the presence of liquidity-constrained 
consumers.  Meanwhile, there is no crowding effect of government expenditures. Public 
spending is a poor substitute for private spending. Therefore, even if debt neutrality 
exists, there is a possibility of expansionary effects of government expenditures on 
aggregate demand. Haque and Montiel (1989) estimate the Euler equation consumption 
function to test for the presence of liquidity constraints and finite horizons in 16 
developing countries, and find that full Ricardian equivalence can be rejected for 15 of 16 
countries due to the existence of liquidity constraints, whereas the infinite horizons 
hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
Gupta (1992) follows Aschauer’s approach to test debt neutrality in 10 developing 
countries. He finds that Ricardian equivalence is supported in South Korea, Pakistan, 
Singapore, and Thailand; at least marginally, he also finds that Ricardian equivalence is 
rejected in India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka, while for Malaysia and 
Taiwan, the evidence is less clear. Aschauer’s procedure is again followed by Ghatak and 
Ghatak (1996) to analyze the validity of Ricardian equivalence in India. They find that 
Ricardian equivalence is rejected due to an imperfect capital market.  
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Survey Studies 
Survey studies yield mixed results. A converging argument is provided by Seater 
(1993) who establishes a bridge between the opponents and the proponents of Ricardian 
equivalence by stating that Ricardian equivalence, despite its unrealistic assumptions, can 
hold at least as an approximation. While Seater stands to support the Ricardian 
equivalence proposition, or at least its approximation, Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998) 
provide less support for the equivalence. They conclude that the debate on theoretical 
work provides clearer results than the debate on empirical work. Empirical tests on the 
assumptions about individuals’ behaviors focus on whether or not individuals base their 
consumption decisions on a rational evaluation of an intertemporal budget constraint that 
captures current and future generations. The results demonstrate that many households do 
not smooth consumption within their lifetimes and across generations due to the 
prevalence of liquidity constraints or myopia. They argue that the empirical evidence on 
the consumption function, rate of interest, and international variables fails to provide 
clear evidence either to support or oppose Ricardian equivalence. However, they admit 
that Ricardian equivalence is important because it describes the world, at least as a first 
approximation, and it offers a theoretical benchmark for much further analysis. Table A4 
in Appendix A presents a summary of these studies.  
The aggregate consumption function has the advantage of being less restrictive, 
while the Euler equation consumption function has the advantage of possessing the 
micro-foundation and rational expectation hypothesis. This study estimates both the 
aggregate consumption function and the Euler equation consumption function. Time 
series properties are examined to understand the behavior of the series. Cointegration and 
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an error correction mechanism are utilized to connect the short-run dynamics to the long-
run solution. As a developing economy, a certain portion of the Indonesian population 
suffers from liquidity constraints. Unlike the aggregate consumption function estimated 
in previous studies, this study takes into account liquidity constraints that are proxied by 
private credit per capita. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Approach 
The Neutrality/Barro-Ricardian Equivalence Proposition 
 A simple illustration of the Ricardian equivalence proposition is provided by 
McCandless Jr. and Wallace (1991). Assume the following conditions: (i) tax = 0.1 unit 
(of good) per capita in current period; (ii) individuals are identical in their endowments, 
implying private borrowing = private lending = 0 in current period; (iii) government 
bonds = 0.1 unit (of good) per capita in current period with tax in future period equal to 
the amount that is required for the government to repay the bonds; (iv) 1/p = r, where p is 
the price of government bonds, and r is the gross rate of interest.  Then the individual’s 
budget constraint is: 
tttt btc −−= ω ,         (2.1) 
ttttt brtc +−= +++ 111 ω ,         (2.2)   
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where  
c = consumption, 
ω = endowment, 
t = tax, 
b = bonds, 
r = gross rate of interest. 
The individual’s consumption pattern when there is 0.1 unit of tax per capita is: 
( ) ( )11 ,1.0, ++ −= tttt cc ωω .        (2.3) 
The individual’s tax liability in future periods is: 
1.01 tttt rbrt ==+ .         (2.4) 
It can be seen that there is no change in the present value of the individual’s tax liability, 
or 0.1 in the current period and 0.1 rt in the future period whose present value is 0.1.   
The individual’s consumption pattern when there is 0.1 unit of bond per capita is: 
( ) ( )11 ,1.0, ++ −= tttt cc ωω ,         (2.5) 
which is equivalent to the consumption pattern when there is 1 unit of tax per capita.  
In equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is equal to the gross rate of 
interest: 
( ) ( ) 1
1
11 ,,
−
+
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⎞
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∂==
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ttt
t c
ccu
c
ccuMRSr .      (2.6) 
Since the consumption pattern in the current period equals the consumption pattern in 
future periods, the marginal rate of substitution will be the same and the rate of interest 
must be the same. Given the equality of the present value of taxes in current and future 
periods, the consumption decision under the issuance of government bonds in the current 
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period and a tax on the current generation in future period is equal to the consumption 
decision under tax on the current generation at current period. This is the Ricardian 
equivalence proposition.  
 The Aggregate Consumption Function 
Two of the most widely cited articles in the Ricardian equivalence empirical 
literature are studies conducted by Feldstein (1982) and Kormendi (1983). Feldstein 
examines whether the power of fiscal policies is offset by the way in which individuals 
react to the policies or to the resulting change in public debt. His analysis of the 
framework relates a consumer expenditure function to a set of explanatory variables: 
ttttttttt uDTRTGSSWWYC ++++++++= 76543210 ββββββββ ,  (2.7) 
where 
C = real per capita consumption expenditures, 
Y = real per capita current income, 
W = real per capita market value of privately owned wealth at the beginning of the  
        period, 
SSW = the real per capita value of future social security benefits, 
G = real per capita government spending, 
T = real per capita tax revenues, 
TR = real per capita government transfers to individuals, 
D = real per capita net debt of federal, state, and local government.  
The null hypothesis for Ricardian equivalence to hold is that ß4 < 0, ß5 = 0, ß6 = 0, ß3 = 0, 
and  ß2 = - ß7. 
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Kormendi (1983) argues that individuals are assumed to take into account their 
command over goods and services from all sources in deciding their consumption choice, 
constituting a consolidated approach that incorporates the public and private sectors: 
ttttt
tttttt
uGBGIntRETX
TRWGYYC
+++++
+++++= −
8765
432112110
ββββ
ββββββ
     (2.8) 
where 
C = real per capita consumption expenditures, 
Y = real per capita current income, 
W = real per capita market value of privately owned wealth at the beginning of the    
        period, 
G = real per capita government spending, 
TX = real per capita tax revenues, 
TR = real per capita government transfers to individuals, 
RE = real per capita retained earnings, 
GInt = government interest payments on outstanding debt, 
GB = real per capita market value of total outstanding government debt.  
The null hypothesis for debt neutrality hypothesis to hold is: ß2 < 0, ß4  =  ß5 =  ß6 = ß7 =  
ß8 = 0. 
This study will use the approach utilized by Kormendi and Feldstein to estimate 
the aggregate consumption function. The aggregate consumption function estimated in 
this study and the hypothesis will be specified in Section Five. 
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The Euler Equation Consumption Function 
The Euler equation consumption function has the advantage of being derived 
from the consumer’s utility maximization problem. Furthermore, from the Euler equation 
consumption function, some sources of deviations from Ricardian equivalence can be 
detected, such as the finite horizons and the prevalence of liquidity constraints. The Euler 
equation implies that current consumption depends only on previous consumption. In this 
case, consumption is said to follow a random walk. As stated by Hall’s (1978) influential 
paper, first lagged consumption contains all information that determines current 
consumption, such as lagged values of other variables. Current consumption will depend 
on the current values of other variables such as income only if those values contain new 
information that is unavailable in the previous period. 
Seater (1993) provides a nice derivation of the Euler equation to test Ricardian 
equivalence. Assuming that there is no capital market imperfection and that there is no 
government expenditure, the individual would like to maximize his or her utility function 
subject to his or her lifetime budget constraint: 
( ) ( ) i
i
tCutMaxU δ∑∞
=
+=
0
1         (2.9) 
subject to   
∑∑ ∞
=
+
∞
=
+ =
00 i
i
it
i
i
it RCRY ,         (2.10) 
where 
U = intertemporal utility function, 
u = intratemporal utility function, 
C = consumption, 
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Y = total income, 
R = discount factor = 1/(1+r), with r = the real rate of interest, which is assumed to be                     
       constant, 
δ = time preference factor = 1/(1+ρ), with ρ = the rate of time preference. 
Therefore, the Lagrangean is: 
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+= ∑ ∑∞
=
∞
=
++
0 0i i
i
it
i
it RCRYtUL λ ,       (2.11) 
where λ = Lagrange multiplier. 
The Euler equation that represents the first order condition for the above maximization 
problem is: 
( ) ( ) λδ iit RCu /=′ + .         (2.12) 
When all government expenditures are financed by tax revenues (which are assumed to 
be a lump sum), the individual’s budget constraint is: 
( ) ∑∑ ∞
=
+
∞
=
++ =−
00 i
i
it
i
i
itit RCRTY .        (2.13) 
With the above budget constraint, the Lagrangean becomes: 
( ) ( ) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−+= ∑ ∑∞
=
∞
=
+++
0 0i i
i
it
i
itit RCRTYtUL λ ,      (2.14) 
and the Euler equation is: 
( ) ( ) λδ iit RCu /=′ + ,         (2.15) 
which equals the Euler equation in the absence of government expenditures and 
taxation−see Equation (2.9). It implies that there is no change in an individual’s 
consumption pattern under the introduction of government outlays that are all financed by 
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lump sum taxation. Lump sum taxation only alters the consumption level. Consumption 
will decrease as a result of the income effect created by lump sum taxation.  
If the government cuts taxes in current period by B dollars per capita and issues 
government bonds by B dollars per capita to finance its outlays, then the following 
equation holds: 
∑ ∑∞
=
∞
=
++ −
0 0i i
i
it
i
it RGRT ,         (2.16) 
where G = government expenditures. 
The individual’s budget constraint becomes: 
( ) ∑∑ ∞
=
+
∞
=
++ =−
00 i
i
it
i
i
itit RCRGY .       (2.17) 
Holding government expenditures constant, the individual’s budget constraint is 
unaltered by the change in the way the government finances its purchases. Hence, the 
individual’s consumption decision is also unaltered by the scheme of government 
financing. Lump sum taxation and bonds issuance yield the same effect on the 
individual’s economic decision, and therefore yield an equivalent effect on the aggregate 
economy.    
The Euler equation consumption function to test the debt neutrality proposition is 
utilized by, for instance, Aschauer (1985), Gupta (1992), and Ghatak and Ghatak (1996). 
This study follows their approach. Utilizing a quadratic utility function and assuming that 
the representative consumer maximizes the present and future discounted value of 
consumption subject to the budget constraint, the following Euler equation is obtained: 
*
1
*
1 −− += ttt bCaCE ,         (2.18) 
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where 
*
tC = effective private consumption, 
E = expectations operator. 
Effective private consumption consists of actual private consumption and public 
spending. This approach is delivered by Bailey (1971). He argues that public spending 
increases individuals’ welfare. Public investment will also add to the private sector’s 
utility via the increase in future product. Therefore, the public sector is consolidated into 
the private sector.  The rationale of the consolidation of the public sector into the private 
sector’s decision can be found in Buiter (1977). The private sector may regard 
government spending on goods and services such as housing subsidies and food stamps 
as private income. Government expenditures with a competitive nature to private 
consumption, such as expenditures on education, law and order, and healthcare can 
substitute for private expenditures. Aschauer’s model incorporates the substitution (or 
complementarity) element. A unit of public spending is assumed to yield the same utility 
as θ units of private expenditures. Public spending affects private utility in the following 
manner: 
ttt GCC θ+=* ,         (2.19) 
where 
Ct = actual private consumption,  
Gt = government spending. 
Lagging Equation (2.19) and substituting it into Equation (2.18) yields: 
11
*
1 −−− ++= tttt GCCE βθβα .        (2.20) 
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Assuming that expectations are formed at time t-1 and taking expectations of Equation 
(2.20) yields ttttt GECCE 1
*
1 −− += θ , which implies: 
ttttt GECEC 1
*
1 −− −= θ .          (2.21)  
Taking into account that under the rational expectations hypothesis tttt uCEC += −1 , 
where u is a random error, and substituting Equation (2.20) into (2.21) yields: 
tttttt uGEGCC +−++= −−− 111 θβθβα .      (2.22) 
The expected value of government spending is assumed to be given by its lagged value 
and the lagged value of government deficit: 
( ) ( ) tttt DLGLGE ωεγ ++=−1 ,       (2.23) 
where ε and ω are suitable polynomials in L, and D is government deficit.  
Equation (2.23) can be written as: 
...... 221122111 ++++++= −−−−− tttttt DDGGGE ωωεεγ     (2.24) 
Under the rational expectations framework, actual government spending is also assumed 
to consist of expected government spending and a random error, therefore: 
tttttt vDDGGG +++++= −−−− 22112211 ωωεεγ .     (2.25) 
Substituting Equation (2.25) into (2.23) yields: 
( ) ( )
ttt
ttttt
uDD
GGGbbCaC
+−+−
−−−−++−=
−−
−−−−
...
...
2211
3322111
θωθω
εθεεθθγ
    (2.26) 
Setting the number of lags equal to 2, Equation (2.26) can be written as: 
ttttttt vDDGGCC +++−++= −−−−− 221122111 μμηηβδ ,    (2.27) 
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where  
θγαδ −= , 
( )11 εβθη −= , 
22 θεη −= , 
11 θωμ −= , 
22 θωμ −= . 
The underlying theoretical structure is represented by the above restrictions. The 
debt neutrality hypothesis is validated if the above restrictions hold.  The cross equations 
restrictions characterize the rational expectations approach and restrict the mechanism 
through which current private consumption expenditures are affected by the past values 
of public spending and budget deficits. If public debt is not neutral, past budget deficits 
will be able to explain the behavior of private consumption expenditures. As a result, if 
the empirical results violate the cross equations restrictions, the joint hypothesis of debt 
neutrality and rational expectations approach is not supported. 
 
Time Series Properties: Unit Roots, Cointegration, and Error Correction 
Mechanism 
 
This study uses time series data. The most common assumption with time series 
regressions is that that the series are stationary. Granger and Newbold (1974) argue that 
regressions involving the levels of non-stationary data may yield misleading standard 
significance tests. The result is that conventional linear regression, ignoring serial 
correlation, suggests a significant relationship even if the series are uncorrelated.  
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Spurious regression may emerge with the involvement of non-stationary series in the 
regressions. Spurious regression emerges if the two series in the regression show strong 
trends, such as sustained upward or downward movements, and yield a high value of R2 
that is the result of the presence of the trend, instead of the correlation between the two 
series. Therefore, it is essential to conduct a test for the stationarity of the data.                                          
A stochastic process is said to be covariance stationary if the mean is independent 
of time; the variance is a finite, positive constant, independent of time; and the covariance 
between two observations is a finite function of the distance between the two 
observations but not of the observations themselves. A test for the unit root will be 
utilized to test for the stationarity of the series, for instance, series Y (Evans and Savin 
1981; Greene 2000; Gujarati 1995): 
ttt uYY += −1ρ  ,         (2.28) 
where u = white noise error term, i.e. non-autocorrelated stochastic error term with zero  
mean and constant variance σ2.  The null hypothesis for the unit root is ρ = 1. If the null 
cannot be rejected, then Y is a random walk time series. Subtracting Yt-1 from Equation 
(2.28) yields: 
( ) ttttt uYuYY +=+−=Δ −− 111 δρ ,       (2.29) 
where 
( )1−= ρδ ,  
1−−=Δ ttt YYY . 
Now, the null is δ = 0. The null cannot be rejected if the absolute value t-statistic, which 
is called the Dickey-Fuller (DF) statistic, exceeds the DF or MacKinnon critical value. If 
the null cannot be rejected, then Equation (2.29) can be written as: 
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tttt uYYY =−=Δ −1 .         (2.30) 
Therefore, the first difference of a non-stationary time series is stationary because ut is 
assumed to be random. If the first difference of a random walk series is stationary, then 
the series is said to be integrated of order one, or I(1). If the series needs to be differenced 
d times to achieve stationarity, then it is said to be integrated of order d, or, I(d).  Other 
forms of the DF test are the following: 
ttt uYY ++=Δ −11 δβ ,         (2.31) 
ttt uYtY +++=Δ −121 δββ ,        (2.32) 
where t is the time trend. The null of unit root is δ = 0. In the case of autocorrelated error 
term, the above equations can be generalized into the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test: 
t
m
i
ititt YYtY εαδββ ∑
=
−− +Δ+++=Δ
1
121 .      (2.33) 
The null of the unit root remains unchanged, i.e.  δ = 0 or ρ = 1.  
If two series (for instance, Y and X), which are integrated of order one, form a 
stationary linear combination, then Y and X are said to be cointegrated. Suppose Y is 
regressed on X: 
ttt uXY ++= 21 ββ .         (2.34) 
If ut, the linear combination of Yt  and  Xt, is I(0), then Y and X are on the same 
wavelength or cointegrated. Two series that possess the same order of integration will be 
cointegrated. Generally, if Y is I(d) and so is X, then Y and X can be cointegrated. 
Regression involving cointegrated variables will yield meaningful, non-spurious results 
and provide long-run information. In other words, if Y and X are cointegrated, then it can 
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be said that there is a long run equilibrium relationship between them (Engle and Granger 
1987; Gujarati 1995). 
Disequilibrium may exist in the short run. The residuals, ut, in the above equation 
can be thought of as the equilibrium error and can be utilized to tie the short run behavior 
of Y to its long run equilibrium.  The mechanism of adjustment from short run 
disequilibrium to a long run solution exists because individuals are assumed to be able to 
recognize deviations between their current position and the desired long run position. The 
motivation to adjust from short run disequilibrium to the long run equilibrium value is 
transmitted to a dynamic reaction function (Salmon 1982). This mechanism is known as 
the error correction model (ECM), popularized by Engle and Granger (1987). Therefore, 
ECM is a dynamic vehicle to bridge the short run disequilibrium with its long run 
equilibrium solution and also to connect the econometric method and time series 
procedure. 
Davidson, Hendry, Srba, and Yeo (1978) were among the earliest researchers who 
utilized a simple dynamic model that can be categorized as an embryo of ECM in its 
early form when they estimate the relationship between consumers’ expenditures and 
income in the U.K. The following illustrates the ECM of Y and X: 
tttt uXY εββ +Δ+Δ+=Δ −121 ,       (2.35) 
where  
∆ut-1 = the lagged value of the first difference of ut from Equation (2.34), 
εt = the white noise error term. 
The estimation of Equations (2.34) and (2.35) is called the two steps Engle-Granger 
ECM.  
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Historical Data on Private Consumption Expenditures and Fiscal Variables 
 
 This section presents the historical data from Indonesia on private consumption 
expenditures (1969-2003), government expenditures (1969-2003), government debt 
(1972-2003), tax revenues (1972-2003), private credit (1981-2003), and the 
decomposition of fiscal variables such as routine and development government 
expenditures (1969-2003), oil and gas revenues, non-tax revenues (1969-2003), and 
components of tax revenues (1969-2003).  Due to the differing initial starting years of 
data availability, the figures depicting the historical data cover different periods.  
During the New Order regime (Soeharto’s administration), the Government of 
Indonesia adopted a “balanced budget rule,” in the sense that total government 
expenditures were covered by total government revenues that included foreign debt. The 
government put the foreign debt under “development revenues” in the budget. The 
difference between government tax plus non-tax revenues and government expenditures 
was financed by foreign debt. Therefore, in an economic sense, the government actually 
ran budget deficits. The rationale behind the “balanced budget rule” was political. The 
New Order administration did not want to encounter the Old Order regime’s experience 
(Soekarno’s administration) of excessive budget deficits that were financed by printing 
money, resulting in hyperinflation in the late 1960s. Instead, government expenditures 
were to be determined by government revenues. Due to the inflexible nature of the 
balanced budget rule, the New Order administration was able to record a success in 
macroeconomic stability. When inflation increased as a result of a booming period, such 
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as an oil bonanza, the fiscal response was stiff, ensuring excessive inflation did not occur 
(Hill 2000). 
Figure 1 shows the trend of government expenditures and private consumption 
expenditures as percentages of GDP. Private consumption expenditures have constituted 
a large portion of GDP. Averaging at approximately 64 percent of GDP during the period 
1969-2003, private consumption expenditures have driven GDP growth. In the early 
period of the New Order regime, private consumption reached almost 90 percent of GDP, 
and its proportion declined gradually prior to the first oil boom. During 1974-1975, the 
share of private consumption to GDP slightly increased before it declined again from 
1975 to 1981. Then, its share ranged from around 52 to 62 percent of GDP from 1981 to 
1997 when the crisis occurred. During 1998-1999, the share of private consumption was 
around 67-73 percent of GDP, but then it declined again to around 61 percent of GDP 
during 2000-2001. During economic crisis when the rate of inflation soared, private 
consumption expenditures remained strong. Consumers seemed to hedge consumption 
goods against inflation. Meanwhile, the population in the low income brackets may have 
spent their whole income or drained their savings in order to maintain the consumption 
level prior to the crisis.  When investment decreased in 2002-2003, private consumption 
expenditures went up to around 66-67 percent of GDP, contributing to the greater part of 
GDP growth. During the economic recovery after the 1997-1999 crisis, private 
consumption expenditures remained the key engine of GDP growth. The recent growth of 
private consumption expenditures was mainly attributable to the growth in consumer 
goods such as motor vehicles due to the increasing availability of consumer credit.  
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Figure 1. Government and Private Consumption Expenditures (% of GDP) 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, CDs July 2004 and July 2005. 
 
The proportion of government expenditures to GDP averaged approximately 19 
percent of GDP during 1969-2003. However, this figure of government expenditures’ 
share of GDP understated the role of government in Indonesian economy, since many 
government activities were recorded off-budget, especially during the oil boom period. 
For instance, the funds allocated for defense expenditures, the state oil company 
Pertamina, and other huge projects were not recorded on-budget.  Moreover, the 
substantial state companies sector has also been run by the government (Hill 2000). 
Compared to the trend of private consumption expenditures, the trend of government 
expenditures has been relatively less fluctuating. Government expenditures showed an 
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increasing trend from 1969-1981. The growth of government expenditures reached its 
highest point in 1975, the peak of the oil boom. During the oil bonanza, the government 
increased its outlays, for instance, by expanding the grants to local governments, 
especially in primary education and public health sectors, to be spent on construction of 
rural schools and health centers. The government also allocated the windfall oil revenues 
in import-intensive infrastructure projects in the telecommunication sector. The oil 
bonanza increased the role of government in the economy, which can be seen by the 
share of government expenditures that reached almost 25 percent of GDP. The increase in 
oil revenues also increased the percentage of the development budget that was financed 
by public savings rather than by foreign debt (Booth 1998). Government expenditures 
declined in 1984 due to fiscal severity caused by the increase in debt service payments. 
Government expenditures as a percentage of GDP showed a slightly declining trend 
during 1987-1996, except during 1991-1992. During the economic crisis of 1997-1999, 
this percentage showed an increasing trend. To overcome the severe consequences of 
economic crisis to low income society, the government allocated about 9 percent of its 
expenditures to provide a social safety net. In addition, the government also subsidized 
rice imports and allocated funds for restructuring domestic commercial banks, which may 
explain the increasing trend of government expenditures during the 1997-1999 economic 
crisis.       
On average, during 1970-2003, real GDP grew at around 6.0 percent per annum, 
while the figures for real private consumption expenditures and real government 
expenditures are 5.2 percent and 7.7 percent, respectively. The Indonesian economy grew 
rapidly during 1970-1981. Real government expenditures grew remarkably in the 1970s, 
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with the exception in 1977, due to the oil revenues and the flow of foreign aid. Until 
1981, real government expenditures grew faster than real GDP. In the period 1982-1985 
when the oil price declined, the growth in real government expenditures was sluggish, 
and in 1984 it even experienced a negative growth for the first time during the New Order 
administration. During those years, the government faced the most challenging fiscal 
problems since 1966. Oil prices started to decline while debt service payments began to 
rise. In 1985, government expenditures as a percentage of GDP increased modestly again, 
before further declining in 1986. In that year, in the words of Hill (2000), the government 
faced a “scissor problem”: declining oil prices on one side and increasing debt service 
obligations on the other side. Consequently, there were outflows of resources in the 
balance of payments (Hill 2000). Fiscal strictness was implemented by cutting 
development expenditures and freezing the increase in civil employees for a few years. 
The government also reduced subsidies, such as the rice subsidy. The growth rate of 
government expenditures recovered in the latter half of the 1980s alongside the economic 
recovery from the decline in oil prices, due to the success of the government in shifting to 
the non-oil sector. One of the key factors in making the non-oil export goods 
internationally competitive was the ability to control domestic inflation, which sustained 
a large fall in the real effective exchange rate. Indeed, when the oil price declined, the 
government diversified its revenue sources by conducting a comprehensive tax reform 
and increasing foreign borrowing without increasing inflationary borrowing from the 
banking sector (Booth 1998).  
Figure 2 depicts the proportion of debt and tax revenues to GDP. The figure 
indicates that debt has been a dominant part of the Indonesian economy, while the role of 
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taxation has been much smaller. Only during 1980-1982 did the proportion of taxes to 
GDP outweigh the one of debt. In 1987, the proportion of debt to GDP reached more than 
50 percent. During the economic crisis, due to the collapse of the exchange rate, debt 
skyrocketed to more than 70 percent of GDP before gradually declining to approximately 
29 percent of GDP in 2003.   
 
Figure 2. Debt and Tax Revenues (% of GDP) 
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             International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics, CD July 2004. 
 
The government has not been able to reduce the country’s dependency on foreign 
debt. Although during the oil bonanza the importance of debt declined, the government 
did not use the momentum to pay off the debt. When the price of oil declined in the mid 
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1980s, debt service payments increased significantly. During 1986-1988, the share of 
debt to GDP ranged from 48 to 54 percent of GDP. The ratio of debt service payments to 
export earnings was more than 30 percent. The balance of payment was deteriorating. 
During the latter half of the 1980s, the government deregulated the trade sector to 
accelerate non-oil exports. During those years, the budget was also squeezed. The budget 
austerity and the liberalization packages led to the decline in the debt trend starting in 
1988. The trend shows a continuing decline (except from 1991 to 1992) until 1996 prior 
to the economic crisis. The devaluation in 1986 also contributed to the increase in export 
competitiveness. This measure together with deregulation measures in the financial, 
trade, and industrial sectors brought confidence to the private sector; hence, capital flight 
was avoided. The story on foreign debt can be concluded by stating that the fiscal 
objective to reduce the fiscal dependency on debt has yet to be achieved, despite the 
success story of the adjustment policies implemented in the late 1980s.  
Figure 3 shows the trend of private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions as percentage of GDP (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 2000). 
The figure indicates an increasing trend from 1981 until the economic crisis in 1997. 
Private credit declined dramatically from about 54 percent of GDP in 1997 to only about 
17 percent of GDP in 2001, before gradually increasing again during 2001-2004 to about 
21 percent of GDP. Private credit can be used to represent the variable that measures a 
liquidity constraint, which is one of several potential causes of deviations from Ricardian 
equivalence. From 1981 to 2004, it averaged approximately 29 percent of GDP.   
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Figure 3. Private Credit (% of GDP) 
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Source: Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, (2000), "A New Database on Financial  
             Development and  Structure," World Bank Economic Review, 14, 597-605. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the decomposition of government expenditures into its routine 
and development components. Routine expenditures consist of wage and salary 
payments, debt service payment, and subsidies such as food subsidy, oil subsidy, and 
regional subsidy. Development expenditures consist of sectoral/departmental 
expenditures such as industry, mining, defense, education, labor and transmigration, 
regional development expenditures, and state enterprise investments (Hill 2000). On 
average, routine expenditures comprised about 63 percent of total expenditures, while the 
remaining 37 percent has been allocated to development expenditures during 1969/1970-
2002. From the early period of the New Order up to the oil boom period, routine 
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expenditures dominated government expenditures. During the oil boom, development 
expenditures dominated total government expenditures. The government conducted a 
tight fiscal policy in the mid 1980s due to an increase in the government’s obligation to 
debt payment. During these years of fiscal austerity, non-debt routine government outlays 
on personnel such as wages and salaries and on recurrent items such as office supplies 
were squeezed, and so were non-debt development expenditures such as capital 
expenditures and grants to local governments (Presidential Instruction funds). Debt 
payments increased dramatically from less than 10 percent of total expenditures in the 
early 1980s to more than 30 percent in the late 1980s, leading to the increasing proportion 
of routine expenditures. The frozen salaries of civil employees and the military during the 
years of fiscal austerity led to the decline in their absolute and relative incomes in 
comparison to the other sectors in the economy, resulting in the increasing trend of 
moonlighting and a decline in the efficiency of services (Booth 1992). In addition, 
development expenditures were also cut, resulting in the decline of civil employees’ 
additional salaries from  potential projects (Hill 2000). From 1986/1987, routine 
expenditures showed an increasing trend while development expenditures exhibited a 
decreasing trend, with the exception of the years 1991/1992-1992/1993, 1997/1998-
1998/1999, and 2000-2001 when the opposite patterns held.  
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Figure 4. Routine and Development Expenditures (% of Total Expenditures) 
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Source: Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia, Financial Notes, various issues. 
 
Figure 5 shows the trend of government revenues from the oil and gas sector, tax 
collections, and non-tax revenues as percentages of total domestic revenues. From 1974 
to 1986, revenues from the oil and gas sector dominated the total domestic revenues, 
ranging from 53 to 70 percent of total domestic revenues. The government’s coffer is 
mainly dependent upon a single “taxpayer”: the oil industry. In the height of the oil 
boom, Pertamina, the state oil enterprise, experienced a crisis. Pertamina’s 
mismanagement, marked by a withdrawal of short-term offshore borrowings to be 
invested off-budget in non-oil related mega projects, resulted in a financial crisis that had 
to be resolved by the government. Real GDP would have grown at a rate of 8-9 percent, 
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instead of 4.9 percent in 1975, if the Pertamina affair had not occurred. Oil and gas 
revenues peaked in 1981, reaching 71 percent of domestic revenues. The government 
sterilized the oil money by building reserves, adjusting trade policies, and investing in 
social and economic infrastructure. In some instances, the government also spent the oil 
money for rice, fertilizer, and fuel subsidies. However, the government did not 
appropriate the windfall oil revenues to pay off foreign debt due to the fear that by doing 
so the government would give an incorrect sign to donors that Indonesia’s need for 
foreign aid had diminished (Prawiro 1998). 
 
Figure 5. Oil and Gas Revenues, Tax Revenues and Non-Tax Revenues  
(% of  Total Domestic Revenues) 
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Source: Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia, Financial Notes, various issues. 
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The decline in oil prices in the mid 1980s decreased the role of oil and gas. In 
1983, revenues from oil started to decline. Aware of the declining oil revenues, the 
government started to shift its focus to other channels of revenue. The parliament 
approved tax reform laws in 1983 to be implemented in 1984. The objective of the tax 
reform was to increase tax collections from the non-oil sector, to increase the efficiency 
of the administrative system, to reduce distortions in resource allocation, and to ensure 
that the poor would not be made worse-off by the tax reform (Booth 1992). The financial 
sector was also deregulated in 1983. Fiscal reform and financial deregulation, 
accompanied by a more export-oriented trade regime, were conducted to increase the 
country’s competitiveness in non-oil export goods and services (Booth 1998). The main 
instrument to increase non-oil tax revenues was the value added tax (VAT). It was 
expected that income tax, property tax, and an improved administrative system would 
significantly improve the share of non-oil tax revenues to GDP in the medium term. In 
the new tax laws, the statutory base and the taxable objects and subjects were extensively 
and clearly defined. The income tax base was defined broadly and income tax-based 
fiscal incentives were eliminated to reduce the tax-induced distortions in resource 
allocation. The new law reduced the nominal tax rate, especially at the upper end of the 
income brackets and established a common rate structure for individual and corporate 
income taxes. Uniform tax rates were introduced across sectors, activities, and 
commodities to reduce distortions. In order not to hurt low income groups with the 
implementation of tax reform, the low nominal rates were maintained, and high income 
groups were not exempted. Exemption levels were applied especially for income tax and 
property tax in order to keep the low income people out of the tax net (Booth 1992). Tax 
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reform in 1984 seemed to significantly improve tax collections. From 1984 to 1997, tax 
revenues showed an increasing trend, ranging from approximately 30 to 66 percent of 
domestic revenues. Prior to 2000, the share of non-tax revenues in domestic revenues was 
relatively constant. Non-tax revenues came from profits of the state enterprises sector and 
non-departmental government institutions. On average, non-tax revenues contributed 
about 9.6 percent of domestic revenues from 1969/1970-2002.   
Figure 6 presents tax collection classification as percentages of total taxes. During 
1969/1970-2002, the averages of income tax, value added tax, property tax, trade tax, 
duties, and other taxes amounted to approximately 39 percent, 27 percent, 3 percent, 19 
percent, 11 percent, and 2 percent of total taxes.  Prior to the oil boom period, trade taxes 
constituted the largest tax collection, reaching more than 50 percent of total tax revenues 
in 1971. The figure shows that trade taxes experienced a decreasing trend over the period 
of observation, and amounted to only about 5 percent of total taxes in the 2000s. Starting 
from the first oil boom (1974) to mid 1985, the income tax dominated, achieving between 
30 to more than 40 percent of total taxes. During the 1970s government tax collections 
relied on a corporate tax on the oil and gas sector.  Value added tax (VAT) reached the 
highest proportion during 1984/1985 to 1989/1990. VAT collections became significant 
after the implementation of the 1984 tax reform, increasing from 16 percent of total tax 
collections in 1980/1981 to almost 39 percent in 1987/1988. Indeed, the simple value 
added tax coupled with the uniform tax rate formed the foundation of tax reform in 1984. 
It replaced the previous complicated sales tax, which applied many different tax rates as 
well as many exemptions. This significant increase occurred because the VAT was 
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extended to wholesalers as well as a large number of services, and the rates were 
increased for the luxury sales tax.  
 
Figure 6. Tax Revenues (% of Total Taxes) 
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Source: Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia, Financial Notes, various issues. 
 
However, since 1990/1991 income tax has again dominated tax collections.  The 
government introduced a tax on the interest of time and savings deposits at the end of 
1988, contributing to about 10 percent of income tax. The increase in income taxes in the 
1990s perhaps was due to the improved technical capability of the tax administration, 
which was achieved by investing in training and hardware and by implementing some 
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technical changes such as the classification of a proportion of the royalties from oil or 
dividends from state enterprises as income tax revenue (Booth 1992) . 
 
Analysis 
Data and the Stationarity Property 
The data for the purpose of estimation capture the period 1972-2003. The data on 
household consumption expenditures, government expenditures, government budget 
deficit (surplus), government debt, gross domestic product, GDP deflator, and population 
are taken from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, CDs July 
2004, July 2005, and June 2006. The data on private credit by deposit money banks are 
taken from World Bank Economic Review 14, 597-605, “A New Database on Financial 
Development and Structure” (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 2000). The nominal 
variables are deflated into the real ones by the GDP deflator (2000 constant price). 
Private credit data are only available during 1981-2003. 
 The private consumption variable should exclude purchases on durables and 
should include imputed services on the stock of consumer durables. Due to the 
unavailability of data on durables and its imputed services, household consumption 
expenditure is used as the proxy for consumption. The income variable should include 
only the labor income after taxes. Since data on labor income is also not available in 
Indonesia, gross domestic product (GDP) is used as the proxy for income. Table 1 
presents the descriptive statistics of the data. 
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Table 1. The Descriptive Statistics of the Data 
 Real 
Consumption 
Per Capita 
(Billions Rp 
Per 1 Million 
Population) 
Real 
GDP 
Per Capita 
(Billions Rp 
Per 1 Million 
Population) 
Real 
Govt. Exp. 
Per Capita 
(Billions Rp 
Per 1 Million 
Population) 
Real 
Tax Revenues 
Per Capita 
(Billions Rp 
Per 1 Million 
Population) 
Real 
Net Debt 
Per Capita 
(Billions Rp 
Per 1 Million 
Population) 
 
Real 
Budget 
Deficit 
Per Capita 
(Billions Rp 
Per 1 Million 
Population) 
Real 
Private 
Credit 
Per Capita 
(Billions Rp 
Per 1 Million 
Population) 
 Mean  45.31403  72.56836  13.66159  11.36155  0.594568 -0.406116  14.45494 
 Median  36.42383  62.62926  11.81093  10.61219  0.529731 -0.530314  12.17392 
 Maximum  106.8504  160.1401  29.67932  24.08270  3.847831  1.459011  33.07219 
 Minimum  21.83054  29.29051  4.607928  3.645269 -0.751201 -1.829306  2.485267 
 Std. Dev.  21.81325  31.59504  5.647301  4.471706  0.777190  0.662734  9.362737 
 Skewness  1.504276  1.238670  1.237422  1.073189  2.031693  0.690736  0.486588 
 Kurtosis  4.382043  3.897695  4.174788  4.170658  10.98893  3.802882  2.122345 
        
 Jarque-Bera  14.61524  9.257426  10.00664  7.969835  107.1121  3.404109  1.645794 
 Probability  0.000670  0.009767  0.006716  0.018594  0.000000  0.182309  0.439158 
        
 Sum  1450.049  2322.187  437.1707  363.5695  19.02616 -12.99572  332.4636 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  14750.35  30945.63  988.6523  619.8808  18.72474  13.61569  1928.539 
        
 Observations  32  32  32  32  32  32  23 
 Period of Obs. 1972-2003 1972-2003 1972-2003 1972-2003 1972-2003 1972-2003 1981-2003 
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 A test for the unit root is conducted to test the stationarity of the series. Table 2 
presents the results of the unit root test. All series are integrated of order one. The results 
confirm that empirical studies using macroeconomic variables usually involve non-
stationary and trending variables. If the series are I(1), then the partial difference between 
them might be stable around a fixed mean. It implies that the series are drifting together 
at about the same rate. If the series are experiencing this phenomenon, then they are said 
to be cointegrated. In this case, a long-run relationship between the series is established. 
The manner in which the variables drift upward together and the short run dynamics, or 
the relationship between deviations of the variables from their long run trend, can be 
distinguished. If this is the case, then differencing the variables would be 
counterproductive. 
 
Table 2. Unit Root Test Estimates 
 
Variables ADF statistic  
for Level 
ADF statistic  
for First Difference 
Order of Integrity 
Private Consumption Expenditures -2.9992 -3.7272 I(1)** 
 (0.1506) (0.0358 )  
Gross Domestic Product -0.9461 -5.6728 I(1)*** 
 (0.9359) (0.0004)  
Government Expenditures -1.5983 -4.7516 I(1)*** 
 (0.7679) (0.0037)  
Tax Revenues -1.9364 -3.6562 I(1)** 
 (0.6091) (0.0416)  
Government Debt -2.0439 -4.0178 I(1)** 
 (0.5479) ( 0.0245)  
Private Credit -2.7435 -3.9508 I(1)** 
 (0.0231) (0.0111)  
Government Budget Deficit -3.1864 -4.1557 I(1)* 
 (0.1074) (0.0150)  
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are probability values. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Aggregate Consumption Function 
Based on the existing literature on the aggregate consumption function test of 
Ricardian equivalence, this study estimates the following empirical model: 
tttttt uBTXGYC +++++= 43210 βββββ ,     (2.36)  
where 
C = real per capita private consumption expenditures, 
Y = real per capita gross domestic product, 
G = real per capita government expenditures, 
TX = real per capita tax revenues, 
B = real per capita net government debt. 
In addition, due to the nature of developing countries, it is expected that 
consumers are liquidity constrained in making their consumption choices in Indonesia. 
To proxy for the presence of liquidity constraints, this study incorporates private credit. 
Hence, the following aggregate consumption function is also estimated: 
ttttttt uCRBTXGYC ++++++= 543210 ββββββ  ,    (2.37) 
where CR = real private credit per capita.   
Economic crisis is expected to affect private consumption behavior in Indonesia. 
To capture that, a dummy variable that takes the value of unity during 1997-1999 and the 
value of zero otherwise is included in the estimated equation.  A dummy variable for the 
1984 tax reform, which equals one after 1984 and equals zero otherwise, is also added in 
the regression.   
In the consolidated approach, the private sector takes the consequences of 
government fiscal policies into consideration. The perception of the private sector is 
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regarded as rational in the sense that it does not differ systematically from the 
implications of the public mode of financing. If the private sector fully considers the 
future taxation implied by debt financing, the current value of future taxes is equivalent 
to the current taxes substituted by debt financing. As a result, the public mode of 
financing between taxation and debt is irrelevant to the private sector consumption 
decision. In addition, the effect of fiscal policy on aggregate consumption is determined 
by consumers’ view on government expenditures.  
Hypothesis 
Null hypothesis: 
Under Ricardian equivalence, the following holds:  ß2 < 0, ß3  = ß4  = 0. 
Alternative hypothesis:  
ß2 ≥ 0, ß3  ≠ ß4  ≠ 0. 
Estimates 
Table 3 presents the estimates of the aggregate consumption function. The 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test suggests that there is no serial correlation. Before further 
analyzing these results, a cointegration test is performed, and the results are presented in 
Table 4. The cointegration test is conducted by testing the stationarity property of the 
residuals of the estimated aggregate consumption function.  
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Table 3. The Cointegrating Regressions Estimates: Long-run Information 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Private Consumption 
(1) 
1972-2003 
(2) 
1981-2003 
Constant -1.3745 -7.6559 
Standard error (2.2404) (2.6546) 
t-statistic [-0.6135] [-2.8840] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.5447} {0.0103} 
   
Gross Domestic Product 0.5693*** 0.5264*** 
Standard error (0.0720) (0.0922) 
t-statistic [7.9070] [5.7086] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0000} {0.0000} 
   
Government Expenditures 1.2352**** 1.5163**** 
Standard error (0.5048) (0.6230) 
t-statistic [2.4467] [2.4339] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0212} {0.0263} 
   
Tax Revenues -0.8625 -0.6393 
Standard error (0.5224) (0.6025) 
t-statistic [-1.6508 [-1.0610] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.1104} {0.3035} 
   
Government Debt -2.8554** -2.2164* 
Standard error (1.1132) (1.0769) 
t-statistic [-2.5651] [-2.0581] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0162} {0.0552} 
   
Private Credit  0.0901 
Standard error  (0.1293) 
t-statistic  [0.6972] 
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.4951} 
   
R-squared 0.9727 0.9823 
F-statistic 240.3271*** 188.8010*** 
Prob (F-statistic) {0.0000} {0.0000}T 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.2703 1.8895 
LM Test 1.8311 0.5601 
Prob. (LM Test) {0.1811} {0.5826} 
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 4. Cointegration Test Estimates 
 
Residuals ADF statistic for Level Order of 
Integrity 
E1 -3.8493 I(0)** 
 (0.027)  
   
E2 -3.6700 I(0)** 
 (0.0477)  
 
Note: 1). Numbers in parentheses are probability values. 
          2). E1 and E2 are residuals terms from the regressions 
               in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, respectively. 
          3). ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent,  
               5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
As shown in Table 4, the residuals are integrated of order zero (or are stationary), 
although, as previously mentioned, each individual variable is integrated of order one and 
the linear combination among them is stationary, indicating the presence of cointegration. 
This finding implies the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship among the 
variables. In this case, OLS estimation is consistent, and there is no problem of spurious 
regression. In a cointegrated system, the t and F statistics are valid, and differencing 
variables will be counterproductive. Moreover, a test of a proposition requires estimation 
as a long run relationship among the variables in their level form.  
Kormendi (1983) argued that if consumers view government budget allocated for 
consumption goods as a substitute for current privately provided consumption goods, the 
decline in private consumption will be greater than if consumers view government budget 
allocated for investment goods as a substitute for future privately provided consumption 
goods. It is important to address the degree of substitutability or complementarity 
between public and private spending, since an evaluation of the effects of fiscal policies 
requires an understanding of the substitutability or complementarity between public and 
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private expenditures (Evans and Karras 1996). Crowding out is said to occur when public 
spending displaces private spending (Buiter 1977).  The coefficient on government 
expenditures indicates the magnitude of the crowding out effect of private consumption 
expenditures by public spending, even if the Ricardian equivalence were to hold. If an 
increase in public spending decreases the marginal utility of private consumption, then 
public spending is a substitute for private spending in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense. This 
substitutability implies that an expansionary fiscal policy will be offset by a decline in 
aggregate consumption. On the contrary, if they are complements, an expansionary fiscal 
policy will be effective, since an increase in government expenditures will be followed by 
an increase in private consumption. Moreover, the substitutability or complementarity 
between private and public spending implies excess sensitivity of the former to the latter.  
In the aggregate consumption function of Equations (2.36) and (2.37), public 
spending is empirically a substitute for private consumption if its parameter is less than 
zero, and it is a complement if this parameter is greater than zero. 
As shown in Table 3, the coefficient on government expenditures is significantly 
positive, invalidating Ricardian equivalence. An increase of Rp 1 Billion of government 
expenditures will increase private consumption by Rp 1.24 Billion in the regression with 
private credit excluded and by Rp 1.52 Billions in the case where private credit is 
included in the model. The magnitude and the positive association between government 
expenditures and private consumption suggest the strong complementarity between them. 
This finding can be explained by the fact that during the observation period, the 
government had subsidized basic private goods such as electricity, fuel, fertilizer, and 
education, which complemented private consumption bundles. In the early period of 
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economic development in the late 1960s and early 1970s, about thirty percent of the 
government budget was allocated for agriculture and irrigation and twenty percent was 
allocated to road rehabilitation to facilitate farmers’ access to agricultural input and 
output marketing.  During the oil bonanza, approximately ten percent of the budget was 
allocated for the Presidential Instruction grants for local governments at county 
(kabupaten) and village levels, grants that were earmarked for infrastructure, education, 
and health. In the 1980s, about 40 percent of the budget was allocated to energy, 
transportation, and education. In the 1990s, routine expenditures dominated the total 
budget (Booth 1998). Although there has been a changing pattern of government budget 
allocation, the type of publicly-provided goods is a complement to private consumption.    
The knowledge of whether or not liquidity constraints exist is crucial to the 
evaluation of the effects of fiscal policies. It is also important to the assessment of the 
extent to which Ricardian equivalence holds (Evans and Karras 1996). The presence of 
liquidity constraints may cause consumption to have an excess sensitivity to income. 
Baxter and Jermann (1999) provide some explanations of the excess sensitivity of private 
consumption to income via household production.  Here, consumers are seen to respond 
to changes in wages and prices by substituting hours work and consumption across home 
and market sectors. An increase in the wage rate, which represents an increase in the 
opportunity cost in household production, will be accompanied by an increase in market 
work and private consumption and a decline in household production. The substitution of 
market purchase for household production can largely be found in, for instance, home 
maintenance, housecleaning, food preparation, and clothing.  This substitution is applied 
also to rational, permanent-income consumers.  
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The estimates show that GDP is exceedingly significant in affecting private 
consumption expenditures, signaling the presence of excess sensitivity of private 
consumption to changes in GDP. An increase of GDP per capita by Rp 1 Billion will 
increase consumption expenditures by approximately Rp 0.57 Billion. This magnitude 
does not change much when the variable of private credit is included in the estimation 
(see column 2 of Table 3).  
The results in Table 3 also show that net government debt significantly affects 
private consumption expenditure. Government debt does matter to private consumption, 
invalidating Ricardian equivalence. In response to the problem of liquidity constraints, 
Attanasio (1995) suggests that the presence of liquidity constraints may provide a role for 
fiscal policies in reallocating future resources to the current period. Public debt may 
constitute a way of transferring resources from the future to the current period. This 
reallocation of resources is not possible for liquidity-constrained individuals. The ratio of 
public debt to GDP in Indonesia averaged about 35 percent during the period of 
observation. High public debt may also be the culprit of the excess sensitivity of private 
consumption to income. Pozzi, Heylen, and Dossche (2003) suggest that the public debt 
ratio may affect the prevalence of liquidity constraints. A higher public debt induces 
private debtors to set the credit conditions stricter. This will, in turn, lead to an increase in 
liquidity constraints.  
The coefficient on tax revenue is less than zero, although insignificant. In 
Indonesia, the most challenging problem of the tax system implementation after the 1984 
tax reform has been the overabundance of exemptions and loopholes. There have been 
instances of collusion and evasion, although the number of offenses has been reduced 
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compared to pre-1984 tax reform. During the period of observation, the share of tax 
collections to GDP was only about 15 percent. Although there has been a substantial 
increase in the number of corporate and individual taxpayers, compliance is still low. 
There is still a large portion of the population who do not pay taxes or who pay far below 
what they have to pay (Prawiro 1998). Therefore, there is a critical need to improve the 
tax system.     
Private credit is insignificant in affecting private consumption, although the sign 
is positive, as expected. The insignificant nature of private credit perhaps can be 
rationalized by stating that most loans are made for investment rather than for 
consumption. The financial and capital market liberalization packages in 1983 and 1988 
have broadened the Indonesian financial system. The expansion of the banking 
infrastructure has provided financial services that have reached portions of the population 
that were previously excluded from the banking sector, including those in remote village 
areas. Villages throughout the archipelago became engaged in formal banking, since 
individuals were encouraged to open bank accounts. Competition among commercial 
banks has been intense. To attract new customers, commercial banks compete to provide 
lotteries, gifts, or more attractive rates and fees. A lower reserve requirement enabled 
commercial banks to be in surplus of loanable funds (Prawiro 1998). Therefore, lending 
has increased. Due to low salaries in the formal sector, employees have been engaged in 
moonlighting activities, mostly in the form of self-employment such as opening retail 
stores. This phenomenon may help to explain why the variable of private credit, although 
it has the correct sign and constitutes about 29 percent of GDP, fails to explain 
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consumption behavior. It seems that private credit is utilized more for investment than for 
consumption.   
Table 5 presents the error-correction estimates. The data behave in an error 
correction manner as derived by Engle and Granger (1987). The estimated equilibrium 
error shows significantly negative signs, indicating the existence of an error correction 
mechanism that implies that fluctuations around equilibrium will vanish in the long run. 
Any deviation from the long-run equilibrium affects the short-run dynamics.  
 The error correction estimates do not differ much from the cointegrating 
regression estimates. As is in the cointegrating regression estimates, gross domestic 
product remarkably significantly affects private consumption. It appears that consumers 
follow a “rule of thumb” of consuming their current income (Campbell et al. 1989). 
Similar to the cointegrating regression results, private credit and tax revenues do not 
significantly affect private consumption expenditures. During the economic crisis in 
1997-1999, private consumption was higher. Meanwhile, the dummy variable on tax 
reform does not seem to influence private consumption. To examine whether there is 
serial correlation, the LM test is used. The null hypothesis is that there is no serial 
correlation. The LM test results show that the null cannot be rejected.  
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Table 5. The Error Correction Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Private Consumption 
(1’) 
1972-2003 
(2’) 
1981-2003 
Constant 0.5280 0.6011 
Standard error (0.9619) (0.7035) 
t-statistic [0.5490] [0.8545] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.5883} {0.4063} 
   
D(Gross Domestic Product) 0.4503*** 0.4337*** 
Standard error (0.0712) (0.0741) 
t-statistic [6.3285] [5.8541] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0000} {0.0000} 
   
D(Government Expenditures) 0.5813 1.2002* 
Standard error (0.6097) (0.5700) 
t-statistic [0.9534] [2.1056] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.3503} {0.0525} 
   
D(Tax Revenues) 0.3036 0.1647 
Standard error (0.6888) (0.7610) 
t-statistic [0.4408] [0.2164] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.6635} {0.8316} 
   
D(Government Debt) -1.6624** -2.0503** 
Standard error (0.7846) (0.7950) 
t-statistic [-2.1189] [-2.5791] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0451} {0.0210} 
   
D(Private Credit)  -0.2015 
Standard error  (0.2097) 
t-statistic  [-0.9610] 
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.3518} 
   
E1(-1) -0.6224***  
Standard error (0.1914)  
t-statistic [-3.2523]  
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0035}  
   
E2(-1)  -1.0556*** 
Standard error  (0.2471) 
t-statistic  [-4.2714] 
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0007} 
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Table 5. Continued 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Private Consumption 
(1’) 
1972-2003 
(2’) 
1981-2003 
Crisis 5.3284*  
Standard error (2.6737)  
t-statistic [1.9929]  
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0583}  
   
Tax Reform -1.6134  
Standard error (1.3527)  
t-statistic [-1.1928]  
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.2451}  
   
R-squared 0.9155 0.9392 
F-statistic 35.6173*** 38.6459*** 
Prob (F-statistic) {0.0000} {0.0000} 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.2662 1.8833 
LM Test 1.9930 0.0215 
Prob. (LM Test) {0.1612} {0.9788} 
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
Euler Equation Consumption Function 
To take into account the rational expectations approach of the consumption 
function, this study follows the approach of Aschauer (1985), Gupta (1992), and Ghatak 
and Ghatak (1996). The following system estimates the Euler equation consumption 
function: 
tttttt uGEGCC +−++= −−− 111 θβθβα ,      (2.38) 
ttttttt uDDGGGE +++++= −−−−− 221122111 ωωεεγ .     (2.39) 
Substitution of Equation (2.39) into (2.38) generates: 
ttttttt vDDGGCC +++−++= −−−−− 221122111 μμηηβδ ,    (2.40) 
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where  
θγαδ −= , 
( )11 εβθη −= , 
22 θεη −= , 
11 θωμ −= , 
22 θωμ −= . 
The above restrictions are the conditions necessary for the Ricardian equivalence 
to hold. Rejection of the above restrictions implies violations of the Ricardian 
equivalence. The Wald test is conducted to examine the validity of the restrictions. Table 
6 summarizes the estimation of the Euler equation consumption function.  
Hypothesis 
Null hypothesis:  
Under Ricardian equivalence, the following holds: 
θγαδ −= , 
( )11 εβθη −= , 
22 θεη −= , 
11 θωμ −= , 
22 θωμ −= . 
Alternative hypothesis:  
θγαδ −≠ , 
( )11 εβθη −≠ , 
22 θεη −≠ , 
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11 θωμ −≠ , 
22 θωμ −≠ . 
Estimates 
Table 6. Estimation of the Euler Equation Consumption Function for n = m = 2 
 
Constrained Coefficients Unconstrained Coefficients Hypothesized Coefficients 
α = 4.1505 
(-0.5392) 
[0.5920] 
δ = 9.0517  
(1.5486) 
[0.1346] 
δ = 11.1617 
β = 0.5753*** 
(3.8904) 
[0.0003] 
β = 0.9649*** 
(3.5772) 
[0.0015] 
β = 0.5753 
θ = -3.9510*** 
(-3.5093) 
[0.0009] 
η1 = 1.1506 
(1.1689) 
[0.2539] 
η1 = 2.1068 
γ = 3.8755** 
(2.0320) 
[0.0473] 
γ = 4.0302** 
(2.6167) 
[0.0148] 
γ = 3.8755 
 ε 1 =1.1085*** 
(4.6640) 
[0.0000] 
ε1 = 1.1220*** 
(5.5433) 
[0.0000] 
ε1 = 1.1085 
 ε 2 = -0.3320 
(-1.6039) 
[0.1148] 
ε2 = -0.3576* 
(-2.0381) 
[0.0522] 
ε2 = -0.3320 
ω1 = 1.5647** 
(2.1213) 
[0.0387] 
ω1 = 1.5524* 
(2.0120) 
[0.0551] 
ω1 = 1.5647 
 ω 2 = -0.2478 
(-0.2389) 
[0.8121] 
ω2 = -0.2396 
(-0.2991) 
[0.7673] 
ω2 = -0.2478 
 μ1 = 3.8033 
(1.1441) 
[ 0.2639] 
μ1 = 6.1822 
 μ2 = -2.4014 
(-0.7659) 
[0.4512] 
μ2 = -0.9789 
 η2 = -1.6084** 
(-2.2881) 
[0.0312] 
η2 = -1.3119 
   
0.8532
0.8707
2
2
=
=
G
C
R
R
 
0.8534
0.8812
2
2
=
=
G
C
R
R
 
 
 
Note: t-ratios (in brackets) follow coefficient values, followed by probability values (in square brackets). 
 ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
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By comparing the unconstrained coefficient estimates with the hypothesized 
values, which are obtained by substituting the constrained coefficient estimates into the 
cross equations restrictions, it can be seen that β, η1, μ1, μ2, η2, and δ are of different 
values. This difference between the values of the unconstrained and the hypothesized 
estimates indicates that the restrictions of the joint debt neutrality-rational expectations 
hypothesis are not confirmed by the data. Moreover, a formal statistical test in the form 
of the Wald test is conducted to test the validity of the restrictions. With the result of the 
Wald statistic of 7.19, the joint restrictions are rejected at 10 percent level.  
 The coefficient that shows the substitutability of public spending for private 
consumption expenditures, θ, plays a role in explaining the behavior of private 
consumption. This parameter explains the degree of direct crowding out or 
ultrarationality in the extent to which the public sector can be subsumed under the private 
sector (Buiter 1977). This ultrarationality is specified as structural behavioral 
relationships in Aschauer’s Euler equation consumption function. The θ coefficient is 
negative and significantly differs from zero at 1 percent level. It implies that public 
spending substantially complements private expenditures. An increase in public spending 
will increase the marginal utility of private consumption. A permanent increase in public 
spending will have an impact on wealth. An expansionary fiscal policy will have an 
expansionary effect on aggregate demand. The larger the level of public spending, the 
larger the wealth effect on consumers.  
 Also, β, the coefficient of past consumption, shows significant values both in 
constrained and unconstrained estimation. This finding designates consumers a somewhat 
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random walk pattern, lending some support for the permanent income hypothesis 
(Campbell et al. 1989).   
Table 7 summarizes the estimates of the Euler equation consumption function 
when the lags of government expenditures, n, and the lags of government budget deficits, 
m, are equal to 1. Some unconstrained coefficients, such as β, η1, and μ1 do not equal their 
corresponding hypothesized values, indicating the rejection of the joint restrictions. 
Formally, the Wald test results suggest a rejection of the joint restrictions at 1 percent 
level, invalidating Ricardian equivalence. This is also the case when n = m = 2 and 
private and public spending are complements, implying that expansionary fiscal policy 
will have an expansionary effect to aggregate demand. There is also some evidence that 
consumers follow a random walk.  
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Table 7. Estimation of the Euler Equation Consumption Function for n = m = 1 
 
Constrained Coefficients Unconstrained Coefficients Hypothesized Coefficients 
α = -4.3250 
(-0.6214) 
[0.5368] 
δ = 13.2654*** 
(2.8239) 
[0.0088] 
δ = 13.5322 
β = 0.5547*** 
(3.8015) 
[0.0004] 
β = 0.7236*** 
(2.9404) 
[0.0066] 
β = 0.5547 
θ = -3.9722***  
(-4.2427) 
[0.0001] 
η1 = 0.2694 
(0.3038) 
[0.7636] 
η1 = 0.8391 
γ = 4.4956*** 
(3.7994) 
[0.0004] 
γ = 4.5309*** 
(3.6566) 
[0.0010] 
γ = 4.4956 
 ε 1 = 0.7659*** 
(11.3362) 
[0.0000] 
ε1 = 0.7638*** 
(9.8931) 
[0.0000] 
ε1 = 0.7659 
ω1 = 2.1636*** 
(3.9436) 
[0.0002] 
ω1 = 2.1801*** 
(3.2976) 
[0.0027] 
ω1 = 2.1636 
 μ1 = 7.5925** 
(2.6482) 
[0.0134] 
μ1 = 8.5942 
   
0.8401
0.8568
2
2
=
=
G
C
R
R
 
0.8402
0.8592
2
2
=
=
G
C
R
R
 
 
 
Note: t-ratios (in brackets) follow coefficient values, followed by probability values (in square brackets) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
In this exercise, emphasis is on the relevance of the neutrality or equivalence 
proposition and on the degree of substitutability or complementarity between government 
expenditures and private consumption. The examination is carried out by two approaches: 
(i) an ad-hoc approach by estimating the aggregate consumption function, and (ii) a 
rational expectations approach by using the Euler equation consumption function.  
The aggregate consumption function estimates do not suggest that the neutrality 
hypothesis holds. When a rational expectations framework is incorporated into the 
modeling of private consumption expenditures, the results support the findings of the ad-
hoc approach: Indonesian consumers tend to behave in a non-Ricardian way. The 
behavior of private consumption seems to be in line with what is predicted by the 
neoclassical paradigm. Consumers are not indifferent to the methods of government 
financing. A deficit-finance policy needs to be implemented with caution. Issuance of 
government bonds most likely will lead to a crowding out of investment and in turn will 
retard capital accumulation and economic growth. The way that the government finances 
its outlays matters to the economy. Fiscal authority needs to focus more attention on 
alternative financing other than public debt, such as taxation. It is essential to conduct an 
enhancement of the system of taxation. A sustainable fiscal policy is one that is expected 
to generate a sequence of debt such that the borrowing constraint holds. A sustainable 
fiscal policy can be distinguished from an unsustainable one by examining the 
stationarity property. The unit root test suggests that Indonesian public debt is not 
stationary at the level form, implying unsustainability. The unsustainable nature of public 
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debt supports taxation as another means of financing; however, the whole taxation system 
must be improved. 
 The estimations of the aggregate consumption function and of the Euler equation 
consumption function suggest that the extent to which individuals perceive government 
expenditures as complements for their private outlays is substantial. Therefore, an 
increase in the level of public spending will have an expansionary effect on the aggregate 
demand. With regard to the excess sensitivity of consumption to income, the aggregate 
consumption function reveals that consumers follow the “rule of thumb” of consuming 
their current income. Meanwhile, the Euler equation estimates denote that there is some 
support for the permanent income hypothesis suggested by the random walk consumption 
behavior. Therefore, while it is clear both from the aggregate consumption function and 
the Euler equation approaches that fiscal policy indeed matters to the economic activities 
in the country, it is far less clear whether consumption follows a random walk of a 
permanent income hypothesis or follows a rule of thumb of consumption of current 
income, since there is evidence for both patterns.    
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CHAPTER III  
ESSAY TWO: DO DEBT AND DEFICITS RAISE THE INTEREST RATE IN 
INDONESIA? 
 
Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine empirically whether government debt 
and government deficits will increase the rate of interest in Indonesia. Ricardian 
equivalence implies that government debt and deficits will not have any impact on the 
interest rate. Ricardian equivalence is said to hold if the null of the coefficients of 
government debt and government budget deficits equal to zero cannot be rejected. On the 
contrary, the Neoclassical view suggests that deficits raise the interest rate since the 
interest rate needs to increase to bring saving (which is depressed by deficits) and 
investment to equilibrium, and since the interest rate needs to increase to depress an 
excess demand for money that is stimulated by an increase in the aggregate demand 
induced by deficits. These two channels of increases in the interest rate can arise only 
when government bonds are perceived as net wealth.  
An interest rate test of Ricardian equivalence is needed since the absence of 
Ricardian equivalence suggests that the way in which the government finances its 
expenditures would matter. If Ricardian equivalence does not hold, issuance of 
government bonds will crowd out private investment, hamper capital stock accumulation, 
and in turn retard economic growth. Ricardian equivalence implies that fiscal treatment 
of revenue from exhaustible natural resources would not matter. Giavazzi, Sheen, and 
Wyplosz (1988) argue that the way the government chooses to use windfall revenue from 
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oil has important macroeconomic implications. Fiscal policy will have no permanent 
effects on the economy if the government uses the windfall revenue to cut taxes or to 
increase government expenditures. Myopic individuals will spend the resource wealth 
instead of capitalizing it. Foreign assets will initially increase, leading to a temporary 
current account surplus and exchange rate appreciation. When the resource is exhausted, 
the current account and the exchange rate will return to their initial equilibrium. On the 
other hand, fiscal policy will have permanent effects on the economy via its effect on the 
real exchange rate if the government uses the windfall revenue to retire its debt. In this 
case, myopic agents will be forced to capitalize by acquiring foreign assets. Revenue 
from resource extraction yields a permanent effect on the economy (Giavazzi, Sheen, and 
Wyplosz 1988).   Due to the nature of developing countries, such as the presence of 
liquidity constraints, uncertainty, and bounded rationally, it is expected that Ricardian 
equivalence will not hold in Indonesia.  
The open economy theory suggests that under the assumption of perfect capital 
mobility, the interest rate in a small open economy must equal the world interest rate plus 
a country specific risk premium. The risk premium captures the perceived political risk of 
making loans in a country and the expected change in the real exchange rate to determine 
the interest rate differentials (Mankiw 2000). Hence, it is worthwhile and appropriate to 
investigate the effect of deficit finance on the interest rate in the country even if it is a 
small open economy. 
 During the 1970s and 1980s, revenue from oil played a major role in the 
Indonesian government budget. In 1974, the international oil price quadrupled, creating a 
massive amount of windfall revenue that accrued to the government. Another round of 
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extraordinary increases in the oil price emerged in 1979-1981. In the case of Indonesia 
during 1972-1985, the oil price so dominated the economy’s fortune that the most 
carefully constructed forecasts based on macroeconomic models proved to be quite 
unreliable (Hill 2000). This essay will assess the implications of the oil price increase for 
Ricardian equivalence, examining whether windfall revenue generated by the increase in 
the oil price has had a permanent effect on the economy as suggested by Giavazzi, Sheen, 
and Wyplosz (1988). Previous studies have not taken into account the natural resource 
notion in Ricardian equivalence. This study is expected to contribute to the empirical 
literature on Ricardian equivalence by incorporating a dominant resource aspect of a 
particular country.  
 
Review of the Literature 
 
Studies on the effect of government debt or government budget deficits on the 
rate of interest have not been as intensive and extensive as the ones on consumption. 
There are no intensive and prolonged exchanges of ideas, methodology, and empirical 
exercises on this topic other than the ones delivered over more than a decade by 
Kormendi (1983), Kormendi and Meguire (1986; 1990; 1995), Barth, Iden, and Russek 
(1986), Modigliani and Sterling (1986; 1990), Feldstein and Elmendorf (1990), Graham 
(1995), and Graham and Himarios (1991; 1996). Some interest rate studies find no 
association between budget deficits and interest rates, supporting the Ricardian prediction 
−for instance, studies on U.S. data by Hoelscher (1983), Ostrosky (1990), Darrat (1990); 
on Canadian data by Darrat and Sulliman (1991); on Canadian, French, German, 
Japanese, British, and U.S. data by Evans (1987a; 1987b); and on British data by Barro 
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(1987). Other studies find a positive association between debt or budget deficits and 
interest rates, confirming the neoclassical prediction−for example, studies on U.S. data by 
Feldstein and Eckstein (1970), Cebula (1990a; 1990b; 1998), Laumas (1989), Swamy, 
Kolluri, and Singamsetti (1990), and Laubach (2003).  
Meanwhile, a few studies find a negative association between deficits and interest 
rates, indicating support for neither Ricardian nor Neoclassical views−for instance, Evans 
(1985) on U.S. data. Seater (1993) and Bernheim (1988) provide several explanations for 
the negative significant relationship between rates of interest and deficits that are 
inconsistent with the conventional as well as the Ricardian paradigms. According to 
Seater, the exclusion of variables, such as uncertainty about future taxation and marginal 
tax rates, will bias the estimates toward negative values. Uncertainty about future taxation 
implies uncertainty about the future incidence of taxation and about the timing of 
distortionary taxation, giving rise to the negative relationship between interest rates and 
deficits regardless of the prevalence of Ricardian equivalence.  Meanwhile, Bernheim 
argues that, in the presence of uncertainty, deficits will crowd-in investment. The 
decrease in marginal tax rates will increase saving in the short run. The lack of treatment 
of information and expectations may lead to the negative association between deficits and 
interest rates.  
 Some studies take into account the role of expected inflation or price level, rather 
than actual inflation or price  level, in determining the behavior of interest rates−for 
instance, Hoelscher (1986; 1983) and (1986), Makin (1983), Mascaro and Meltzer 
(1983), Barth, Iden, and Russek (1986), Viren (1988),  Darrat (1990), Mehra (1992), and 
Cebula (1998). The role of expectations is mentioned by Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998). 
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Rates of interest depend on expectations of fiscal policy and other variables that are hard 
to measure. VAR can be utilized to generate forecasts as a proxy for expectations; 
however, VAR assumes that the variables follow a stable time series process and do not 
contain qualitative information, such as those that relate to the political process. If the 
series contain non-quantitative information, then the measurement error will bias the 
coefficients toward zero, thus creating a bias toward Ricardian equivalence.  
Some studies use VAR to estimate the interest rate equation; see for instance 
Plosser (1982) and Darrat and Sulliman (1991). On the use of VAR, Darrat and Sulliman 
argue that, although VAR results cannot distinguish between alternative structural 
hypotheses, it is useful to suggest predominant channels through which relationships 
work. Since VAR imposes no restrictions on the dynamic relationship among the 
variables, it is a reliable alternative to structural models that impose arbitrary restrictions.    
Bernheim (1988) and Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998) discuss the problem of the 
absence of the benchmark effect in interest rate estimation. In the case of the effects of 
fiscal policy on consumption, there are benchmark measurements, such as Keynesian, 
Ricardian, or life-cycle benchmarks of the effect of taxes on consumption. In the case of 
the interest rate test, the literature only utilizes the Ricardian benchmark that indicates 
that deficits do not raise interest rates. If international capital flows affect the financial 
market in a country, then the rates of interest might not respond to changes in fiscal 
policy in that country, even if there is a departure from Ricardian equivalence.   
It is relevant to include government spending in the interest rate test of Ricardian 
equivalence. Most interest rate studies of Ricardian equivalence fail to incorporate 
government spending, and, even if they do, they fail to decompose it into permanent and 
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transitory components. Only a few studies have taken into account the relevance of 
government spending in determining the rate of interest−see for instance, Barro (1987), 
Evans (1987a; 1987b), Cebula (1990a; 1990b), and Kuehlwein and Samalapa (2004). 
Barro’s study is one of the most important studies on the interest rate test of Ricardian 
equivalence since it takes into account the decomposed permanent and transitory 
components of government spending, which seems unimportant in the consumption test 
of Ricardian equivalence. 
    Many studies use OLS to estimate the effect of debt and/or deficit variables on 
interest rates−see for instance, Plosser (1982), Mascaro and Meltzer (1983), Wachtel and 
Young (1987), Viren (1988), and Laumas (1989). Some estimate OLS with the 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure to overcome the autocorrelation problem−see for instance, 
Hoelscher (1983), Makin (1983), and Cebula (1990). In attempts to overcome 
autocorrelation, some authors estimate the partial adjustment model−see for instance, 
Hoelscher (1983), Barth, Iden, and Russek (1986); OLS in first difference−see for 
instance, Hoelscher (1986), Zahid (1988); and OLS with the first-order autoregressive 
process AR(1)−see for instance, Monadjemi and Kearney (1991). Although most studies 
use time series data, there are a very few studies that take into account the cointegration 
approach (Darrat 1990; Kuehlwein and Samalapa 2004). 
To address the endogeneity and simultaneity issue, some studies report the OLS 
and IV results (Evans 1987a, 1987b), and some studies report the OLS and 2SLS 
results−for example, Cebula (1990), Kuehlwein and Samalapa (2004). In many of the 
studies, debt and deficit variables enter the equation together to explain the rate of 
interest, raising the issue of simultaneity between them−see for instance Barth, Iden, and 
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Russek (1986), Feldstein (1986), Barro (1987), and Cebula (1990a; 1990b). However, as 
argued by Seater (1993), it appears that simultaneity bias is not important in existing 
interest rate studies.   
Plosser (1982) focuses on the association between government financing 
decisions and asset prices. Plosser’s contribution is to measure expected variables using 
the VAR model. The results show that government purchases have a significant impact 
on bond returns, but there is only little support for the conventional view that an increase 
in government debt will decrease securities prices and drive up yields. However, 
innovations in government expenditures are negatively related to excess returns, 
contributing to higher rates of interest. Plosser (1987) extends his 1982 work by including 
more recent data, isolating the relationship between debt shocks and ex ante real interest 
rates, and explicitly investigating expected future deficits and interest rates. The VAR 
results show that accumulated future deficits will not lead to an increase in interest rates. 
The lack of association between interest rates and the policy variables is due to the 
offsetting effects on ex ante real rates and expected inflation.  
Cebula (1998) uses two measures of expected inflation: the inflationary 
expectations obtained from Livingston survey data and the four-quarter distributed lag of 
the inflation rate of the consumer price index. The two measures of inflation generate 
similar results. The results show that the nominal long term interest rate correlates 
positively to expected inflation, the real short term interest rate, and the budget deficit, 
correlates negatively to expansionary monetary policy, and is weakly associated with net 
capital inflows. Therefore, despite the fact that there are massive net capital inflows, 
budget deficits do matter. 
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Many studies utilized the IS-LM theoretical framework a foundation for their 
study−see for instance Makin (1983), Barth, Iden, and Russek (1986), Evans (1985), and 
Cebula (1990). Makin (1983) derives a Fisher-type interest rate equation that includes a 
government sector, an open economy specification, and inflation uncertainty. The 
evidence on the crowding out hypothesis is considered mixed to weak. A high real rate of 
interest stems from a combination of slow money growth, declining inflationary 
expectations, and a fall in inflation uncertainty. Evans (1985; 1987a) presents evidence 
from the U.S. that supports Ricardian equivalence. The results show that there is no 
relationship between budget deficits and rates of interest. However, although several 
regressions show significant negative relationships, Evans does not interpret that budget 
deficits lower interest rates; rather, he interprets that there is no evidence that budget 
deficits raise interest rates. Incorporating expected future budget deficits yields similar 
results. Using data from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, U.K., and U.S, Evans (1987) 
also finds that the relationship between budget deficits and nominal interest rates is often 
negative rather than positive. Government expenditure has a positive significant 
association with the nominal interest rate in only two cases. Money supply has a negative 
significant relationship with the nominal interest rate in three cases. Meanwhile, by 
employing the Euler equation in a more recent study, Evans (1998) takes into account 
social security wealth and finds that social security has a strong effect on the U.S. 
economy. A decrease in the ratio of social security wealth to consumption will decrease 
consumption initially, decrease the balanced growth path for interest rates, and increase 
the balanced growth path for stock of capital, consumption, and output significantly and 
economically, thus rejecting Ricardian equivalence.  
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Cebula (1990) asserts that the nominal interest rate is determined by real 
government expenditures, real budget deficit, real exogenous money stock, real balance 
of trade, and expected inflation. He uses Moody’s Aaa and Baa rated corporate bonds, 
high grade (Standard & Poor’s) municipal bonds, and the interest rate on ten-year 
Treasury notes to represent long term nominal interest rates. He also decomposes the 
deficit into structural (exogenous) and cyclical (endogenous) components. The results 
show that there is a positive and significant impact of a budget deficit on the real rate of 
interest in the U.S. Ostrosky (1990) criticizes his work, arguing that the choice of interest 
rate employed by Cebula leads to the positive significant relationship between budget 
deficits and real rates of interest. By using a different measure of rate of interest, i.e. 
three-month Treasury bills, Ostrosky finds that a deficit does not raise the interest rate. 
Cebula argues that Ostrosky’s conclusions are correct for the short term interest rate but 
not for the long term interest rate. Darrat (1989; 1990) argues that correlation-based 
regressions, like those Cebula used, do not adequately test whether there is causality 
between deficits and interest rates. A positive coefficient on deficits in interest rate 
regression does not discriminate against other alternative hypotheses, such as 
bidirectional or no causalities between deficits and interest rates or unidirectional 
causality from interest rates to deficits. Therefore, a more appropriate test such as a 
cointegration test is worth conducting. Cointegration tests show that there is no long run 
equilibrium relationship between structural deficits and interest rates. Mehra (1992) also 
performs a cointegration test to examine the relationship between deficits and real long 
term interest rates. There is a long run equilibrium relationship between deficits and 
interest rates, implying that deficits raise long term interest rates.  
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In the framework of the loanable funds model, Hoelscher (1983) uses short term 
interest rates and quarterly data to find that there is no association between federal 
borrowing and rates of interest. In response to Hoelscher’s study, Barth, Iden, and Russek 
(1986) show that the effect of a deficit is ambiguous because not all deficits have the 
same economic effects. Their re-estimation of Hoelscher’s study shows that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between deficits and interest rates. The equilibrium 
value of the nominal interest rate is determined by real stock of high-powered money, 
private wealth net of federal debt, federal debt, federal expenditures, federal transfers, 
federal taxes, federal interest payments, and expected inflation rates. Since the Ricardian 
view assigns the coefficient of tax to be equal to zero, government expenditures (or taxes) 
should be included in the interest rate equation that includes a deficit variable in order to 
capture the difference in coefficients on government expenditures and taxes.   
Most studies on the effect of deficits on long term interest rates use quarterly or 
monthly data rather than annual data. Hoelscher (1986) employs U.S. annual data and 
three different measures of deficits, all of which confirm the conventional theory that 
deficits raise the rate of interest. Hoelscher argues that data periodicity may have an 
effect on the regression results; for example, the existence of lags and leads may not 
show up in quarterly data. The work of Feldstein and Kormendi implies that if a budget 
deficit is associated with government expenditures or transfers, then it might be the case 
that the deficit is proxying the effect of government expenditures or transfers on rates of 
interest.  In relation to this, Hoelscher tests the proposition by including government 
expenditures and transfers as regressors, and the result indicates that, although fiscal 
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variables could be determining the rate of interest, the deficit variable still has a positive 
and significant effect on the rate of interest.  
 Darrat (1989) follows Hoelscher’s (1986) study by employing annual data when 
estimating the effect of budget deficits on interest rates. Employing Granger causality, the 
hypothesis that a deficit does not cause a long term interest rate is maintained, whereas 
the hypothesis that a long term interest rate does not cause a deficit is rejected, 
contradicting Hoelscher’s argument. Darrat argues that Hoelscher’s study fails to 
distinguish between the interest rate effect on bond-financed deficit and on money-
financed deficit. Therefore, base money growth should be included in the estimation to 
ascertain that the finding that deficit does not affect interest rate is not the result of the 
exclusion of money-financed deficit. After controlling the impact of base money growth 
on interest rate, a similar finding still prevails. Darrat and Suliman (1991) employ VAR 
methods to capture the causal influence of base money and budget deficits on interest 
rates, exchange rates, real output, and inflation. The results show that budget deficits do 
not have any impact on interest rate, supporting the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis.  
 Feldstein (1986) investigates three sources of fluctuation in the real interest rate in 
the U.S: changes in budget deficits, changes in tax rules, and changes in monetary policy. 
The empirical evidence shows that budget deficits and monetary policy have important 
effects on long term interest rates, but changes in tax rules and investment incentives do 
not have any impact on the rate of interest. Using a data set covering 16 countries over 
the period 1924-1938, Viren (1988) uses various alternative measures for budget deficits 
and money measures to ensure the robustness of the empirical results. It appears that 
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different variable measurements do not lead to different results. For all variable 
specifications, budget deficits raise nominal interest rates, although insignificantly.  
  Barro’s (1987) investigation of the effects of temporary changes in government 
purchases on interest rates is one of the most important studies testing Ricardian 
equivalence looking at interest rate behavior because his study involves the 
decomposition of government purchases into permanent and transitory components. 
Barro regresses the yield of the consol on the current and first to fifth lags of temporary 
government purchases (that are proxied by military spending), deficits, and debt. 
Temporary spending positively significantly affects interest rates, whereas deficits and 
debt only marginally affect interest rates. The significance of temporary spending in 
affecting interest rates is greater when deficits and debt variables are excluded from the 
regression, whereas the significance of debt and deficit variables is greater when 
temporary spending and its lagged values are excluded from the regression. These results 
suggest some preference for temporary government purchases as the determinant of 
interest rates. Due to the close relationship between temporary military spending and 
deficits, it is not clear whether interest rates respond to temporary spending per se or to 
the associated deficits. Therefore, it is necessary to examine deficits periods that are not 
associated with military spending or wartime. Over a sample period of more than two 
hundred years, Barro finds two examples of deficits that were not associated with 
wartime or the business cycle.  These are the period of compensation payments to slave-
owners in 1835-1836 and the period of a political dispute in 1909-1910.  During these 
two periods, interest rates did not respond to the exogenous deficits.  
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  Laumas (1989) employs a measure of deficits that avoids the contamination of 
changes in government purchases and tax revenue due to the operative automatic 
stabilizers. Within the framework of the rational expectations model, his study involves 
the joint interaction of monetary and fiscal policies in determining the rate of interest. 
The results show that, when faced with anticipated and unanticipated deficit, individuals 
react in the way predicted by the conventional view.  Monadjemi and Kearney (1991) 
draw together the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis and the capital inflow hypothesis. 
Interest rate neutrality is usually observed in economies that are open to trade in goods, 
services, and financial assets. This neutrality can stem from the prevalence of the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, the capital inflow hypothesis, or both. The empirical 
evidence supports the capital inflow hypothesis for Australia, Britain, Germany, and the 
United States; for Canada a positive relationship between private saving and the 
government budget deficits is found.   
  Kuehlwein and Samalapa (2004) test Keynesian and Neoclassical theories to 
measure the impact of public spending and budget deficits on real interest rates in the 
Thai economy. The result favors neoclassical theory. Only government expenditures, not 
expansionary fiscal policy, affect interest rates. An increase in public consumption and 
construction expenditures tends to increase interest rates. The results suggest that, despite 
the fact that government spending increases interest rates and retards private capital 
formation, this does not need to be the case if government spending is partially financed 
by external financing and if it significantly boosts the economy’s productivity potential.   
 Laubach (2003) is concerned with the question of whether the effect of a deficit 
on interest rates depends on whether the deficit is caused by an increase in spending or by 
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a change in the timing of taxation. According to Ricardian equivalence, a change in 
projected deficits without a change in government outlays will not alter expected interest 
rates. Therefore, the coefficient on the projected deficits in an estimation involving 
projected government outlays will be equal to zero. The results support the neoclassical 
prediction.  Both deficits and debt are positively and statistically significant in affecting 
interest rates.  
With regard to the oil-macroeconomy relationship, oil price shocks have been 
found to significantly affect the macroeconomy. Hamilton (1983) pioneered studies on 
the relationship between oil and real economic activities, and found that oil shocks were a 
contributing factor in the U.S. recessions for the period 1948-1972 and 1973-1980. Oil 
price shocks have a significant and nonspurious relationship with U.S. macroeconomic 
performance. Previous empirical studies on the oil-macroeconomy relationship have 
focused on the effects of oil prices on inflation or on economic activities such as GDP 
growth and stock returns. Only a few studies examine the effects of oil prices on interest 
or exchange rates.  
Lee, Lee, and Ratti (2001) investigate the extent to which oil price movements 
influence the stance of Japanese monetary policy during 1960:1-1996:5. They use the 
vector autoregressive model (VAR), and the variables are Japanese call money rate 
(CALL), industrial production (IP), consumer price index (CPI), a comprehensive index 
of commodity prices denominated in Japanese yen (SPOT), and several oil price 
measures such as nominal, real, and normalized oil prices (POIL). The SPOT variable is 
included in the model because an increase in SPOT represents an increase in the price of 
imported commodities due to an increase in the spot price in U.S. dollar terms or a fall in 
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the yen relative to the U.S. dollar, and can be expected to lead to a tightening monetary 
policy. The call money rate is adopted as the indicator of the stance of Japanese monetary 
policy since it is pegged or tightly smoothed from month to month by the Bank of Japan 
and is not subject to being endogenous in the way that the monetary aggregates are. The 
estimation results show that the call money rate was higher by 2 percentage points due to 
the first major oil price shock in the mid 1970s and was higher by about 2.5 percentage 
points due to the second major oil price shock in 1979-1980. In turn, the increase in the 
call money rate induced by an increase in oil price is found to strengthen the 
contractionary effect of oil shocks. Between 30 and 50 percent of the negative impact of 
oil price shocks on Japanese output is attributable to a tight monetary policy induced by 
oil price shocks. 
Cologni and Manera (2005) estimate a structural cointegrated VAR model that is 
reparameterized as a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) to study the direct effects 
of oil price shocks on output, prices, and the reaction of monetary variables to external 
shocks in G-7 countries. The variable vectors are short-term interest rates, narrow money, 
consumer price index, real gross domestic product, the world price of oil, and the 
exchange rate. For nearly all countries, there is a negative impact of the oil price shock on 
output, with the exceptions of the U.K. and Canada, which are both net oil exporters and 
for which the total impact of the oil price shock is positive. The temporary rise of oil 
prices also fuels inflationary pressures. For Italy, Japan, and the U.S., the inflationary 
pressures related to the increase in oil prices explain the response of the monetary 
authorities. However, after this impulse response, in Italy interest rates continue to 
increase, while in Japan and the U.S. there is a progressive easing of monetary policy; 
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responses appear not to be directly linked to the external shock. For Canada and France, 
without the price shock the interest rates would be higher with respect to the endogenous 
scenario, suggesting an expansionary monetary policy response to the oil price increase. 
Overall, monetary policies of most countries react by raising interest rates, suggesting a 
contractionary monetary policy directed to fight inflation.  
 This study will incorporate the oil-macroeconomy relationship in the interest rate 
investigation of Ricardian equivalence. It will examine whether the inclusion of a 
dominant resource aspect of a country will alter the results of the investigation. 
 
Ricardian Fiscal Policy 
 
 This section will discuss the Ricardian fiscal policy. The following illustration is 
borrowed from Walsh (2003). Fiscal policy can be defined in terms of a time series for 
government expenditures g and interest bearing debt b:{ }∞=++ 0, iitit bg . Changes in 
seigniorage and changes in a lump sum tax t, which are needed to keep{ }∞=++ 0, iitit bg  
unaltered, will constitute monetary policy. Monetary policy changes the government’s 
total liabilities. An open market purchase by the central bank will decrease the stock of 
interest-bearing government debt that is held by the private sector. To keep the sequence 
of bt+i unaltered, the Treasury will have to issue additional interest-bearing debt.  Total 
government liabilities will increase. Meanwhile, under the definition of s , monetary 
policy determines the division of d between interest-bearing debt and non-interest-
bearing debt, whereas fiscal policy sets { }∞=++ 0, iitit dg . 
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 By ignoring the effect of unanticipated inflation, the government budget 
constraint can be written as: 
( ) ttttttt sbbtbrg +−+=+ −−− 111 .       (3.1) 
By solving the above equation forward and assuming the interest factor r as a positive 
constant, the following expression is obtained: 
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The no-Ponzi condition (or the requirement to satisfy the intertemporal budget balance) is 
fulfilled if the last term in the above equation is equal to zero:   
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The government has to increase revenue in present value terms to repay its debt and 
finance its expenditures. The intertemporal budget balance implies that: 
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where  
∆t+i= g – t – s = primary deficits. 
Therefore, if bt-1 > 0, the present value of primary deficits has to be less than zero, or the 
government has to run a primary surplus that can be created by reducing its expenditures, 
increasing taxes, or seigniorage. Sequences of primary deficits can be consistent with the 
intertemporal budget balance as long as large primary surpluses are expected to occur. 
The intertemporal budget balance is said to hold if ∆t and bt-1 are cointegrated. If a linear 
combination between the primary deficits and the stock of debt that is stationary exists, 
then the intertemporal budget balance holds. The prevalence of the intertemporal budget 
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balance implies that the deficit is sustainable. The situation in which monetary policy is 
free to set the nominal money stock or the nominal interest rate while fiscal policy has to 
adjust to satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget to be balanced is regarded as the 
Ricardian regime.  
Walsh (2003) further illustrates that fiscal and monetary policies are linked. 
Issuance of government bonds will decrease the nominal stock of money and will 
increase the interest-bearing debt held by individuals. As a result, the price level will 
change and so will the real stock of money, which in turn will alter the equilibrium 
interest rate. The change in interest-bearing debt held by individuals will have 
implications for future expected taxes and policies that affect stock of debt. The policy 
authority is said to be Ricardian when fiscal policy is ensured to keep the government’s 
intertemporal budget balanced, while monetary policy is free to set the nominal money 
stock or the nominal rate of interest. If Ricardian equivalence does not hold, fiscal policy 
will have an effect on the real interest rate. A given increase in government expenditures 
that increases the real interest rate will raise the nominal interest rate and decrease real 
money demand. Hence, given the nominal money supply, price has to increase to 
decrease the real money supply. Recent literature suggests that any regime in which taxes 
and or seigniorage always adjust to satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget 
balance is categorized as Ricardian.   
The following illustrations describe a two-period overlapping generation model 
that enables the open market operation to influence the real intergenerational distribution 
of wealth. Setting government expenditures equal to zero and ignoring real income 
growth and population gives: 
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11 )1( −−+=++ ttttt brsbt ,        (3.5) 
where  
s = real seigniorage revenue, 
t = real tax revenues, 
b = real value of government debt, 
r = real interest rate. 
The individual is assumed to have y endowment in each period. The lump sum tax 
that the individual has to pay is t, and the interest rate on government bonds that the 
individual receives is (1 + it+1) Bt-1/Pt = (1 + rt+1)bt-1, where i is the nominal rate of 
interest, B is the number of government bonds at the beginning of  period, P is the price 
level, and rt+1 = (1 + it+1) / (1 + πt) = 1 = ex post real interest rate. The individual’s 
allocation of his or her real money balances of Mt-1/Pt = (1 + πt)-1mt-1 is:   
t
t
t
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11 ,      (3.6) 
where 
c = consumption,  
m = real money holdings, 
b = stock of debt, 
y = endowment, 
r = real rate of interest, 
π = rate of inflation, 
t = lump sum taxes. 
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Fiscal policy is Ricardian if ψ (the fraction of government interest-bearing debt 
that ranges from zero to unity) equals unity, implying that the government keeps 
outstanding debt liabilities equal to the present discounted value of current and future tax 
revenues. Fiscal policy is traditional non-Ricardian if ψ < 1, where seigniorage must 
adjust to keep itself and the present value of taxes equals government debt.  
 The present discounted value of taxes, Tt, should equal the fraction of government 
interest-bearing debt, ψ multiplied by the net liability of government, bt-1 (1+ rt-1), which 
can be written as: 
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The above equation can also be stated ttt btT ψ+= .  
Meanwhile, since 11 )1( −−++= tttt brtT ψ  the following equation holds: 
)( 11 tttt bbRt −= −−ψ ,         (3.8) 
where rR += 1 . 
Like tax revenue, seigniorage revenue can be stated as: ))(1( 11 tttt bbRs −−= −−ψ  where 
(1 – ψ) represents the fraction of government liabilities that are backed by seigniorage. 
Hence, the government budget constraint is the following: 
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Under a Ricardian regime, where ψ = 1, only the stock of money matters, and the 
government budget constraint becomes: 
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Under a non-Ricardian regime, where ψ < 1, the government budget constraint can be 
written as: 
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where w = m + (1 – ψ)b.  Through wt-1, an individual’s demand for assets depends on ψ. 
Hence, the equilibrium nominal rate of interest and the price level depends on ψ. 
 Assuming perfect foresight and log separable utility ln ct + δ ln m, the Euler 
equation is ct+1 = β(1 + rt) ct since individuals will equate the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and money holdings to be equal to it/ (1 + it). 
Therefore, the individual’s budget constraint becomes: 
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Since in equilibrium ct = y, the above equation becomes:  
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In steady state, wt = wt-1 = wss = δy/β(R - 1). Since w = = [M+(1 – ψ)B]/P, the steady 
state price level can be stated as the following: 
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Under a Ricardian regime, the price level is a function of nominal stock of money only, 
whereas under a non-Ricardian regime, the price level is determined by nominal stock of 
money and nominal stock of debt. An increase in nominal stock of money and debt will 
increase the steady state price proportionately. However, even under a Ricardian regime 
the way the government finances shocks to its budget has important implications.  First, 
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in an active monetary policy and a passive fiscal policy, public debt will not alter 
monetary policy that targets nominal interest rates, whereas fiscal policy will respond by 
adjusting taxes to fulfill the intertemporal budget balance.  Second, in an active fiscal 
policy and a passive monetary policy, monetary policy has to adjust seigniorage revenue 
to meet the intertemporal budget balance, whereas fiscal policy will not respond to debt 
shocks.  
 Under a Ricardian regime, a tax cut does not have any impact on equilibrium, 
since it does not imply a wealth effect. Individuals recognize the increase of the present 
value of future taxes by an equal amount of the tax cut. Therefore, a permanent tax cut 
will not alter the economy. If the government plans a tax cut to affect the economy, 
government expenditures have also to be cut. If Ricardian equivalence does not hold, 
fiscal policy will have an impact on the real rate of interest, and the price level is also 
determined by fiscal policy. An increase in expenditures will increase the real and 
nominal rate of interest and will decrease the real demand for money. With an exogenous 
nominal money supply, price has to increase to decrease the real supply of money in 
order for the money market to be in equilibrium.   
 The relationship between the government budget constraint and the nominal rate 
of interest is described as follows. Monetary authority has to finance the difference 
between government real liabilities and budget surplus. In equilibrium, real money 
demand has to be equal to real money supply, and the government budget constraint has 
to be fulfilled. Individuals will equate the marginal rate of substitution between money 
holdings and consumption to money holding cost, which depends on the nominal interest 
rate: 
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Assuming the utility function of the form: 
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then the equality between the marginal rate of substitution and the cost of holding money 
implies that: 
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In a steady state, the above equation can be stated as: 
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where 
Rm = 1+ i = gross nominal rate of interest. 
This implies that the relationship between nominal stock of money and the equilibrium 
price level is proportional. Furthermore, in perfect foresight equilibrium, inflation 
surprises are absent; hence, the government budget constraint is stated as: 
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In a stationary equilibrium, government expenditures, taxes, real stocks of government 
debt, and money are constant; hence, the government budget constraint can be stated as: 
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where 
1/ß = gross real rate of interest, 
Rm ≡ (1 + πt)/β. 
If the fiscal authority sets government expenditures, taxes, and public debt, then the 
government budget constraint will determine the nominal rate of interest. In this case, the 
government must increase g + [(1/β)-1]b-t in seigniorage.  The level of seigniorage that 
must be increased will determine the nominal interest rate. Since the nominal interest rate 
equals (1 + πt)/β, it can be stated that the inflation rate is determined by fiscal policy. The 
nominal quantity of money is determined by Mt = Pt f (Rm). The initial price level is 
determined by the requirement for the solvency of the government budget, since the 
government budget constraint determines the nominal rate of interest and thus the money 
demand. Fiscal policy also determines 1/f(Rm), the factor of proportionality between the 
initial price level and the initial stock of money. The fiscal requirement that seigniorage 
has to be equal to g + [(1/β)-1]b-t determines the inflation rate and the path of future 
nominal stock of money. If the government increases its outlays, given the path of public 
debt and taxes, then seigniorage has to increase. The equilibrium nominal rate of interest 
will increase to create seigniorage (Walsh 2003).  
 
The Institutional History of the Indonesian Financial Sector 
 
During the oil boom period of 1974-1982, the windfall revenues from oil enabled 
the government of Indonesia to conduct a state-led model of development by 
strengthening the state banks’ position in order to allocate the revenues to selected 
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domestic industries, state enterprises, and cooperatives (Holloh 1996). Consequently, the 
financial sector was dominated by the state banks.  This interventionist model of 
development led Indonesia to experience financial repression until 1983.  
The central bank controlled the deposit interest rate for state banks. The interest 
rate subsidy to state banks resulted in a far lower interest rate than the one in the private 
sector.  Figure 7 shows that the nominal interest rate on deposits was constant at 21 
percent during 1973-1974, 11 percent during 1973-1976, and 6 percent during 1978-
1983. Inflation soared in 1973-1974, partly due to the doubling of the retail price of rice 
and the quadrupling of the oil price. The ceiling on interest rates led to a negative real 
interest rate during 1974-1983. The inflation rate was very high during 1973-1976, 
resulting in a real interest rate of -8 percent to -18 percent. The real interest rate remained 
negative (ranging from -2 percent to -12 percent) until 1983. 
Since the interest rate did not reflect its market value, the role of the banking 
system as a financial intermediary was limited. Figure 8 shows that prior to 1983 the 
proportion of quasi money (time and saving deposits) as a percentage of GDP was 
smaller than that of narrow money (currency plus demand deposits). The broad money 
(narrow money plus quasi money) accounted for only about 10-20 percent of GDP until 
1983. The quasi money alone constituted only about 4-9 percent of GDP during 1972-
1983. Similar to the first oil boom in 1973-1974, the government faced difficulty in 
sterilizing the monetary impact of the second oil boom. As a result, the money supply 
grew faster in the early 1980s. The growth in international reserves is considered to be 
the main source of money supply growth. During the oil boom, the government could 
have sterilized the monetary impact by retiring its debt, building its foreign exchange 
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reserves, investing the money offshore, or purchasing import goods. However, foreign 
aid and debt continued to flow to the domestic economy due to the favorable 
concessional term and the wish of the government to maintain access to international 
capital markets and donors. Due to the soft term of the loans, the government decided to 
allocate the oil money to development projects and repay the debt at the original schedule 
(Hill 2000; Prawiro 1998). 
 
Figure 7. Interest Rate and Inflation (%) 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, CDs July 2004 and July 2005. 
 
 
The share of state bank assets reached 80 percent of total bank assets, and state 
bank credit allocation constituted 85 percent of total bank credit by 1982. Entry to the 
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banking sector was heavily regulated and restricted. Foreign banks could only operate in 
the capital. The role of state banks was more as government agents than as financial 
intermediaries. The central bank also allocated subsidized liquidity credit to favored 
industrial sectors (Feridhanusetyawan et al. 2000; Halim 2000; Holloh 1996). 
Furthermore, the government required state banks to allocate directed concessional credit 
to selective industries with subsidized interest rates, especially to import substitution and 
heavy industries. A credit ceiling hampered the development of small and medium 
enterprises, especially in rural areas. Due to unsound credit allocation practices, the credit 
subsidy program did not reach the majority of the rural population. Financial repression 
decreased the interest rate for public investment, causing enhanced public investment and 
decreased private investment (Fukuchi 1995).  
What Indonesia experienced prior to 1983 is a common phenomenon in 
developing countries with repressed financial systems. Government imposition of 
allocation decisions on the banking industry yields a negative real interest rate, which in 
turn leads to excess demand for credit. Consequently, a credit ceiling is implemented, 
resulting in allocation of funds to favored sectors that are selected administratively rather 
than market-freely. Economic development can be stimulated by financial liberalization. 
A positive real interest rate would result from market determination of interest rates, 
attracting idle funds to be saved in the banking sectors. A positive real interest rate also 
creates incentives for borrowers to invest in productive sectors. Financial liberalization is 
expected to deepen financial sectors in collecting idle funds and channeling them into 
productive investment (Pill and Pradhan 1997).       
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Figure 8. Real Narrow Money, Quasi Money, and Broad Money (% of GDP) 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, CDs July 2004 and July 2005. 
 
The collapse of the oil price shifted the government’s orientation from a heavy 
import substitution industry toward financial and manufacturing industries. The situation 
forced the government to liberalize the financial sector. On June 1, 1983, the Indonesian 
government ended the era of financial repression by allowing the market mechanism to 
operate. The financial liberalization package removed the credit ceiling, allowed the 
nominal interest rate to be market-determined by removing deposit and lending interest 
rate control, removing deposit interest rate subsidies to state banks, and reducing the 
subsidized credit program. A series of financial liberalization packages followed the June 
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package. In January 1985, the liberalization package captured the introduction of 
monetary instruments and central bank certificates. In May 1987, to improve fund 
management, the central bank increased the interest rates on central bank certificates, 
monetary instruments, discount facilities, and swap premiums. On October 27, 1988 the 
government liberalized the financial sector more extensively. The objective of this 
liberalization package was to increase competitiveness in the financial industry and to 
develop the capital market. The reserve requirement was reduced from 15 percent to 2 
percent. Entry and branching barriers to the banking industry were removed. State 
enterprises were allowed to put up to 50 percent of their deposits outside of state banks. 
Restrictions to non-bank financial institutions were also eased. Joint ventures with 
foreign banks were permitted. Domestic banks were allowed to open branches throughout 
Indonesia, foreign banks were allowed to open offices in major cities, and rural banks 
were allowed to operate outside the capitals of provinces. The package also included the 
reduction of the liquidity credit facility from the central bank.  
In December 1988 and March 1989 the liberalization packages on the capital 
market were launched. The Jakarta stock exchange (JSX) was privatized, and foreigners 
were allowed to buy stocks in JSX up to 49 percent of a company’s share, except for 
bank shares. In January 1990, the subsidized credit programs were reduced further; 
domestic banks were required to allocate 20 percent of their portfolio to small firms, 
while foreign and joint venture banks were required to allocate 50 percent of their 
portfolio to export-oriented sectors (Feridhanusetyawan et al. 2000; Halim 2000; 
Hofman, Rodrick-Jones, and Thee 2004; Holloh 1996).  
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 A positive real interest rate was realized after the implementation of financial 
liberalization. Figure 7 shows that real interest rate on deposits started to record a positive 
value of 5.5 percent in 1984, jumped to around 13 percent in the following year, and 
ranged from about 7.5 percent to 14 percent during 1985-1992. The financial 
liberalization packages also changed the composition of monetary aggregates. The earlier 
Figure 2 shows that from 1984 quasi money started to exceed narrow money in 
percentages of GDP. Narrow money showed a constant trend while quasi money 
experienced an increasing trend from 1983 to 1998. The increase in quasi money was 
more remarkable after 1988, suggesting an outward shift of the saving schedule that 
indicated an inflow from unproductive activities (Fukuchi 1995). The holding of quasi 
money peaked in 1998 when it reached 50 percent of GDP. Figures 7 and 8 indeed show 
the results of financial deepening: the realization of a positive real interest rate and the 
significant increase in the holding of time and saving deposits.  
The number of domestic banks and branches increased significantly after the 
October 1988 package was launched. In the era of financial repression, there was a 
decrease in the number of domestic private banks and branches from 138 and 295 
respectively in 1969 to 83 and 279 respectively in 1978. In 1988 there were 94 domestic 
private banks and 1536 branches. In 1993 the number increased to 152 domestic private 
banks and 2923 branches. The number of foreign banks stayed constant at 11 in 1969, 
1978, and 1988 and increased to 39 in 1993. Foreign bank branches only slightly 
increased from 15 in 1969 to 20 in 1978 but increased significantly from 21 in 1988 to 75 
in 1993 (Hill 2000). Credit expansion emerged after the implementation of financial 
liberalization. The share of total credit of domestic private banks increased from 23 
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percent in 1987 to 49 percent in 1996, while the one of foreign banks increased from 3 
percent in 1987 to 10 percent in 1996 (Halim 2000). In addition, by 1995 the share of  
domestic private banks in savings mobilization and credit allocation had exceeded the 
share of state banks (Holloh 1996). Meanwhile, domestic credit increased from 13.50 
percent of GDP in 1982 to 45.48 percent of GDP in 1990 and 62.49 percent of GDP in 
1999 (see Figure 9). The figure shows that domestic credit grew the fastest during the 
period 1988-1991 when massive financial liberalization packages took place. Figure 9 
also shows investment as percent of GDP (data are available only from 1978) and real 
interest rates on lending or working capital loans (data are available only from 1986).   
Fukuchi (1995) found that financial liberalization reduced distortion costs, which 
amounted to 69 percent of total interest payments. However, the financial liberalization 
was not without cost. The extraordinary growth of money supply created inflationary 
pressure. The monetary authority responded by implementing a tight money policy. The 
boom in banking also created some problems. There was a significant number of non-
performing loans. Several banks granted loans to their own affiliated conglomerate 
groups up to 90 percent of the banks’ capital and exceeding the legal lending limit. 
Banking scandals, such as extensive losses caused by foreign exchange speculation, 
excessive loans to the real estate sector, and the misuse of loans, occurred due to lack of 
enforcement of prudential regulation and supervision. The banking sector was not 
fundamentally healthy. In 1991, the government reversed the liberalization measures by 
re-imposing foreign borrowing limits on banks and implementing lending control 
(Feridhanusetyawan et al. 2000).  
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Figure 9. Investment (% of GDP), Domestic Credit (% of GDP),  
and Lending Rate (%) 
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In 1992, the parliament passed a new banking law that emphasized market-
oriented banking. The law removed the specialized functions of state banks and 
transformed them into limited liability companies. New foreign entrants were required to 
establish joint ventures with at least 15 percent of local equity. The central banking law 
was also passed in 1992. All banking activities required a license from the Minister of 
Finance, which was issued based on the central bank’s recommendation. The law also 
enabled the central bank to ask banks’ shareholders to conduct certain measures, such as 
changing the members of the board of directors and commissioners, injecting new capital, 
writing off the bad loans, and covering the losses with the banks’ capital, in the case that 
banks faced liquidity problems (Halim 2000; Holloh 1996). The 1990s story shows that 
 
 
 
       
106
the legal framework and banking supervision were not adequate to frame the 
liberalization measures that perhaps were taken too drastically and too soon. The decline 
in oil prices was seen by the technocrats, who designed the liberalization measures, as an 
opportunity to launch beneficial banking and financial reforms without waiting for the 
institutions to adequately frame the change (Hofman, Rodrick-Jones, and Thee 2004).  
 The economic crisis of 1997-1998 adversely affected the banking sector. As can 
be seen from Figure 9, the nominal interest rate sky rocketed to about 20 percent in 1997 
and 39 percent in 1998. Inflation was also very high at about 58 percent in 1998, resulting 
in a negative real interest rate of about 19 percent in 1998. This was the only time that the 
real interest rate reached a negative value in the period of financial liberalization. The 
nominal interest rate was still high at about 25 percent in 1999 and declined to about 15 
percent in 2002 and 10 percent in 2003. The high interest rate in 1998 and 1999 led to a 
massive debt overhang and a credit crunch in 1999 and 2000.  Before the crisis, the 
interest rate was already high at 15-16 percent in 1995-1996. Consequently, banking and 
corporate sectors borrowed funds in foreign currency. When the Rupiah fell, banking and 
corporate sectors were not able to repay the debt in foreign currency. Furthermore, the 
economic crisis had stopped the allocation of new loans and credit activities 
(Feridhanusetyawan et al. 2000).  
Figure 9 also shows that domestic credit started to decline during 1999-2003. The 
central bank increased the interest rate on the central bank’s certificate from 7 percent to 
30 percent in December 1997 and to 80 percent in 1998 before reducing it to 40 percent 
in 1999. The Rupiah was floated in August 1997 after widening the band of the managed 
floating system from 8 percent to 12 percent. However, the government’s attempt to 
 
 
 
       
107
prevent capital flight and further depreciation by conducting a tight money policy and an 
increasing rate of interest was not effective. The Rupiah depreciated further. Furthermore, 
capital flight remained and capital inflow did not occur. The high interest rate eroded 
banks’ profit and capital base due to the presence of negative spreads, and it also 
increased capital and production costs of the real sector (Feridhanusetyawan et al. 2000; 
Halim 2000).     
 In November 1997, the IMF urged the government to liquidate 16 insolvent 
banks. This liquidation created financial panic and explained the phenomenon of the 
skyrocketing interest rate in 1998. In March 1999, there was a closure of 38 banks and a 
takeover of 7 banks, leaving only 73 banks healthy (Halim 2000). The Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency (IBRA) restructured banking by merging, recapitalizing, closing, 
and taking over a significant number of banks, the cost of which amounted to 
approximately 60 percent of GDP (Feridhanusetyawan et al. 2000).  The IMF’s Letter of 
Intent required that the bank’s reform strategy focus on the government-assisted 
recapitalization program for viable banks; liquidation or take-over for non-viable banks; 
merger, reform, and recapitalization for state banks; central bank’s measures to recover 
liquidity support to troubled banks; and a strengthening of the banking supervision 
system (Halim 2000). Adequate monitoring and supervision of banks are needed to 
institutionally frame the financial deepening.   
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Model and Data 
Model 
Ricardian equivalence implies that the financing method of government 
expenditures does not matter, whereas the conventional view suggests that the interest 
rate reacts more positively to budget deficits than to government expenditures. It is useful 
to distinguish between the two views. Based on the IS-LM model, given a path of 
government expenditures, issuance of government bonds accompanied by a tax cut will 
increase disposable income and domestic consumption. Some portion of the increase in 
domestic consumption will be in the form of an increase in the demand for domestic 
goods, which will increase the real demand for assets. Holding the money supply 
constant, the nominal interest rate should increase to bring back the money market to 
equilibrium. Furthermore, since the balanced-budget multiplier will raise government 
expenditures and increase domestic demand, holding the government budget deficit 
constant, the nominal interest rate is an increasing function of government expenditures. 
The nominal interest rate is also an increasing function of the expected rate of inflation. 
Holding the nominal interest rate constant, an increase in the expected rate of inflation 
will decrease the real interest rate. Consequently, demand for investment increases; 
therefore, real money demand will increase. As a result, the nominal interest rate has to 
rise to equilibrate market for loanable funds. In addition, the nominal interest rate is a 
decreasing function of the real supply of money. Holding constant other factors that 
influence the demand for money, the nominal interest rate has to decrease for economic 
agents to willingly hold the increased real stock of money. The real rate of interest is 
obtained by subtracting the rate of inflation from the nominal interest rate. Higher taxes 
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are expected to decrease the real rate of interest since they decrease aggregate demand via 
the decline in disposable income and private consumption expenditures. Seater (1993) 
mentions that, unlike for consumption behavior, for the interest rate test of Ricardian 
equivalence the decomposition of government expenditures into its transitory and 
permanent components is important. Barro (1987)  models the real interest rate to be 
determined by the stock of debt, budget deficits, and transitory government spending. 
The transitory spending is defined as ttt ggg ˆ−=(  where tgˆ  is the permanent component 
of government spending and tg  is total government spending. Expectations of high 
inflation may also raise the interest rate, and individuals may expect that the growing 
public debt will be paid by seigniorage. Consequently, expected inflation increases, and 
so does the interest rate. Expected inflation is modeled as an autoregressive-moving 
average process. Besides foreign debt, the oil price has played an important role in the 
Indonesian economy. Existing literature on the oil-macroeconomy relationship shows that 
few studies have been conducted to examine the effect of oil price on the interest rate. 
This study, therefore, incorporates the oil price as one of the determinants of interest rate 
behavior. 
The interest rate equations estimated in this study are as the following: 
tttttttt uaTxaMaBaDaGaaR +++++++= π6543210 , and   (3.21) 
tttttttt uPOILaaTxaMaBaDaGaaR +++++++++= 76543210 π ,  (3.22) 
where 
R = real interest rate, 
G = real government consumption expenditures, 
D = real government budget deficits, 
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B = real government debt, 
M = real money supply,  
Tx = real tax revenue, 
π = inflation or expected inflation, 
POIL = oil price, 
u = white noise error term. 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Null hypothesis:  
Under Ricardian equivalence, a2 = a3 = 0. 
Alternative hypothesis:  
a2 ≠ a3 ≠ 0. 
Data 
 Government expenditures, budget deficits, government debt, money supply, and 
tax revenue are expressed as percentages of trend real GDP as a relative measurement to 
the size of the economy. However, estimation involving the above variables in real terms 
(billions of Rupiah) is also conducted. The real value of those variables is obtained by 
dividing the nominal value by the GDP deflator (line 222 International Finance Statistics, 
or IFS). 
 The data are taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS), covering the period 1972-2003. Gross domestic product is taken 
from line 99b IFS. R is the real interest rate on three months’ deposits. In estimations 
involving oil price, R is the nominal money market rate, which is taken from line 60b 
IFS; it represents the rate on short-term lending between financial institutions. The real 
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term is obtained by subtracting the inflation rate from the nominal deposit rate. The 
inflation rate is obtained by dividing the difference form of the consumer price index 
(CPI) (line 64 IFS) by the lagged value of CPI. Expected inflation is obtained by 
estimating inflation as an ARMA(2) process. G is the ratio of the real value of 
government consumption expenditures (line 91 IFS) to the real value of trend GDP, 
multiplied by 100. Temporary government consumption expenditures is obtained by 
subtracting the trend value of real government consumption expenditures from its real 
total. The trend value is obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott filter procedure.2  D is the 
real value of the ratio of the government budget deficit (line 80 IFS) to the real trend 
GDP, multiplied by 100.  The deficit is calculated as the difference between revenue, plus 
grants received, and expenditures, plus lending, minus repayments. Lending minus 
repayments consists of government lending for public policy purposes, minus repayments 
to government and government acquisition of equity participation for public policy 
purposes, minus any sales of such equities by government. This study estimates two 
measures of M, i.e. real narrow money and real base money. Both measures are expressed 
in terms of trend real GDP. Narrow money is the sum of currency outside deposit money 
banks and demand deposits other than those of the central government (line 76 IFS). Base 
money consists of currencies and reserves (line 35 IFS). B is the ratio of the real value of 
the stock of domestic debt (line 88a IFS) and foreign debt (line 89a IFS) to the real trend 
                                                 
2 The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is a smoothing procedure with a two-sided linear filter that computes the   
   smoothed series s of y by minimizing the variance of y around s, subject to a penalty that constrains the  
   second difference of s:  
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   The penalty parameter λ controls the smoothness of the series. The larger the value of λ, the smoother the       
   series. As λ→∞, the series approaches a linear trend (EViews 5.1 Program Applications Help Topics). 
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GDP, multiplied by 100. Tx is tax revenues (line 3.1 GFS). POIL is the official export 
price of crude petroleum (2000=100) in U.S. dollars. 
 Table 8 presents the summary of the data descriptive statistics. For the money 
market rate, the number of observations is 30 (covering the period of 1974-2003); for 
reserve (base) money, the number of observations is 24 (1980-2003); for the other 
variables, there are 32 observations (1972-2003). Therefore, for estimation involving the 
real deposit rate as the dependent variable, the period of observation is 1972-2003; when 
the real money market rate is used as the regressand, the period of observation is 1974-
2003, and when base money is included as one of the regressors, the period of 
observation is 1980-2003. 
  
Table 8. Data Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables  Mean  Median  Max.  Min. Std.Dev.  Skewness Kurtosis 
Deposit Rate  1.17 4.02 13.91 -28.60 10.64 -1.02 3.43 
Money Market Rate 2.14 3.77 21.59 -29.18 8.03 -1.62 9.65 
Govt.Cons/Trend GDP 9.15 9.31 11.66 4.82 1.82 -0.46 2.55 
Temporary Govt. Cons/Trend GDP -0.04 0.13 1.11 -2.28 0.88 -1.06 3.67 
Permanent Govt. Cons/Trend GDP 9.19 9.61 10.98 6.97 1.51 -0.35 1.55 
Govt. Budget/Trend GDP -1.38 -1.78 2.26 -4.32 1.63 0.42 2.36 
Narrow Money/Trend GDP 10.46 10.34 13.17 8.03 1.09 0.28 3.59 
Base Money/Trend GDP 7.48 6.95 12.80 4.78 2.02 1.20 3.91 
Tax Revenues/Trend GDP 15.73 15.50 22.16 11.68 2.67 0.47 2.81 
Inflation 13.55 9.58 58.39 3.72 11.21 2.59 9.94 
Expected Inflation 13.92 11.17 32.74 2.49 7.58 0.98 3.06 
Oil Price 70.70 65.55 122.67 9.76 28.41 -0.01 2.52 
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Analysis 
  
 When using time series data, it is essential to test the stationarity properties of the 
series to avoid spurious regression estimates. A stationary series has finite variance and 
constant long-run mean, which are independent of time. A non-stationary series possesses 
no long-run mean to which the series returns; in addition, the variance of non-stationary 
series is dependent on time. Contrary to the covariance of a stationary series, the 
covariance between two time periods of a non-stationary series depends only on the lag 
between the two time periods and does not depend on time. For non-stationary series, 
serial correlations do not decay, while for stationary series, serial correlations decay as 
lag length increases. Shocks to non-stationary series will have a permanent effect 
whereas shocks to stationary data will be temporary. Unless linearly combined with other 
non-stationary series that yield stationary residuals, regressions involving non-stationary 
time series will yield spurious results, which look good despite the absence of any 
meaningful economic relationship. Non-stationary data contain unit roots. Therefore, it is 
essential to conduct a test for the presence of unit roots. The following equation is the 
generalized form of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for unit roots that is 
implemented in this study: 
t
m
i
ititt YYtY εαδββ ∑
=
−− +Δ+++=Δ
1
121 .      (3.23) 
The null of unit root test:   
δ = 0 or ρ = 1.           (3.24) 
 The ADF statistics for level form presented in Table 9 show that the null of the 
presence of unit root cannot be rejected for all variables. The next procedure is to test the 
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order of integration for each series to investigate how many times the series needs to be 
differenced to become stationary.  If a series needs to be differenced d times to achieve 
stationarity, then it is said to be integrated of order d, or I(d).  The ADF statistics for the 
series in first differences show that the null of unit roots can be rejected for all variables. 
All series need to be differenced once to be stationary series, or I(1). A non-stationary 
series, when combined with other non-stationary series, may form a stationary 
cointegration, generating a meaningful long-run economic relationship.  
 Table 10 presents the estimates of Equation (3.21). Such regressions would be 
meaningless if the residuals were non-stationary. In this case, deviation from the long-run 
interest rate equilibrium will be permanent. If this model has permanent errors, its 
importance is questionable. On the other hand, if the residuals of Equation (3.21) are 
stationary, then the system is cointegrated, since all series are integrated of the same 
order, i.e. I(1). To establish whether the residuals are stationary, a cointegration test is 
performed. The results are presented in Table 11. The null that there is no cointegration 
can be rejected. The residuals are stationary and the variables in the system are 
cointegrated. Estimates of Equation (3.21), hence, are called the cointegrating 
regressions. Any deviation from equilibrium will have temporary effects; therefore, the 
estimates have economic importance and provide a long-run relationship.  
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Table 9. Unit Root Test Estimates 
 
Variables ADF statistic  
for Level 
ADF statistic  
for First Difference 
Order of 
Integration 
Real Interest Rate -1.8068 -5.7073 I(1)*** 
(% p.a.) (0.3699) (0.0001) 
Real Govt. Cons.  -0.3379 -5.8851 I(1)***
(% of Real Trend GDP) (0.5564) (0.0000) 
Real Temporary Govt. Cons. -2.4962 -4.7980 I(1)***
(% of Real Trend GDP) (0.1264) (0.0006) 
Real Permanent Govt.Cons. -1.5808 -1.7633 I(1)*
(% of Real Trend GDP) (0.4809) (0.0740)  
Real Deficit -2.5554 -6.8361 I(1)***
(% of Real Trend GDP) (0.1123) (0.0000) 
Real Debt -2.4941 -5.8036 I(1)***
(% of Real Trend GDP) (0.1268) (0.0000) 
Real Base Money -2.5511 -4.2292 I(1)***
(% of Real Trend GDP) (0.1241) (0.0038) 
Real Narrow Money 0.2455 -7.2873 I(1)***
(% of Real Trend GDP) (0.7496) (0.0000) 
Real Tax Revenues -0.8170 -5.0679 I(1)***
(% of Real Trend GDP) (0.7992) (0.0003) 
Inflation -2.3249 -6.1338 I(1)*** 
(% p.a.) (0.4091) (0.0001)  
Expected Inflation -1.2797 -5.8370 I(1)*** 
(% p.a.) (0.1809) (0.0000)  
Real Govt. Cons.  -1.3201 -5.7060 I(1)*** 
(Billions of Rupiah) (0.6059) (0.0000)  
Real Temporary Govt. Cons. -0.4791 -5.6960 I(1)*** 
(Billions of Rupiah) (0.8816) (0.0001)  
Real Permanent Govt.Cons. -2.8905 -4.4426 I(1)*** 
(Billions of Rupiah) (0.1790) (0.0073)  
Real Deficit -2.7997 -6.5723 I(1)*** 
(Billions of Rupiah) (0.2073) (0.0000)  
Real Debt -0.9370 -3.4697 I(1)*** 
(Billions of Rupiah) (0.7616) (0.0197)  
Real Base Money -0.8422 -4.1154 I(1)*** 
(Billions of Rupiah) (0.7848) (0.0049)  
Real Narrow Money 1.4606 -8.0112 I(1)*** 
(Billions of Rupiah) (0.9987) (0.0000)  
Real Tax Revenues -1.4916 -7.5124 I(1)*** 
(Billions of Rupiah) (0.5236) (0.0000)  
Oil Price -1.68735 -4.68727 I(1)*** 
(2000=100, U.S. Dollar) (0.7362) (0.0033)  
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are probability values. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
 
 
       
116
 The estimates in Table 10 provide support for the Neoclassical view that deficits 
and debt will increase interest rates. The Ricardian view predicts that deficits and debt 
will have no effect on interest rates and that only the level of government spending 
matters. This study decomposes government spending into its temporary and permanent 
components. Existing literature shows that such decomposition is important in the interest 
rate test of Ricardian equivalence. Table 10 shows that temporary government 
consumption expenditures significantly increased the interest rate during 1980-2003, 
while deficits and debt significantly raised the interest rate in all estimated equations 
during 1972-2003 and 1980-2003. If debt increases by 1 percent of GDP, the rate of 
interest increases by around 0.30 percent. Money variables do not seem to explain the 
movement in the interest rate. Only in one equation, i.e. column (1), does the money 
variable significantly affect the interest rate. If narrow money increases by one percent of 
GDP, the interest rate decreases by 2.4 percent. Tax revenue does not affect the interest 
rate, perhaps because tax revenue only constitutes a small proportion of GDP.  By the 
Fisher equation, inflation and expected inflation decrease the real interest rate 
significantly. Expected inflation is generated by an ARMA (2) process.  
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Table 10. The Cointegrating Regressions Estimates: Long-run Effects of 
Government Deficit (% of GDP) and Temporary Government  
Consumption (% of GDP) on Real Interest Rate (%) 
 
Dependent Variable: Real Interest Rate    
 (1) 
1972-2003 
(2) 
1972-2003 
(3) 
1980-2003 
(4) 
1980-2003 
Constant 27.5037 13.3059 -3.4721 9.3108 
Standard error (11.0670) (17.1524) (5.1413) (11.1258) 
t-statistic [2.4852] [0.7757] [-0.6753] [0.8369] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0197}** {0.4449} {0.5076} {0.4136} 
     
Real Temporary Govt. Consumption  
(percent of Real Trend GDP) 
0.1218 2.9122 5.3601 5.6419 
Standard error (1.3962) (2.0829) (1.3811) (1.3751) 
t-statistic [0.0872] [1.3982] [3.8811] [4.1030] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.9311} {0.1739} {0.0010}*** {0.0007}*** 
     
Real Deficit  
(percent of  Real Trend GDP) 
1.3679 2.3309 2.4869 2.2115 
Standard error (0.4984) (0.7429) (0.7668) (0.7834) 
t-statistic [2.7446] [3.1378] [3.2434] [2.8231] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0108}** {0.0042}*** {0.0043}*** {0.0113}** 
     
Real Debt  
(percent of  Real Trend GDP) 
0.3392 0.3866 0.3475 0.3114 
Standard error (0.0632) (0.0983) (0.0902) (0.0930) 
t-statistic [5.3680] [3.9339] [3.8511] [3.3488] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0000}*** {0.0006}*** {0.0011}*** {0.0036}*** 
     
Real Base Money  
(percent of  Real Trend GDP) 
  -0.4315 -0.7299 
Standard error   (0.5977) (0.6314) 
t-statistic   [-0.7219] [-1.1559] 
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.4791} {0.2628} 
     
Real Narrow Money  
(percent of  Real Trend GDP) 
-2.4496 -1.3569   
Standard error (1.0437) (1.6099)   
t-statistic [-2.3471] [-0.8428]   
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0268}** {0.4070}   
     
Real Tax Revenues  
(percent of  Real Trend GDP) 
   -0.6074 
Standard error    (0.4710) 
t-statistic    [-1.2897] 
Prob. (t-statistic)    {0.2135} 
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Table 10. Continued 
 
Dependent Variable: Real Interest Rate    
 (1) 
1972-2003 
(2) 
1972-2003 
(3) 
1980-2003 
(4) 
1980-2003 
     
Inflation -0.7941    
Standard error (0.1053)    
t-statistic [-7.5396]    
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0000}***    
     
Expected Inflation  -0.5913   
Standard error  (0.2099)   
t-statistic  [-2.8168]   
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0091}***   
     
R-squared 0.8660 0.6728 0.6430 0.6732 
F-statistic 33.6017 10.6936 8.5566 7.4169 
Prob. (F-statistic) {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0004}*** {0.0006}*** 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.7961 2.2641 1.9697 2.0638 
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
 
Table 11. Cointegration Test Estimates: Residuals from Table 10 
 
Residuals ADF statistic for Level Order of Integrity 
EC(1) -4.5930 I(0)*** 
 (0.0015)  
EC(2) -4.8621 I(0)*** 
 (0.0005)  
EC(3) -7.1727 I(0)*** 
 (0.0000)  
EC(4) -4.7315 I(0)*** 
 (0.0011)  
 
  Note: 1). Numbers in parentheses are probability values. 
                                            2). EC(1), EC(2), EC(3), and EC(4), are residuals terms  
                                                  from the regressions in columns (1), (2), (3), and (4)  
                 of Table 10, respectively. 
                                     3). *** denotes significance at 1 percent. 
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Having estimated the long-run relationship, the next procedure is to estimate the 
short-run dynamics, which is presented in Table 12. The short-run dynamics of the 
system are affected by the deviation from long-run equilibrium. The short-run error 
correction model uses the estimates of the first lagged residuals (called the error 
correction terms) in the cointegrating regression: EC(1), EC(2), EC(3), and EC(4) from 
columns (1), (2), (3), and (4), respectively from Table 10. The t-statistics for all the error 
correction terms are significant at 1 percent, indicating the presence of an error correction 
mechanism, which also suggests the existence of cointegration. Hence, the OLS estimates 
of the cointegrating regressions are super-consistent.  
Similar to the long-run estimates, the short-run dynamics provide support for the 
Neoclassical paradigm. Deficits and debt significantly raise the real interest rate, and 
temporary government consumption expenditures increase the real interest rate as well. 
Compared to the long-run solution, in the short run base money seems to better explain 
the behavior of the interest rate, and base money also better explains the movement of the 
interest rate than narrow money does. Tax revenues remain insignificant in influencing 
the interest rate.  
 The dummy variable for financial deregulation, D83, increases the real interest 
rate. Prior to 1983, the nominal interest rate was set by the Bank of Indonesia, and 
therefore, did not reflect the real market value of money. During that period, the real 
interest rate was often negative, hindering economic agents from allocating their wealth 
in time or savings deposits. When commercial banks were allowed to set the nominal 
interest rate based on market mechanisms, the interest rate rose, reflecting the market 
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value of money. The 1983 deregulation ended the era of financial repression in Indonesia. 
During the oil boom periods, the real interest rate was lower by around 4-5 percent. 
  
Table 12. The Error Correction Estimates: Short-run Effects of Government  
Deficit (% of GDP) and Temporary Government Consumption   
(% of GDP) on Real Interest Rate (%) 
 
Dependent Variable: D(Real Interest Rate)    
 (1’) 
1973-2003 
(2’) 
1973-2003 
(3’) 
1981-2003 
(4’) 
1981-2003 
Constant 0.3278 0.4747 -9.3989 -6.4809 
Standard error (0.6349) (1.0055) (3.6045) (3.9937) 
t-statistic [0.5162] [0.4721] [-2.6076] [-1.6228] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.6108} {0.6413} {0.0190}** {0.1255} 
     
     
D(Real Temporary Govt. Cons.) 
[% of Real Trend GDP] 
1.2878 5.5855 8.9284 8.7437 
Standard error (0.7428) (1.2269) (1.2098) (1.3256) 
t-statistic [1.7337] [4.5523] [7.3799] [6.5962] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0970}* {0.0001}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** 
     
D(Real Deficit)  
[% of  Real Trend GDP] 
0.5242 2.0823 2.5691 2.3258 
Standard error (0.3889) (0.6222) (0.5565) (0.6911) 
t-statistic [1.3480] [3.3469] [4.6169] [3.3654] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.1914} {0.0028}*** {0.0003}*** {0.0042}*** 
     
D(Real Debt)  
[% of  Real Trend GDP] 
0.1228 0.4306 0.3941 0.3806 
Standard error (0.0593) (0.0999) (0.0804) (0.0928) 
t-statistic [2.0704] [4.3127] [4.9005] [4.0994] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0504}* {0.0003}*** {0.0002}*** {0.0009}*** 
     
D(Real Base Money)  
[% of  Real Trend GDP] 
  -2.4655 -2.2942 
Standard error   (1.0975) (1.1806) 
t-statistic   [-2.2464] [-1.9433] 
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.0391}** {0.0710}* 
     
D(Real Narrow Money)  
[% of  Real Trend GDP] 
-2.0924 -1.5380   
Standard error (0.6691) (1.2086)   
t-statistic [-3.1270] [-1.2726]   
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0049}*** {0.2159}   
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Table 12. Continued 
 
Dependent Variable: D(Real Interest Rate)    
 (1’) 
1973-2003 
(2’) 
1973-2003 
(3’) 
1981-2003 
(4’) 
1981-2003 
     
D(Real Tax Revenues)  
[% of  Real Trend GDP] 
   -0.4621 
Standard error    (0.7699) 
t-statistic    [-0.6002] 
Prob. (t-statistic)    {0.5573} 
     
D(Inflation) -0.8243    
Standard error (0.0509)    
t-statistic [-16.1974]    
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0000}***    
     
D(Expected Inflation)  -0.5642   
Standard error  (0.2054)   
t-statistic  [-2.7471]   
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0115}**   
     
EC(1)[-1]   -1.2588  
Standard error   (0.2191)  
t-statistic   [-5.7451]  
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.0000}***  
     
EC(2)[-1] -0.9817    
Standard error (0.1687)    
t-statistic [-5.8197]    
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0000}***    
     
EC(3)[-1]  -1.4303   
Standard error  (0.1644)   
t-statistic  [-8.7016]   
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0000}***   
     
EC(4)[-1]    -1.2365 
Standard error    (0.2324) 
t-statistic    [-5.3212] 
Prob. (t-statistic)    {0.0001}*** 
     
D(Inflation) -0.8243    
Standard error (0.0509)    
t-statistic [-16.1974]    
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0000}***    
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Table 12. Continued 
 
Dependent Variable: D(Real Interest Rate)    
 (1’) 
1973-2003 
(2’) 
1973-2003 
(3’) 
1981-2003 
(4’) 
1981-2003 
     
D(Expected Inflation)  -0.5642   
Standard error  (0.2054)   
t-statistic  [-2.7471]   
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0115}**   
     
EC(1)[-1]   -1.2588  
Standard error   (0.2191)  
t-statistic   [-5.7451]  
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.0000}***  
     
EC(2)[-1] -0.9817    
Standard error (0.1687)    
t-statistic [-5.8197]    
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0000}***    
     
EC(3)[-1]  -1.4303   
Standard error  (0.1644)   
t-statistic  [-8.7016]   
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0000}***   
     
EC(4)[-1]    -1.2365 
Standard error    (0.2324) 
t-statistic    [-5.3212] 
Prob. (t-statistic)    {0.0001}*** 
     
OILBOOM -4.0735 -5.0525   
Standard error (1.5160) (2.3969)   
t-statistic [-2.6870] [-2.1079]   
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0135}** {0.0461}**   
     
CRISIS 3.4436    
Standard error (1.9215)    
t-statistic [1.7921]    
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0869}*    
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Table 12. Continued 
 
Dependent Variable: D(Real Interest Rate)    
 (1’) 
1973-2003 
(2’) 
1973-2003 
(3’) 
1981-2003 
(4’) 
1981-2003 
     
D83   10.3910 7.1123 
Standard error   (3.8040) (4.0782) 
t-statistic   [2.7316] [1.7440] 
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.0148}** {0.1016}* 
     
R-squared 0.9493 0.8465 0.8559 0.8473 
F-statistic 51.4419 18.1172 15.8399 11.8869 
Prob. (F-statistic) {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.4619 1.4250 1.7130 1.4655 
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
D(.) denotes first difference operator. 
 
 As can be seen from Table 13, unlike temporary government consumption 
expenditures, permanent expenditures do not influence the real interest rate. When 
government spending is not decomposed, its effect on the interest rate is unclear. Column 
(8) shows an insignificant effect, whereas column (9) suggests that an increase of 
government consumption by 1 percent of GDP increases the real interest rate by 2 
percent. Other variables tell a similar story to the estimates of the equations with 
temporary government expenditures as a proxy for government spending: debt and 
deficits significantly increase the real interest rate, suggesting support for the 
Neoclassical prediction. Money and tax revenue do not affect the real interest rate. 
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Table 13. The Cointegrating Regressions Estimates: Long-run Effects of 
Government Deficit (% of GDP) and Permanent Government  
Consumption (% of GDP) on Real Interest Rate (%) 
 
Dependent Variable: Real Deposit Rate     
 (5) 
1972-2003 
(6) 
1972-2003 
(7) 
1980-2003 
(8) 
1972-2003 
(9) 
1980-2003 
Constant -49.3890 -36.8296 -15.8496 -38.9542 -29.9884 
Standard error (20.7162) (18.3645) (20.0145) (14.6315) (13.0818) 
t-statistic [-2.3841] [-2.0055] [-0.7919] [-2.6623] [-2.2924] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0258}** {0.0550}* {0.4382} {0.0129}** {0.0335}** 
      
Real Pmnt. Govt. Cons.  
(% of Real Trend GDP) 
2.9780 0.1972 0.9476   
Standard error (2.0232) (1.2363) (1.4495)   
t-statistic [1.4720] [0.1595] [0.6537]   
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.1546} {0.8745} {0.5211}   
      
Real Govt. Consumption 
(% of Real Trend GDP) 
   1.2065 2.0386 
Standard error    (1.0236) (0.8923) 
t-statistic    [1.1787] [2.2847] 
Prob. (t-statistic)    {0.2488} {0.0340}** 
      
Real Deficit  
(% of  Real Trend GDP) 
3.2322 2.5337 2.8223 2.9543 3.3974 
Standard error (1.2315) (1.0396) (1.2335) (0.9914) (1.0150) 
t-statistic [2.6247] [2.4373] [2.2880] [2.9798] [3.3472] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0151}** {0.0217}** {0.0338}** {0.0060}*** {0.0034}*** 
      
Real Debt  
(% of  Real Trend GDP) 
0.3402 0.3429 0.3387 0.4052 0.3878 
Standard error (0.1670) (0.1354) (0.1272) (0.1324) (0.1118) 
t-statistic [2.0368] [2.5335] [2.6620] [3.0594] [3.4677] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0533}* {0.0174}** {0.0154}** {0.0050}*** {0.0026}*** 
      
Real Base Money  
(% of  Real Trend GDP) 
  0.2244  0.6398 
Standard error   (1.0302)  (0.7975) 
t-statistic   [0.2178]  [0.8022] 
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.8299}  {0.4324} 
      
Real Narrow Money  
(% of  Real Trend GDP) 
3.7514 2.6370  1.8038  
Standard error (1.9137) (1.4277)  (1.5640)  
t-statistic [1.9603] [1.8471]  [1.1533]  
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0622}* {0.0757}*  {0.2589}  
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Table 13. Continued 
 
Dependent Variable: Real Deposit Rate     
 (5) 
1972-2003 
(6) 
1972-2003 
(7) 
1980-2003 
(8) 
1972-2003 
(9) 
1980-2003 
      
Real Tax Revenues  
(% of  Real Trend GDP) 
-1.5263     
Standard error (1.1187)     
t-statistic [-1.3643]     
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.1857}     
      
R-squared 0.5347 0.4718 0.3741 0.4972 0.4980 
F-statistic 5.2868 6.0291 2.8393 6.6740 4.7114 
Prob. (F-statistic) {0.0022}*** {0.0013}*** {0.0531}* {0.0007}*** {0.0082}*** 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.7818 1.6327 1.7594 1.7085 1.8768 
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
 Table 14 summarizes the estimates of the cointegration test for the residuals from 
the regressions in Table 13. All residuals are I(0), suggesting that there exists a long-run 
equilibrium relationship. The lagged residuals, therefore, can be used to tie the short-run 
dynamics to the long-run solution. 
 
Table 14. Cointegration Test Estimates: Residuals from Table 13 
 
Residuals ADF statistic for Level Order of Integrity 
EC(5) -4.6068 I(0)*** 
 (0.0010)  
EC(6) -4.8531 I(0)*** 
 (0.0005)  
EC(7) -4.6589 I(0)*** 
 (0.0008)  
EC(8) -4.2946 I(0)*** 
 (0.0029)  
EC(9) -4.5877 I(0)*** 
 (0.0015)  
 
Note: 1). Numbers in parentheses are probability values. 
          2). EC(5), EC(6), EC(7), EC(8), and EC(9), are residuals 
                terms from the regressions in columns (5), (6),  
                (7), (8) and (9) of Table 13, respectively. 
          3). *** denotes significance at 1 percent. 
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The short-run error correction estimates are presented in Table 15. Similar to the 
long-run estimates, permanent government consumption does not affect the interest rate. 
However, composed government expenditures do increase the real interest rate in the 
short-run, contrary to the long-run estimates. Ricardian equivalence is, again, not 
supported by the data. Narrow money is negatively associated with the real interest rate 
in the short-run.  Tax revenue also lowers the real interest rate, although the effect is 
statistically marginal.  
Financial deregulation increases the real rate of interest. Its lagged effect also 
raises the interest rate. The effect of crisis on the real interest rate is ambiguous. Table 15 
shows that the real interest rate is lower during the crisis, whereas Table 14 shows the 
opposite effect. Figure 7 may explain this phenomenon. The crisis covers the period 
1997-1999. From 1997 to 1998, the real interest rate increased, while from 1998 to 1999, 
it decreased due to soaring inflation. Real rate of interests were lower during the oil boom 
periods. 
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Table 15. The Error Correction Estimates: Short-run Effects of Government  
Deficit (% of GDP) and Permanent Government Consumption  
(% of GDP) on Real Interest Rate (%) 
 
Dependent Variable: D(Real Interest Rate)     
 (5’) 
1973-2003 
(6’) 
1973-2003 
(7’) 
1981-2003 
(8’) 
1973-2003 
(9’) 
1981-2003 
Constant 4.7974 2.0687 -5.7388 2.1568 -9.3732 
Standard error (3.9961 (1.8375 (3.5049 (1.1952 (3.5241 
t-statistic [1.2005] [1.1258] [-1.6374] [1.8045] [-2.6597] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.2440} {0.2719} {0.1224} {0.0837}* {0.0171** 
      
D(Real Pmnt. Govt. Cons.)  
[% of Real Trend GDP] 
-17.8205 -4.9337 6.5769   
Standard error (12.5498) (7.9515) (11.0572)   
t-statistic [-1.4200] [-0.6205] [0.5948]   
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.1710} {0.5410} {0.5608}   
      
(Real Govt. Cons.) 
[% of Real Trend GDP] 
   4.9731 6.6099 
Standard error    (1.3691) (1.0914) 
t-statistic    [3.6323] [6.0562] 
Prob. (t-statistic)    {0.0013}*** {0.0000}*** 
      
D(Real Deficit)  
[% of  Real Trend GDP] 
1.8582 1.5461 1.9265 2.6453 2.8959 
Standard error (0.9163) (0.8164) (0.6737) (0.7510) (0.5515) 
t-statistic [2.0278] [1.8938] [2.8594] [3.5226] [5.2510] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0561}** {0.0709} {0.0119}** {0.0017}*** {0.0001}*** 
      
D(Real Debt)  
[% of  Real Trend GDP] 
0.2746 0.3265 0.5271 0.4041 0.4303 
Standard error (0.1364) (0.1339) (0.1019) (0.1176) (0.0803) 
t-statistic [2.0127] [2.4390] [5.1715] [3.4355] [5.3591] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0578}* {0.0229}** {0.0001}*** {0.0022}*** {0.0001}*** 
      
D(Real Base Money)  
[% of  Real Trend GDP] 
  -0.1213  -2.2286 
Standard error   (1.1442)  (1.0669) 
t-statistic   [-0.1060]  [-2.0888] 
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.9170}  {0.0531}** 
      
D(Real Narrow Money)  
[% of  Real Trend GDP] 
5.4406 3.4939  0.8836  
Standard error (1.2236) (1.0604)  (1.2446)  
t-statistic [4.4463] [3.2949]  [0.7099]  
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0002}*** {0.0032}***  {0.4846}  
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Table 15. Continued 
 
Dependent Variable: D(Real Interest Rate)     
 (5’) 
1973-2003 
(6’) 
1973-2003 
(7’) 
1981-2003 
(8’) 
1973-2003 
(9’) 
1981-2003 
D(Real Tax Revenues)  
[% of  Real Trend GDP] 
-1.7001     
Standard error (0.9859)     
t-statistic [-1.724]     
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.1001}*     
      
EC(5)[-1] -1.2414     
Standard error (0.2177)     
t-statistic [-5.7023]     
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0000}***     
      
EC(6)[-1]    -1.2465  
Standard error    (0.1760)  
t-statistic    [-7.0815]  
Prob. (t-statistic)    {0.0000}***  
      
EC(7)[-1]  -1.1711    
Standard error  (0.2020)    
t-statistic  [-5.7977]    
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0000}***    
      
EC(8)[-1]   -1.4261   
Standard error   (0.2230)   
t-statistic   [-6.3956]   
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.0000}***   
      
EC(9)[-1]     -1.0687 
Standard error     (0.1797) 
t-statistic     [-5.9462] 
Prob. (t-statistic)     {0.0000}*** 
      
      
OILBOOM -9.5863 -10.3155  -12.2015  
Standard error (5.2032) (4.1994)  (3.0276)  
t-statistic [-1.8424] [-2.4564]  [-4.0302]  
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0803}* {0.0220}**  {0.0005}***  
      
      
CRISIS  -8.0186 -14.1374   
Standard error  (4.6364) (3.9424)   
t-statistic  [-1.7295] [-3.5860]   
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0971}* {0.0027}***   
 
 
 
       
129
Table 15. Continued 
 
Dependent Variable: D(Real Interest Rate)     
 (5’) 
1973-2003 
(6’) 
1973-2003 
(7’) 
1981-2003 
(8’) 
1973-2003 
(9’) 
1981-2003 
      
D83 -7.2748    11.4585 
Standard error (5.7539)    (3.7724) 
t-statistic [-1.2643]    [3.0375] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.2207}    {0.0078}*** 
      
D83(-1)   10.0784   
Standard error   (4.0127)   
t-statistic   [2.5116]   
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.0239}**   
      
R-squared 0.7350 0.7052 0.8041 0.7766 0.8621 
F-statistic 6.9356 7.8605 8.7960 13.9081 16.6777 
Prob. (F-statistic) {0.0002}*** {0.0001}*** {0.0002}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.9578 2.0977 2.2711 1.4915 2.3102 
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
D(.) denotes first difference operator. 
  
 The estimation of the interest rate model with the variables expressed as the ratio 
to trend real GDP is intended to take into account the growing size of the Indonesian 
economy. This study also examines the interest rate model with the variables expressed in 
billions of Rupiah. The estimates are presented in Tables 16-19. The results are not 
different from the estimates when the variables are expressed as the ratio to trend real 
GDP. 
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Table 16. The Cointegrating Regressions Estimates: Long-run Effects of 
Government Deficit (Billions Rupiah) and Government Consumption 
(Billions of Rupiah) on Real Interest Rate (%) 
 
Dependent Variable: Real Interest Rate    
 (10) 
1980-2003 
(11) 
1972-2003 
(12) 
1972-2003 
(13) 
1972-2003 
Constant -0.4911 7.8142 -13.3047 3.4556 
Standard error (2.9617) (4.8917) (7.3146) (10.5895) 
t-statistic [-0.1658] [1.5975] [-1.8189] [0.3263] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.8700} {0.1222} {0.0805}* {0.7469} 
     
Real Temporary Govt. Cons.  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
0.0562 0.0275   
Standard error (0.0162) (0.0237)   
t-statistic [3.4679] [1.1597]   
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0026}*** {0.2567}   
     
Real Permanent Govt. Cons.  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
  0.0597  
Standard error   (0.0279)  
t-statistic   [2.1422]  
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.0417}**  
     
Real Govt. Consumption  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
   0.0353 
Standard error    (0.0228) 
t-statistic    [1.5468] 
Prob. (t-statistic)    {0.1345} 
     
Real Deficit  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
0.0226 0.0309 0.0413 0.0392 
Standard error (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.0147) (0.0111) 
t-statistic [2.2132] [2.8447] [2.8011] [3.5270] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0393}** {0.0086}*** {0.0095}*** {0.0016}*** 
     
Real Debt  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
0.0036 0.0046 0.0029 0.0051 
Standard error (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0014) 
t-statistic [3.1294] [3.0418] [1.7167] [3.5458] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0055}*** {0.0053}*** {0.0979}* {0.0016}*** 
     
Real Base Money  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
-0.0081    
Standard error (0.0048)    
t-statistic [-1.6869]    
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.1080}    
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Table 16. Continued 
 
Dependent Variable: Real Interest Rate    
 (10) 
1980-2003 
(11) 
1972-2003 
(12) 
1972-2003 
(13) 
1972-2003 
     
Real Narrow Money  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
 -0.0098 0.0011 -0.0096 
Standard error  (0.0074) (0.0138) (0.0145) 
t-statistic  [-1.3125] [0.0787] [-0.6633] 
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.2008} {0.9379} {0.5132} 
     
Real Tax Revenues  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
  -0.0260 -0.0183 
Standard error   (0.0156 (0.0099 
t-statistic   [-1.6681] [-1.8455] 
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.1073} {0.0768}* 
     
Expected Inflation  -0.6621  -0.5568 
Standard error  (0.2155)  (0.2645) 
t-statistic  [-3.0729]  [-2.1054] 
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0049}***  {0.0455}** 
     
R-squared 0.5495 0.6318 0.4474 0.6765 
F-statistic 5.7944 8.9219 4.2092 8.7121 
Prob. (F-statistic) {0.0032}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0062}*** {0.0000}*** 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.7049 2.2574 1.7931 2.3150 
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
 
Table 17. Cointegration Test Estimates 
 
Residuals ADF statistic for Level Order of Integrity 
EC(10) -4.3145 I(0)*** 
 0.0028  
EC(11) -7.4242 I(0)*** 
 0.0000  
EC(12) -5.3876 I(0)*** 
 0.0001  
EC(13) -7.6439 I(0)*** 
 0.0000  
  
  Note: 1). Numbers in parentheses are probability values. 
                                            2). E(10), EC(11), EC(12), and EC(13), are residuals 
                                                  terms from the regressions in columns (10), (11), 
                                                  (12), and (13) of Table 16, respectively. 
                                            3). *** denotes significance at 1 percent. 
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Table 18. The Error Correction Estimates: Short-run Effects of Government Deficit  
(Billions of Rupiah) and Government Consumption (Billions of Rupiah) 
on Real Interest Rate (%) 
 
Dependent Variable:  
D(Real Interest Rate) 
(10’) 
1981-2003 
(11’) 
1973-2003 
(12’) 
1973-2003 
(13’) 
1973-2003 
Constant -8.0252 0.9817 3.4663 -1.0282 
Standard error (4.0670) (1.0760) (2.2291) (1.1617) 
t-statistic [-1.9733] [0.9124] [1.5550] [-0.8851] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0660}* {0.3714} {0.1342} {0.3861} 
     
D(Real Temporary Govt. Cons. ) 
[Billions of Rupiah] 
0.0950 0.1059   
Standard error (0.0155) (0.0214)   
t-statistic [6.1142] [4.9492]   
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0000}*** {0.0001}***   
     
D(Real Permanent Govt. Cons.)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
  -0.0545  
Standard error   (0.0816)  
t-statistic   [-0.6676]  
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.5113}  
     
D(Real Govt. Consumption)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
   0.0865 
Standard error    (0.0209) 
t-statistic    [4.1283] 
Prob. (t-statistic)    {0.0005}*** 
     
D(Real Deficit)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
0.0238 0.0398 0.0254 0.0383 
Standard error (0.0072) (0.0079) (0.0116) (0.0092) 
t-statistic [3.3064] [5.0608] [2.1992] [4.1583] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0045}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0387}** {0.0004}*** 
     
D(Real Debt)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
0.0037 0.0059 0.0044 0.0059 
Standard error (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0012) 
t-statistic [4.0031] [5.2965] [2.8629] [4.8496] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0010}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0090}*** {0.0001}*** 
     
D(Real Base Money)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
-0.0284    
Standard error (0.0113)    
t-statistic [-2.5225]    
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0226}**    
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Table 18. Continued 
 
Dependent Variable:  
D(Real Interest Rate) 
(10’) 
1981-2003 
(11’) 
1973-2003 
(12’) 
1973-2003 
(13’) 
1973-2003 
D(Real Narrow Money)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
 -0.0430 0.0121 -0.0344 
Standard error  (0.0153) (0.0135) (0.0171) 
t-statistic  [-2.8196] [0.8955] [-2.0046] 
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0100}*** {0.3802} {0.0581}* 
     
D(Real Tax Revenues)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
  -0.0234 -0.0083 
Standard error   (0.0132) (0.0104) 
t-statistic   [-1.7740] [-0.7968] 
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.0899}* {0.4345} 
     
Expected Inflation  -0.4330  -0.4927 
Standard error  (0.2085)  (0.2258) 
t-statistic  [-2.0774]  [-2.1822] 
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0496}**  {0.0406}** 
     
EC(10)[-1] -1.1643    
Standard error (0.2351)    
t-statistic [-4.9520]    
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0001}***    
     
EC(11)[-1]  -1.3124   
Standard error  (0.1496)   
t-statistic  [-8.7710]   
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0000}***   
     
EC(12)[-1]   -1.1326  
Standard error   (0.1699)  
t-statistic   [-6.6665]  
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.0000}***  
     
EC(13)[-1]    -1.3724 
Standard error    (0.1636) 
t-statistic    [-8.3865] 
Prob. (t-statistic)    {0.0000}*** 
     
OILBOOM  -5.3716 -6.1269 -5.0600 
Standard error  (2.2490) (3.3362) (2.4943) 
t-statistic  [-2.3885 [-1.8365 [-2.0287 
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0259}*** {0.0798} {0.0554}* 
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Table 18. Continued 
 
Dependent Variable:  
D(Real Interest Rate) 
(10’) 
1981-2003 
(11’) 
1973-2003 
(12’) 
1973-2003 
(13’) 
1973-2003 
CRISIS  5.7415 -7.9174 6.0599 
Standard error  (3.2834) (4.4217) (3.3731) 
t-statistic  [1.7487] [-1.7906] [1.7966] 
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0943}* {0.0871}* {0.0868}* 
     
D83 9.8764    
Standard error (4.3587)    
t-statistic [2.2659]    
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0377}**    
     
R-squared 0.8160 0.8671 0.7484 0.8563 
F-statistic 11.8262 17.9438 8.1821 13.9076 
Prob. (F-statistic) {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.6882 1.5523 1.7007 1.4337 
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
D(.) denotes first difference operator. 
 
 Table 19 presents the long-run estimates of the interest rate model with the oil 
price included, or Equation (3.22). Table 20 suggests that the residuals from the long-run 
estimates are I(0), indicating that there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship. The 
lagged residuals are then used to estimate the short-run adjustment, which is presented in 
Table 21.  The inclusion of oil price seems to weaken the Neoclassical evidence. The 
deficit no longer affects the interest rate, as is expected by the Ricardian view. The 
significance of debt in affecting the interest rate also decreases. Temporary government 
consumption expenditures remain a better determinant of the interest rate than the 
permanent component. Narrow money and tax revenue have more explanatory power 
compared to the model where oil price is excluded.  The short-run dynamics form a 
similar picture to the long-run equilibrium estimates. 
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Table 19. The Inclusion of Oil Price: Long Run Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Real Interest Rate 
(14) 
1974-2003 
(15) 
1974-2003 
(16) 
1974-2003 
Constant -19.7136 -12.0033 -12.3019 
Standard error (4.6572) (5.7995) (4.9817) 
t-statistic [-4.2330] [-2.0697] [-2.4694] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0003}*** {0.0504}* {0.0218}** 
    
Real Govt. Consumption  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
 -0.0031  
Standard error  (0.0153)  
t-statistic  [-0.2029]  
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.8411}  
    
Real Temporary Govt. Cons.  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
0.0488   
Standard error (0.0143)   
t-statistic [3.4114]   
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0024}***   
    
Real Permanent Govt. Cons.  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
  -0.0031 
Standard error   (0.0163) 
t-statistic   [-0.1905] 
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.8506} 
    
Real Deficit  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
0.0008 -0.0083 -0.0080 
Standard error (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0073) 
t-statistic [0.0989] [-1.0664] [-1.1035] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.9221} {0.2978} {0.2817} 
    
Real Debt  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
0.0027 0.0019 0.0020 
Standard error (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
t-statistic [2.4177] [1.7112] [2.0366] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0239}** {0.1011}* {0.0539}* 
    
Real Narrow Money  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
-0.0370 -0.0283 -0.0290 
Standard error (0.0092) (0.0095) (0.0077) 
t-statistic [-4.0278] [-2.9673] [-3.7704] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0005}*** {0.0071}*** {0.0011}*** 
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Table 19. Continued 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Real Interest Rate 
(14) 
1974-2003 
(15) 
1974-2003 
(16) 
1974-2003 
Real Tax Revenues  
(Billions of Rupiah) 
0.0384 0.0333 0.0337 
Standard error (0.0088) (0.0078) (0.0090) 
t-statistic [4.3545] [4.2507] [3.7367] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0002}*** {0.0003}*** {0.0011}*** 
    
Oil Price -0.1712 -0.1620 -0.1623 
Standard error (0.0591) (0.0602) (0.0621) 
t-statistic [-2.8963] [-2.6921] [-2.6145] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0081}*** {0.0133}** {0.0158}** 
    
Inflation  -0.3938 -0.3785 
Standard error  (0.1082) (0.0758) 
t-statistic  [-3.6380] [-4.9942] 
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0015}*** {0.0001}*** 
    
R-squared 0.7328 0.8115 0.8114 
F-statistic 10.5150 13.5293 13.5256 
Prob. (F-statistic) {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.1369 2.4600 2.4470 
 
            Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
Table 20. Cointegration Test Estimates: Residuals from Table 19 
 
Residuals ADF statistic for Level Order of Integrity 
EC(14) -8.2917 I(0)*** 
 (0.0000)  
EC(15) -7.9223 I(0)*** 
 (0.0000)  
EC(16) -7.9213 I(0)*** 
 (0.0000)  
 
  Note:  1). Numbers in parentheses are probability values. 
                                             2). EC(14), EC(15), and EC(16) are residuals terms  
                                                   from the regressions in columns (14), (15),  
                                                   and (16) of Table 19, respectively. 
                                             3). ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent,  
                  5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 21.  The Inclusion of Oil Price: Short-Run Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Real Interest Rate 
(14’) 
1975-2003 
(15’) 
1975-2003 
(16’) 
1975-2003 
Constant 1.1153 0.5120 0.0955 
Standard error (0.6624) (0.6565) (1.0594) 
t-statistic [1.6837] [0.7800] [0.0902] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.1071} {0.4445} {0.9290} 
    
D(Real Govt. Consumption)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
 0.0097  
Standard error  (0.0159)  
t-statistic  [0.6072]  
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.5505}  
    
D(Real Temporary Govt. Cons.)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
0.0645   
Standard error (0.0144)   
t-statistic [4.4657]   
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0002}***   
    
D(Real Permanent Govt. Cons.)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
  0.0219 
Standard error   (0.0391) 
t-statistic   [0.5603] 
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.5815} 
    
D(Real Deficit)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
0.0105 -0.0021 -0.0027 
Standard error (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0059) 
t-statistic [1.9024] [-0.3267] [-0.4643] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0709}* {0.7473} {0.6474} 
    
D(Real Debt)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
0.0042 0.0030 0.0028 
Standard error (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
t-statistic [5.6294] [3.5379] [3.8062] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0000}*** {0.0021}*** {0.0011}*** 
    
D(Real Narrow Money)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
-0.0401 -0.0286 -0.0231 
Standard error (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0075) 
t-statistic [-3.5501] [-2.5299] [-3.0783] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0019}*** {0.0199}** {0.0059}*** 
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Table 21. Continued 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Real Interest Rate 
(14’) 
1975-2003 
(15’) 
1975-2003 
(16’) 
1975-2003 
D(Real Tax Revenues)  
[Billions of Rupiah] 
0.0209 0.0184 0.0175 
Standard error (0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0072) 
t-statistic [3.0179] [2.5990] [2.4503] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0065}*** {0.0172}** {0.0236}** 
    
D(Oil Price) -0.1258 -0.1297 -0.1315 
Standard error (0.0360) (0.0371) (0.0369) 
t-statistic [-3.4976] [-3.4987] [-3.5614] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0021}*** {0.0023}*** {0.0020}*** 
    
D(Inflation)  -0.3297 -0.3453 
Standard error  (0.0704) (0.0595) 
t-statistic  [-4.6803] [-5.8073] 
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0001}*** {0.0000}*** 
    
EC(14)[-1] -1.1604   
Standard error (0.1541)   
t-statistic [-7.5289]   
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0000}***   
    
EC(15)[-1]   -1.2020 
Standard error   (0.1919) 
t-statistic   [-6.2624 
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.0000}*** 
    
EC(16)[-1]  -1.1931  
Standard error  (0.1920)  
t-statistic  [-6.2128  
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.0000}***  
    
R-squared 0.8583 0.8589 0.8582 
F-statistic 18.1724 15.2209 15.1252 
Prob. (F-statistic) {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.2139 1.4689 1.6252 
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
D(.) denotes first difference operator. 
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Table 22. Correlation Matrix 
 
 Govt.Exp.   Budget       Debt         M1         M0      Tax Inflation    Oil Price 
Govt.Exp. 1.00 -0.05 -0.09 0.67 0.09 0.14 -0.76 0.43 
Budget -0.05 1.00 -0.18 -0.02 -0.26 -0.12 -0.23 -0.26 
Debt -0.09 -0.18 1.00 0.17 0.19 -0.32 -0.02 -0.51 
M1 0.67 -0.02 0.17 1.00 0.33 0.33 -0.59 0.34 
M0 0.09 -0.26 0.19 0.33 1.00 -0.33 0.04 0.23 
Tax 0.14 -0.12 -0.32 0.33 -0.33 1.00 -0.17 0.56 
Inflation -0.76 -0.23 -0.02 -0.59 0.04 -0.17 1.00 -0.31 
Oil Price 0.43 -0.26 -0.51 0.34 0.23 0.56 -0.31 1.00 
 
  
Table 22 presents the correlation matrix of the independent variables in the 
estimation. One may suspect that there are correlations between debt and deficits and 
between government consumption expenditures and deficits; however, the correlation 
matrix shows that there is no evidence for multicollinearity. Conceptually, debt and 
deficits may correlate, but on the collinearity problem between debt and deficits, Seater 
(1993) argues that existing literature shows its “apparent unimportance.” Therefore, such 
collinearity is not a problem.  In this study, the correlation between debt and deficits is a 
low figure of -0.18. 
Oil revenues and government debt have been an important means of government 
financing in the Indonesian economy. The revenue picture is dominated by the changing 
relative importance of the three main aggregates: oil revenue, foreign debt, and other 
domestic revenue (non oil domestic revenue, or NODR). In the late 1960s, foreign 
government debt played a major role, providing 25 to 30 percent of government revenue. 
Before oil prices began to rise steeply, oil revenue contributed 10 to 20 percent of the 
total revenue, with the remaining 50 to 60 percent coming from NODR including tax. 
Increasing oil prices in the 1970s resulted in significant changes in these shares. The 
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share of oil almost doubled from 1971 (25 percent of the total revenue) to 1974 (48 
percent), rising further to its peak share of 62 percent in 1981. Over this period, the share 
of foreign debt fell to less than 20 percent, and during the early 1980s it was as low as 12 
to 13 percent. Declining oil prices in the mid 1980s produced another major change in 
revenue composition. In 1986, oil’s share in revenue had fallen to 29 percent, less than 
half of that of its maximum in 1981. The share of debt to government revenue rose from 
around 16 percent in 1986 to 30 percent in 1988. During the oil boom period, debt funded 
an increasingly small percentage of the development budget (e.g., the government budget 
that is allocated for investment expenditures). The share was 70-75 percent of the total 
development budget prior to the oil boom period in 1970, and this share fell to 25 percent 
in the oil boom periods in 1974 and in 1980-1982. After the oil boom, the share rose to 
70 percent. Hence, during the oil boom, the relative importance of debt fell. However, 
during the oil boom period, the flow of debt remained sizable. The real interest rate 
dropped to almost -30 percent during the oil price shock in 1974. With the nominal 
interest rate held constant by the central bank, the fall in the real interest rate was due to 
the skyrocketing inflation. Indeed, oil price shocks accompanied by limited macro policy 
responses have comprised massive inflationary pressures.  
The government did not utilize the momentum of an increase in oil price to retire 
debt during the oil boom period; rather the government appropriated the resource income 
by increasing public outlays enormously, especially in the health and education sectors. 
Arndt (1974), as is quoted from Hill (2000), observed: 
        Indonesia in 1974 is like a man who has won first prize in a lottery. The    
    opportunities are immense, almost unimaginable. But so are the pressures and  
    temptations to spend too much too fast, and the difficulties in making wise and  
    effective use of the windfall. 
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 The above quotation explains the weakening of the Neoclassical results when the 
oil price is included in the estimation. The reluctance to retire debt generates results that 
are closer to the Ricardian prediction. The government appropriates the windfall revenue 
from oil to meet the urgent need for economic development, for instance, by spending on 
social and economic infrastructure development. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 When the oil price is excluded in the estimation, deficits and debt significantly 
increase the real interest rate, invalidating Ricardian equivalence and supporting the 
Neoclassical hypothesis. Consequently, debt and deficits are likely to crowd out private 
investment through their effects on the interest rate. This implies that capital formation is 
impeded and economic growth is retarded. The evidence shows some preference for debt 
and deficit variables over government consumption expenditures as determinants of 
interest rates. During the oil boom periods, the real interest rate is lower. Together with 
foreign debt, oil has played a significant role in Indonesian economy. The effect of the oil 
price on the macroeconomic relationship seems to be too important to be disregarded.  
In the model with the oil price included as one of interest rate determinants, an 
increase in the oil price significantly lowers the real interest rate. The inclusion of the oil 
price in the interest rate test of Ricardian equivalence weakens the Neoclassical results, 
providing more support for the Ricardian paradigm. The government budget deficit no 
longer increases the interest rate. However, debt still significantly raises the real interest 
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rate. Fiscal policy will matter if the government appropriates the windfall revenue of an 
increase in oil price to retire debt. This represents a loss of momentum of the Indonesian 
government two decades ago to decrease its dependency from public debt. The 
government could have used the windfall foreign exchange reserves to pay off foreign 
debt. The government employed the oil windfall on import-intensive infrastructure 
development projects. Apart from social and economic infrastructure development, a 
large proportion of government consumption expenditures constituted a subsidy for rice 
during the first oil boom and for petroleum products during the second oil boom. The 
money was channeled to build domestic industry and to achieve rice self-sufficiency. 
During oil boom periods, routine and development budget relied on the oil windfall. The 
importance of the oil price in the interest rate estimation suggests that in modeling the 
Indonesian macroeconomy, the oil sector should be incorporated. 
 Economic crisis appears to significantly affect real interest rates, though the 
direction of the effect is ambiguous. The crisis raised the real rate of interest in 1997-
1998 and lowered it in 1998-1999 due to the skyrocketing inflation. The dummy variable 
that represents financial deregulation has a positive effect on the real rate of interest. The 
non-stationary nature of the stock of debt implies the failure of the intertemporal budget 
balance to hold. This, in turn, indicates that the deficit financed by public debt is not 
sustainable. The government needs to shift gears to taxation as the backbone of financing 
its outlays. Issuance of tax identification number for individuals and law enforcement for 
paying taxes should be enhanced.  
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CHAPTER IV 
ESSAY THREE: DO TWIN DEFICITS EXIST IN INDONESIA? 
 
Introduction 
 
The objective of this essay is to empirically investigate whether or not twin 
deficits exist. Twin deficits are said to exist if the government budget deficit leads to a 
current account deficit. The Neoclassical or the conventional view predicts the prevalence 
of twin deficits. On the contrary, the Ricardian paradigm predicts that there is no 
association between government budget deficits and trade deficits.  
Twin deficits may occur if the national saving decreases when the government 
runs budget deficits. Since saving declines, some investment will have to be financed by 
borrowing from abroad. The decrease in national saving implies a decline in net exports, 
causing a trade deficit. Therefore, fiscal policy that decreases national saving, such as tax 
cuts or an increase in government spending, will lead to a trade deficit. However, the 
Ricardian view suggests that twin deficits may not be the case if individuals regard the 
timing of lump sum taxes as neutral. A present tax cut will be matched by a present value 
in future taxation. Only the present value of the government spending matters. In this 
case, national saving will not change in the presence of a budget deficit. Private saving 
will change by the full amount of the change in government saving, leaving national 
saving constant. As a result, a budget deficit will not lead to a trade deficit. The 
irrelevance of the government budget deficit for resource allocation is referred to as the 
Ricardian equivalence.  
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In a regression of trade balance on government budget balance and other control 
variables, Ricardian equivalence is said to hold if the coefficient on government budget 
balance is not statistically different from zero. On the other hand, twin deficits prevail 
when the coefficient on government budget balance is statistically greater than zero. In 
this case, an improvement in the government budget balance will lead to an improvement 
in the trade balance. 
The current account deficit is often regarded as one of the vulnerable factors in 
the health of a country’s fundamental economy. The current account deficit may harm 
several sectors such as manufacturing and agricultural sectors. If the current account 
deficit is partly led by the fiscal deficit, then the policy prescription to reduce the current 
account deficit is to curb the fiscal deficit. Furthermore, unless Ricardian equivalence 
holds and the government budget is spent on expenditures that yield positive social net 
benefits, then the fiscal deficit will harm future generations due to the hindered capital 
formation. Twin deficits seem to be a problem for an economy’s fundamentals. The issue 
of twin deficits is important because, if there is no underlying association between the 
two deficits, then restraining fiscal deficits will not be a panacea for the current account 
deficit. 
Given the features of developing economies of Indonesia such as the nature of 
imperfect capital market, uncertainty, uninformed individuals, and distortionary taxation, 
it is expected that the behavior of the trade balance may not be in conformity with 
Ricardian equivalence. However, it is possible that, although Ricardian equivalence most 
probably would not be supported by Indonesian data, the association between the 
government budget deficit and the trade deficit may still be negligible. In this case, it may 
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be tempting to state that Ricardian equivalence would hold as an approximation. 
Therefore, empirical investigation is needed to gauge the relationship between the 
government budget deficit and the current account deficit. 
It is expected that the trade balance behavior will be as is predicted by the 
conventional view. The conventional view suggests that there is a positive association 
between the government budget balance and the trade balance. Government budget 
deficits will invite foreign capital inflow due to the increase in the rate of interest. The 
balance of payments requires offsetting inflows of goods and services. Hence, the budget 
deficit induces the trade deficit. This essay will examine the effects of the government 
budget deficit and other control variables such as the exchange rate, the stock of money, 
and debt securities on the trade deficit.  
The problem with the interest rate test of Ricardian equivalence, as in Chapter III, 
is the role of international capital flows. Interest rate neutrality may be due to the 
prevalence of Ricardian equivalence or of perfect international capital markets. In the 
presence of a perfect capital market, the government budget deficit will have no impact 
on the interest rate, since the budget deficit leads to an incipient rise of interest rate and 
offsets the capital inflow from abroad. Hence, the interest rate is prevented from rising. In 
this case, interest rate neutrality stems from the inflows of capital, regardless of Ricardian 
equivalence. As a result of the capital inflow, the domestic currency will appreciate, and 
the current account balance will deteriorate. The prevalence of Ricardian equivalence 
implies that the government budget deficit will have no impact on the trade balance. Due 
to the problem in testing Ricardian equivalence via interest rate, it is important to conduct 
a current account test on Ricardian equivalence. The role of capital inflow will be taken 
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into account by incorporating a debt securities variable. In addition, oil has played a 
dominant role in the Indonesian economy. This factor will be considered by examining 
the effect of the oil price in the current account test of Ricardian equivalence.  
 
Literature Review 
 
A current account test of Ricardian equivalence fails to produce clear evidence on 
whether the equivalence prevails. Some studies conduct a current account test of 
Ricardian equivalence by regressing a set of macro-international economic variables and 
government budget and/or debt variables on the current account balance−see for instance 
Ahmed (1986) and (1987), Monadjemi and Kearney (1991), Winner (1993), Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995), and Mohammadi (2004); and on exchange rates−see for instance, 
Feldstein (1986) and Beck (1994). Some studies with time series data often employ the 
Granger causality test−see for instance, Darrat (1988), Anoruo and Ramchander (1998), 
and Vamvoukas (1999); and vector autoregressive (VAR) or vector error correction 
(VEC) approaches−see for instance, Enders and Lee (1990), McMillin and Koray (1990), 
Rosensweig and Tallman (1993), and Normandin (1999). Meanwhile, in an attempt to tie 
the short run dynamics to the long run solution, Akbostanci and Tunç (2002) utilize a 
single equation error correction model (ECM). A single equation ECM is also used by 
Vamvoukas (1999) in addition to trivariate Granger causality. 
In conjunction with the ambiguity of the empirical evidence of the current account 
test of Ricardian equivalence, the theoretical work also yields conflicting results. 
Devereux (1995) develops an overlapping generations model that explores the link 
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among the real exchange rate, trade balance, and anticipated future budget deficits. This 
model predicts ambiguous results: a high elasticity of intertemporal substitution will lead 
to appreciation of the real exchange rate while a low elasticity yields depreciation.  
Kawai and Maccini (1995) develop an extension of the Yaari-Blanchard model 
with forward-looking agents possessing finite lives to study the behavior of the 
government budget balance, the current account balance, and the exchange rate when 
agents perceive that a bonds-financed deficit is unsustainable and anticipate that the 
government will have to switch to tax or money finances or its combination in the future 
period. The solution of the model indicates that the economy will react in two different 
ways: the twin deficits that occur when agents anticipate that the government will finance 
future deficit by increasing taxation; and the unpleasant fiscal arithmetic that occurs when 
there is a current account surplus that accompanies fiscal deficits when agents anticipate 
that the government will finance future deficits by increasing seigniorage.  
Burgess (1996) examines the intergenerational welfare effects of government 
deficits in a simple life cycle model of an almost small open economy such as Canada, 
which can borrow at given interest rates and import at given prices but has unexploited 
market power in exports. The simulation results show that the deficit-financed tax cut that 
is applied to the young generation will cause the real exchange rate to appreciate, despite 
perfect capital market integration. In the long run, the real exchange rate will depreciate 
to a lower level of steady state value and the after-tax wage rate will decline by more than 
the tax increase that is used to finance the larger deficit. Since the real exchange rate 
achieves a lower steady state level asymptotically, a temporary government budget deficit 
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leads to a prolonged adjustment in the current account balance, instead of a complete 
adjustment.  
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) derive intertemporal approaches to the current 
account, and examine the relationship between the current account surplus and the 
government budget deficit using OECD data (1976-1980; 1981-1985; 1986-1990). They 
regress the government deficit to GDP ratio on the current account surplus to GDP ratio. 
The results for the periods 1976-1980 and 1981-1985 support the prediction of the 
overlapping generation model that there is negative correlation between the current 
account surplus and the government budget deficit. However, the negative correlation 
disappears for the period 1986-1990, suggesting that there are other factors that dominate 
the influence on the current account. 
Evans (1986) investigates the effects on the U.S. dollar’s exchange rates with 
other countries (Canada, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Britain, 
and rest of the world) when the United States government shifts its expenditures 
financing from tax to debt, given the path of real money supply and government 
expenditures in the framework of the efficient market hypothesis The results reject the 
conventional view. There is no evidence that U.S. households consume more when 
taxation is substituted for debt, providing support for Ricardian equivalence.     
Feldstein (1986) examines the reasons for changes in the real value of the 
exchange rate between U.S. dollars and German marks during 1973-1984. He employs 
annual data because monthly or quarterly data on expected future budget deficit may 
contain much more measurement error with little or no increase in actual information. 
The results show that an increase of one percentage point in the expected future budget 
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deficit leads to an increase of about 30 percentage points of the exchange rate. However, 
in his later work, Feldstein (1992) argues that the parallel movement of budget and trade 
deficits in the 1980s is not a general phenomenon that is unsustainable in the long run and 
should be considered as a special case. The national income equation implies that a 
decrease in national saving leads to a decrease in the sum of investment and net exports. 
An increase in the budget deficit induces a decrease in national saving−since national 
saving is equal to private saving minus budget deficit−unless private saving offsets by an 
equal amount. U.S. data show that the increase in budget deficit in the 1980s was not 
offset by an increase in private saving. In fact, the ratio of private saving to GNP fell 
during that period. Changes in domestic saving are offset by changes in international 
flows in the short run while persistent changes in domestic saving induce parallel changes 
in domestic investment. The saving gap that drives U.S. enlarged trade deficit in the 
1990s is no longer due to a raise in budget deficit but rather to the decline in private 
saving. The argument that the twin deficits phenomenon is only temporary is supported 
by Feldstein’s further work in 1993. In 1990 the trade deficit was less than 1.5 percent of 
GDP, while the budget deficit, although also declined from its peak, was still recorded 
around 3 percent of GDP. The decrease in the value of the U.S. dollar and the resulting 
decrease in trade deficit imply that the extent of the crowding out effect of budget deficits 
on domestic investment is greater than before.  
Ahmed (1986) investigates the effects of changes in government expenditures in a 
small open economy within an intertemporal substitution framework for U.K. annual data 
1908-1980. This study decomposes government expenditures into its permanent and 
transitory components. The empirics show that temporary government expenditures 
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significantly affect trade balance under the assumption that individuals are not able to 
predict war-related government expenditures. On the other hand, permanent government 
expenditures do not have a significant impact on trade balance, supporting the Ricardian 
equivalence. A unit of government expenditure crowds out 0.40 units of private 
consumption. Meanwhile, under the assumption that individuals are able to predict war-
related government expenditures, temporary government spending still has a significant 
effect on the trade balance, as do permanent government expenditures. In this study, the 
prevalence of Ricardian equivalence depends on whether individuals are able to forecast 
war-related government expenditures. Given that the significant temporary movements of 
government expenditures arise in the peace years, the conclusion of the study relies 
heavily on the observations of the World Wars period. Therefore, Ahmed (1987) 
continues his 1986 study by considering other periods that may provide large variations 
in temporary government expenditures. He employs a large open economy setting since 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britain was much considered as a large 
rather than a small open economy. When the path of government expenditures is held 
constant, changes in the real budget deficit do not affect the trade balance. Large 
intertemporal substitution and the Ricardian equivalence proposition are supported by the 
data.    
 Darrat (1988) utilizes a multivariate Granger causality test U.S. on quarterly data 
1960.1-1984.4. The results cannot reject the null that the fiscal deficit does not Granger-
cause the trade deficit; however, there is also a strong significant feedback from trade 
deficits to fiscal deficits, suggesting a bi-directional causality between the two. The study 
also finds evidence that several macroeconomic variables such as interest rates, exchange 
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rates, and the monetary base significantly affect the variation in both fiscal and trade 
deficits.  
 Using U.S. monthly data 1974.6-1987.10, Melvin, Schlagenhauf, and Talu (1989) 
re-investigate Feldstein’s (1986) findings by estimating the effect of expected future U.S. 
budget deficits and other sets of explanatory variables such as money supply, asset 
holdings, and output on real exchange rate within rational expectations framework. The 
results support the hypothesis that the appreciation of the U.S. dollar is partly due to the 
increase in the expected U.S. budget deficit. 
 By using U.S. and Canadian quarterly data 1961.1-1984.4, McMillin and Koray 
(1990) investigate the effects of government debt on real Canadian/U.S. dollar exchange 
rates within a VAR model that includes government debt, exchange rates, output, price 
level, nominal money, interest rates, and government purchases. The VAR methodology 
is used since it is useful for characterizing the dynamic association among variables 
without imposing theoretical restrictions. The results show that there are negative effects 
of debt on real exchange rates and interest rates that can be explained within the 
Ricardian equivalence framework.  
 Enders and Lee (1990) develop a two-country micro-theoretical model in the 
framework of Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. A substitution of taxes for debt will not 
influence private consumption or current account balance. However, an increase in 
government expenditures will induce a current account deficit. The unconstrained VAR 
results show that the dynamic paths are inconsistent with the Ricardian equivalence 
hypothesis. An increase in debt explains 12.9 percent of the variance in the current 
account balance, 5.2 percent in consumption, and 5.5 percent in interest rates. 
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Meanwhile, a temporary increase in government spending is related to the current 
account deficit. Government spending seems to be a poor substitute for private 
consumption spending. A temporary innovation in government expenditures will 
deteriorate the current account balance. However, the substitution of taxes for debt will 
not result in current account deficits. 
Beck (1993) examines the effects of government budget deficits and government 
spending announcements on exchange rates, interest rates, and forward premia by using 
U.S. monthly data 1980.1-1990.7. The results provide support for the open economy 
hypothesis rather than the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. Announcements of large 
budget deficits in the early 1980s led to the appreciation of the dollar, indicating that 
some of the crowding out effect was transferred to the export sector from the real 
investment sector.  In her further work, Beck (1994) empirically tests the effects of 
budget deficits to exchange rates for five OECD countries: U.S, Japan, Germany, U.K, 
and Canada for the period 1980-1989. She estimates Evans’ (1986) and Feldstein’s 
(1986) specifications. If Ricardian equivalence holds, deficits should be insignificant in 
both specifications. The results show that the coefficients on government budget deficits 
are significant for U.S., Germany, and Canada, invalidating the Ricardian equivalence. 
The Ricardian equivalence is only supported by Japanese data. Expected budget deficits 
induce appreciation of the domestic currency. This currency appreciation transfers the 
crowding out effect to the export sector.  
Rosensweig and Tallman (1993) employ a VAR system that includes government 
expenditures, government budget balance, trade balance, interest rates, and exchange 
rates to investigate whether the government budget deficit leads to dollar appreciation 
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and trade deficits for U.S. quarterly data 1961.1-1989.4. Two measures of fiscal policy, 
i.e. government purchases and government balances, are used to help distinguish between 
the Mundell-Fleming and Ricardian interpretations. Innovations in government budget 
balance are associated with 42.2 percent of the variance of trade balance, indicating 
support for the twin deficit hypothesis. Meanwhile, innovations in the trade balance are 
only associated with 8 percent of the variance in the government budget balance, 
implying a direction of causality that runs from the government budget balance to the 
trade balance. Moreover, innovations in the government budget balance, but not in 
government purchases, yield significant predictive power for future trade balances, 
invalidating Ricardian equivalence. Budget deficits are associated with the appreciation 
of the dollar. 
 Using Australian annual data for 1970-1989, Winner (1993) performs an OLS 
estimation to show that there is no correlation between the government budget deficit and 
the current account deficit. The analysis is based on the IS-LM framework and the 
national income accounting. The saving-investment identity indicates that saving and 
investment have a large impact on the current account balance. Saving and investment 
also counteracted the positive movements of the government budget balance in the late 
1980s. Ricardian equivalence is supported. Meanwhile, Kasa (1994) develops and 
examines the dynamic model of current account to test the existence of twin deficits in 
U.S. (1950-1993), Japan (1960-1992), and Germany (1968-1993). The model includes 
government budget surplus, per capita labor income, government purchases, current 
account surplus, and the world interest rate. The results show that the twin deficits 
hypothesis is supported. Anoruo and Ramchander (1998) employ the multivariate VAR 
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to investigate the relationship between the trade deficits and the fiscal deficits in India 
(1957-1993), Indonesia (1970-1993), Korea (1967-1993), Malaysia (1960-1993), and the 
Philippines (1957-1993); the other control variables are interest rates, exchange rates, 
output, and inflation. The results show that the null that fiscal deficits do not Granger-
cause trade deficits cannot be rejected for all countries except Malaysia. However, 
contrary to most previous studies, the null that trade deficits do not Granger-cause fiscal 
deficits is supported only by very little evidence, indicating that fiscal deficits are not 
causally prior to trade deficits while trade deficits are causally prior to fiscal deficits. Bi-
directional causality between fiscal and trade deficits is found for Malaysian data. The 
pooled estimation also shows the causality from trade deficits to fiscal deficits. This 
anomaly might be because the government sets expenditures to decrease the 
consequences of trade deficit. For example, to protect the domestic manufacturing 
industry that is harmed by large imports, the government may give aid to the industry, 
which leads to a boost in government expenditures and a repression in revenues due to 
the automatic stabilizing aspect of fiscal policy and a depressed activity in the export 
sector. 
 Normandin (1999) examines the twin deficits hypothesis by testing the responses 
of the external deficits to changes in the budget deficits in U.S. and Canada over the 
period 1950.1-1992.3. Following Blanchard’s model, he develops a tractable small open 
economy overlapping the generation model to describe consumer behavior and to derive 
the potential causal relationship between the two deficits. The empirical results indicate 
that the responses of external deficits to an increase of budget deficits due to a tax cut are 
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always large and statistically positive. The responses are positively influenced by the 
birth rate and by the persistence of budget deficits. 
 Peeter’s (1999) OLS estimation results show that there is no association between 
the government budget deficits and the current account deficits in U.S., Germany, and 
UK (1984.1-1994.4). The twin deficits hypothesis is only supported by Japanese data. 
However, NiGEM simulation results show that there is a stronger effect of the 
government budget deficit on the current account deficits. Changes in public (private) 
savings tend to be offset by changes in private (public) saving, especially in the U.S. Due 
to the almost perfect public-private savings in the short run, an increase in private savings 
will be translated as an increase in the government budget deficits. Vamvoukas (1999) 
uses a single equation ECM to find that there is short- and long-run positive association 
between the budget deficits and the trade deficits in Greece over the period 1948-1994. 
Using Granger causality on trivariate of budget deficits, trade deficits, and GDP or 
inflation, he finds that there is unidirectional causality from the budget deficit to the trade 
deficit in the short- and long-run. 
Aksboctanci and Tunç (2002) test the association between the budget deficits and 
the trade deficits in the short-run and long-run in Turkey (1987-2001) by using 
cointegration and ECM. The model includes output, an industrial production index, and 
money supply to capture domestic absorption and monetary channels to proxy different 
channels of interaction between the budget deficits and the trade deficits, as is suggested 
by the Mundell-Flemming model. The cointegration test shows that there is a long run 
equilibrium relationship between budget balance, trade balance, and money supply. In the 
long run, an increase in fiscal deficits will worsen the trade balance. The short run 
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estimation also provides support for the association between budget and trade balances. 
In a more recent study using annual panel data for 63 countries over 1975-1998, 
Mohammadi (2004) regresses government budget surplus, government expenditures, real 
exchange rates, money supply growth, and real income growth on current account 
balance. The results are consistent with the conventional view prediction. 
Most previous current account test of Ricardian equivalence focus on the U.S. or 
industrial countries possessing long time series data. In previous studies, the availability 
of a long series in industrial countries enables the researchers to estimate VAR or VECM, 
which requires the estimation of various lag lengths without worrying about losing the 
degree of freedom. This essay utilizes two-steps Engle-Granger ECM with a single lag 
length, which (as opposed to VAR and VECM) is more appropriate for the short span of 
Indonesian series, since the Engle-Granger ECM does not require various lag lengths, and 
hence, the degree of freedom is maintained.  
All studies that are presented here did not take into account the dominant resource 
aspect of a country. For some period of time, the Indonesian economy was dependent on 
revenues from oil. Giavazzi, Sheen, and Wyplosz (1988) argue that the way the 
government chooses to use windfall revenues from oil has important macroeconomic 
implications. Fiscal policy will have no permanent effects on the economy if the 
government uses the windfall revenues to cut taxes or to increase government 
expenditures. Myopic individuals will spend the resource wealth instead of capitalizing 
on it. Foreign assets will initially increase, leading to a temporary current account surplus 
and exchange rate appreciation. When the resource is exhausted, the current account and 
the exchange rate will return to their initial equilibrium. On the other hand, fiscal policy 
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will have permanent effects on the economy via its effect on the real exchange rate if the 
government uses the windfall revenues to retire its debt. In this case, myopic agents will 
be forced to capitalize by acquiring foreign assets. Revenues from resource extraction 
yield permanent effects on the economy (Giavazzi, Sheen, and Wyplosz 1988).    
This essay is expected to contribute to empirical literature of Ricardian 
equivalence by capturing oil price as a dominant resource aspect of a country. This essay 
will also take into account the role of international capital flows by incorporating the 
variable debt securities in the balance of payment accounts. Most previous studies did not 
explicitly model capital inflows in their attempts to examine the behavior of the current 
account balance. 
 
Analytical Framework 
 
This section delivers the Ricardian view versus the traditional or conventional 
analysis of the link between the government budget balance and the current account 
balance. The relationship between the government budget deficit and the current account 
deficit can be well understood by examining the national income and product accounts. 
However, the fiscal-current account relationship drawn from national income and product 
accounts is merely based on accounting mechanism, not on a behavioral association 
among the variables. The fiscal-current account relationship in the framework of 
behavioral analysis will be discussed later in this section.  
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Saving-Investment Identity 
 
The national income accounting suggests that private saving is the difference 
between disposable income and consumption  (Barth and Wells 1999): 
Sp = Y + Tr + Int – T – C,        (4.1) 
where            
Sp = private saving, 
Y = gross national product, 
Tr = government transfer, 
Int = interest payments, 
T = tax revenue, 
C = private consumption. 
The national income identity states that: 
Y = C + I + G + (NX) .        (4.2) 
Substituting the above income identity into the saving identity yields: 
Sp = I + (G + Tr + Int –T) + NX,       (4.3) 
where                     
G = government spending, 
I = investment, 
NX = net exports. 
This fundamental relationship states that a deficit (G + Tr + Int > T), with private 
saving held constant, lowers national saving (Sp – G – Tr – Int + T) and thereby adversely 
affects investment or net exports or both. The mechanism through which a decline in 
national saving reduces investment and/or net exports is the interest rate. When the 
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government finances a deficit by borrowing in financial markets, the interest rate rises, 
thereby reducing investment spending and causing an appreciation in the currency. The 
appreciation, in turn, retards exports and stimulates imports, worsening the current 
account balance (Barth and Wells 1999). Hence, a government budget deficit is 
associated with a current account deficit. This is the so-called twin deficits hypothesis 
that is suggested by the conventional view. 
 The Ricardian view suggests an opposing hypothesis of the association between 
government budget balance and current account balance. According to the Ricardian 
equivalence hypothesis, the budget deficit has no impact on the current account balance. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) present the case where Ricardian equivalence holds. Ignoring 
transfer and interest payment for simplicity, private saving is: 
Sp = Y – T - C,         (4.4) 
and the government budget surplus is the government saving: 
SG = T – G.          (4.5) 
National saving is the sum of private saving and government saving: 
S = SP + SG = Y – C – G.        (4.6) 
A change in private saving will be offset by an equal amount of a change in government 
saving. If the government lowers taxes by dT in the first period and therefore has to 
increase taxes by (1 + r)dT in the second period, individuals will increase private saving 
by dT so that they can pay higher taxes in the second period. More detailed explanation 
of the two-period consumption and saving decisions will be presented at the end of this 
sub-section. 
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Argy (1994) includes the behavioral approach to illustrate a simple two-country 
model that accommodates Ricardian equivalence. The economies in the two countries are 
assumed to be at full employment level. In each country, the current account balance (X – 
M) is determined by the excess of national savings over investment that must be matched 
by the excess of investment over national savings in the other country: 
DISMX −−=− ,         (4.7) 
where D is the government budget deficit. 
The current account balance is determined by the exchange rate E: 
EMX XMα=− .         (4.8) 
Meanwhile, private saving is a positive function of domestic interest rate rd and is 
adjusting to D by a factor of (1-ф). If ф = 1, then Ricardian equivalence does not hold 
and saving is determined solely by domestic interest rate. On the contrary, if ф = 0, the 
private sector rakes future tax liabilities fully, leading an equal offset of an increase in 
private saving as a response to an increase in government budget deficits, implying that  
Ricardian equivalence holds. 
( )DrS dS φα −+= 1 .         (4.9) 
Investment is a negative function of domestic interest rate: 
dI rI α−= .          (4.10) 
Ignoring its government budget balance, the other country (whose variables are 
represented by asterisks) experiences the following relationships: 
( )MXMX −−=− ** ,        (4.11) 
**** ISMX −=− ,         (4.12) 
***
** rIS ISα=− ,         (4.13) 
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w
d rrr == * ,          (4.14) 
where rw is the world interest rate.     
The effects of deficit in the first country on the world interest rate and exchange rate can 
be analyzed as the following: 
( ) ** ** rDr ISIrd αφαα −=−+ .        (4.15) 
Rearranging the above equation yields: 
( )***
*
ISIrD
r
ααα
φ
++= .        (4.16) 
Solving for E and (X-M) yields: 
( ) ( )( )**** rSIr ISdD
MX
ααα
φα
++−=
− ,       (4.17) 
( )[ ]( )**** ISIrXM ISdD
E
αααα
φα
++−= .,       (4.18) 
Given ф ≠ 0, i.e. Ricardian equivalence does not fully hold, an increase in government 
budget deficits in the first country will lead to the increase in the world interest rate, the 
appreciation of the first country’s currency, and the worsening of the first country’s 
current account balance. In the case where ф = 0, i.e. the full prevalence of Ricardian 
equivalence, an increase in the government budget deficits in the first country will have 
no impact on the world interest rate, the country’s exchange rate, and the current account 
balance. In that case, private saving rises to fully absorb the government budget deficits, 
leaving the interest rate, exchange rate, and current account balance unchanged.  
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The Prevalence of Ricardian Equivalence 
 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996)  illustrate government budget deficits in the absence 
of overlapping generations. Population is assumed to be constant and normalized to unity 
to enable all the variables in the individual’s utility function and budget constraint to be 
associated with the whole economy. The intertemporal individual’s budget constraint is 
therefore (assuming two-period horizon): 
r
TYTY
r
ICIC +
−+−=+
+++
11
22
11
22
11 ,      (4.19) 
where the subscript i denotes the period i.  Assuming that the initial government debt is 
zero, the government budget constraint sets the present value of government expenditures 
to be equal to the present value of government revenues: 
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Substituting Equation (4.20) into Equation (4.19) yields: 
r
GYGY
r
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22
11
22
11 .      (4.21) 
Given the interest rate r, individuals will not change their consumption decisions between 
periods. Imbalances in government budget keep the schemes of individuals’ consumption 
and investment unaltered, hence giving no effect upon the allocation of resources. Each 
dollar of postponed taxes in the current period will be paid with interest in the future 
period by the exact same group of taxpayers alive in the current period: Ricardian 
equivalence holds. Individuals’ consumption decisions are only affected by the present 
value of government expenditures. Obstfeld and Rogoff further point out that Ricardian 
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equivalence holds in the case of infinite horizon. The individual’s asset accumulation 
identity is: 
ttt
P
ttt
P
t
P
t ICTArYAA −−−+=−+1 ,       (4.22) 
where 
P
tA = the individual holdings of financial assets at the end of period t-1. 
Given a constant interest rate r, the individual lifetime budget constraint is: 
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The government’s asset accumulation identity is: 
t
G
ttt
G
t
G
t GArTAA −+=−+1 ,        (4.24) 
where 
 
G
tA = the government’s net financial assets at the end of period t-1.  
 
Equation (4.24) leads to the following government intertemporal budget constraint: 
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Equation (4.25) states that the present value of government revenues must be equal to the 
present value of government expenditures. The economy’s net foreign asset stock is the 
sum of individuals’ assets and government’s assets: 
GP AAA += .          (4.26) 
By summing up the individual and the government budget constraint and applying 
Equation (4.26), the following equation is obtained: 
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Equation (4.27) implies that the timing of taxation does not influence an individual’s 
economic decisions. Private consumption and investment are expressed as functions of 
the constant interest rate r. Individuals will internalize the postponement of taxes in 
deciding the path of consumption and investment. How an economy’s net foreign assets 
are allocated between private sector and government sector does not matter. A transfer of 
foreign assets from the private sector to the government sector will be translated in a tax 
cut, which, assuming a constant path of government expenditures, is just sufficient to 
keep the present value of individuals’ disposable income unaltered. The way the 
government finances its outlays does not change the equilibrium of the economy: 
Ricardian equivalence prevails.  
The Failure of Ricardian Equivalence 
 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) discuss the presence of overlapping the generation 
model that cuts the linkage between individuals’ planning horizons and the government’s 
horizon. Individuals are assumed to have perfect information and are perfectly farsighted. 
The economy is assumed to be a small open one that produces and consumes a single 
composite good. Trades flow freely to the rest of the world but labor is immobile. The 
only traded asset is a consumption-indexed bond with fixed face value and gives net 
interest payment of rt in period t-1 to t. Suppose At+1 is the per capita stock of net foreign 
claims at the end of period t, Yt is the per capita net domestic product in period t, Ct is per 
capita private consumption expenditures, Gt is per capita government expenditures, and It 
is per capita net investment. Then the current account balance can be stated as: 
ttttttttt IGCYArAACA −−−+=−= +1 .      (4.28) 
The market discount factor for consumption at date s is defined by: 
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where Rt,s = 1. 
Forward iterating the current account identity yields: 
( ) ( ) 1,, lim1 +∞→
∞
=
+−++=+ ∑ sstsssssts sttt ARYIGCRAr .     (4.30) 
Since foreign creditors will not permit the economy to roll over the debt indefinitely, 
1,lim +∞→ ssts AR  has to be greater or equal to zero. The intertemporal budget constraint is, 
therefore, stated as follows: 
∑∞
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stR ,  ( ) ( ) ++≤++ ttsss ArIGC 1  s
ts
st YR∑∞
=
, .     (4.31) 
If no resources are willingly forgone, the above equation holds with equality, implying 
that the present value of the economy’s expenditures has to be equal the initial net foreign 
wealth plus the present value of domestic production. Suppose the representative 
individual maximizes the following time-separable utility function: 
=tU  ∑∞
=
−
ts
s
ts Cu )(β ,         (4.32) 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) .0,0,1,0 <′′>′∈ CuCuβ  
Now, let Vt be the real value of domestic firms at the end of period t-1. The dividends 
have been paid after period t-1. Let also Bt be the stock of interest-earning claims owned 
by the domestic private sector at the end of period t-1, let wt be the real wage at period t, 
let Lt be the per capita labor supply, and let Tt be the lump sum taxes. The intertemporal 
budget constraint becomes: 
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When the time-separable utility function is the maximized subject to the above 
intertemporal budget constraint, the following intertemporal Euler equation is obtained: 
( ) ( ) ( )111 ++ ′+=′ ttt CurCu β .        (4.34) 
The Euler equation that equates the marginal rate of substitution of present consumption 
for future consumption to the price of future consumption in terms of present 
consumption implies that individuals will optimize consumption following a smooth 
constant path. Now, suppose the utility function takes the following form: 
( ) σ
σ
/11
1/11
−
−=
−cCu .         (4.35) 
 The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is σ > 0. With the above utility function, the 
growth of optimal consumption will be the following: 
( ) ttt CrC σσβ 11 1 ++ += .        (4.36) 
Equation (4.36) is employed to eliminate Cs (s > t) from the initial intertemporal budget 
constraint to obtain the economy’s date t consumption: 
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Suppose the permanent level of a variable X on date t is defined by: 
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, ,         (4.38) 
 and let ( )σβ R/ be the weighted average of ratios of (s - t) period subjective and market 
discount factors to the power of σ that is defined as: 
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The current account identity and the consumption at date t show the current account 
surplus at date t as the following: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ttttttttttttttt IGYArRIIGGYYArrCA −−+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −+−−−−−+−= σβ /
11 . (4.40) 
Equation (4.40) implies that, if the world interest rate is greater than its average and if the 
economy is a net foreign creditor, then as individuals smooth out consumption and face 
high foreign interest income, the current account will be in larger surplus. On the 
contrary, if the economy is a net foreign debtor, then the current account will be in larger 
deficits. A growing economy can run the current account deficits indefinitely. Suppose 
the production function for a small economy is the following Cobb-Douglas 
specification: 
ααθ −= 1LKY ttt ,          (4.41) 
with α < 1 and where Kt is the end of period t-1 stock of capital that is available for 
production in period t, L is the fixed labor force that is normalized to unity, and θ is the 
coefficient of productivity. θ grows so that: 
( ) tt g θθ α−+ += 11 1 ,         (4.42) 
with the growth rate g > 0. The fixed world rate of interest r must equal to the marginal 
product of capital 1−ααθ tt K . Meanwhile r is assumed to be greater than g.  In steady state, 
investment is: 
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Both output and investment grow at rate g.  In the absence of government expenditures, 
the optimal current account can be shown as: 
( )[ ] ( )( ) ttttttt YrgYAgr rgArAACA ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−−+−+−+−−=−= + αββ
σσ
σσ 111111 .   (4.44) 
Dividing Equation (4.44) by Y yields: 
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Given (1 + r)σβσ < 1 + g, the following steady state is stable: 
( )
( )gr
rgYA −
−−= /1/ α .         (4.46) 
Since (αg)/r = I/Y, the long run foreign debt to output ratio equals to current output to 
present value of future output net of investment ratio. Equation (4.46) presents 
information on the economy’s trade balance if r, g, and α are known. Obstfeld and 
Rogoff explore the shortcoming of this model as the following. With finite lifetimes, the 
individuals are not able to borrow against the present value of the output in the economy. 
Moreover, the world interest rate is determined by the economic growth of the world, 
which must equal (1 + r)σβσ and which is less than (1 + g). If a small economy grows 
faster than the world growth rate in a long period, then it ceases to be a small economy 
and the assumption of constant interest rate will not hold. On the contrary, if a small 
economy has a growth rate that converges to the economic growth of the world, then the 
economy’s ability and propensity to borrow decreases. 
 The following illustrates the predictions on the current account when the economy 
consists of heterogeneous individuals born in different periods that are not connected by 
the altruism chain. Suppose the population of the economy is defined by the labor force 
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Lt whose rate of growth is n; hence Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt, with L0 normalized to unity. An 
individual born on date t will maximize: 
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tv CuU ,, β          (4.47) 
subject to the following budget constraint: 
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where B is the bonds holdings and every individual provides one unit of labor per period. 
All individuals are assumed to face the same wage, interest rate, and lump sum tax. It is 
also assumed that Vv,v = Bv,v = 0. Suppose the interest rate is fixed at r and the utility 
function is u(C) = log (C), hence, the consumption function is: 
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The economy is assumed to start at date 0. Suppose that Xv,t is the value of X on date t. 
The size of generation v = 0 is 1, the size of generation 1 is (1 + n) - 1 = n, the size of 
generation 2 is (1 + n)2 – (1 + n) = n(1 + n), and so on, up to the size of generation t, 
which is n(1 + n)t-1.  Therefore, the per capita average value of X on date t is:  
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The consumption equation expressed as a function of the time path of taxes is: 
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Now, suppose that Dt denotes the per capita government debt at the end of date t-1 and let 
Gt be the per capita government consumption. The intertemporal government budget 
constraint on date t is: 
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In the intertemporal government budget constraint, the present value of tax revenues must 
equal to the present value of government expenditures plus initial debt. If r ≤ n, then 
neither government revenue nor government expenditures has a finite present value; 
therefore, it is assumed that r > n. Dividing the intertemporal government budget 
constraint by (1 + n)t, the following per capita government budget constraint is obtained: 
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Updating the intertemporal government budget constraint by one period yields: 
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1 .        (4.54) 
Solving Equation (4.54) for Tt and taking present values yields the following expression: 
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Rearranging Equation (4.55) yields: 
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Equation (4.56) shows that in a model with overlapping generations, government debt is 
regarded as net wealth by individuals. It implies that higher future government deficits 
will reduce the present value of taxes, given the path of government expenditures. If per 
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capita government debt were a unit higher, the government would have to increase taxes 
in future periods only by (r - n) to hold constant per capita government debt. Hence, an 
additional unit of government debt will increase an individual’s discounted stream of tax 
liabilities by: 
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Now suppose the government conducts a tax cut by (1 + n) units in period t that is 
financed by additional bonds to make Dt+1 a unit higher. To maintain the per capita level 
of debt, the government has to increase taxes by (r – n) per capita started from data (t + 
1). Therefore, the net effect of a tax cut that is financed by debt issuance is the decrease 
of the present value of taxes by: 
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In the absence of altruistic chains that link current to future generations, the current 
generation does not fully internalize future tax liabilities resulting from the issuance of 
government bonds. In this case, a fiscal deficit leads to a current account deficit. A 
translucent way to examine the association is to simply regress the government budget 
balance on the current account balance (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995, 1996). 
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Indonesian Institutional History of the Exchange Rate Regime 
and the Current Account 
 
From 1971-1977, Indonesia adopted a fixed exchange rate by pegging the Rupiah 
to the U.S. dollar, creating the period of exchange rate stability that did not happen in the 
previous years. Figure 10 shows the trend of nominal and real exchange rates of Rupiah 
per U.S. dollar during 1967-2003. From 1971 to 1977 the exchange rate was pegged at 1 
U.S. dollar = 415 Rupiah. The exchange rate stability was accompanied by a dramatic 
decrease in inflation rate (which reached three digits in mid 1960s under the old regime3) 
and tight fiscal policy. This constituted the economic achievement of the new regime4 in 
its early administration. The capital account has been liberalized since 1971. Most 
restrictions on international transactions, which were applied during the old regime, were 
eliminated. The free capital mobility obliged the central bank to buy and sell foreign 
currencies to maintain the pegged exchange rate.  
During the 1970s, the Indonesian economy was marked by huge inflows of 
foreign aid and windfall oil revenues. The windfall was due to the quadrupling oil price 
in the early 1970s, the first oil boom period. The dramatic increase in the oil price during 
the first oil boom doubled the exports to GDP ratio in 1974 to its value in 1971. This ratio 
increased again in 1978-1980 when the second round of an increase in the oil price 
emerged.  
 
                                                 
3 The old regime refers to Indonesia’s first president Soekarno’s administration during 1945-1967. 
4 The new regime refers to Indonesia’s second president Soeharto’s administration during 1969-1998. 
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Figure 10. Nominal and Real Exchange Rates (Rupiah/U.S. Dollar) 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, CDs July 2004 and July 2005. 
 
Figure 11 shows the development of oil price in 1967-2003. If the government 
had been applying a floating exchange rate, the Rupiah would have appreciated. The oil 
boom created Dutch disease where the competitiveness of the non-oil sector eroded due 
to the appreciation of the real exchange rate. The cost of the exchange rate stability was 
the presence of high inflation due to growth in money supply that was spurred by the 
increase in international reserves during the oil boom period.  
Figure 12 shows the inflation rate during 1967-2003. The figure shows that the 
inflation rate reached 20-40 percent during 1973-1976. Apparently, the central bank had 
to print Rupiah in exchange for oil-generated dollar revenues. Although the monetary 
authority was able to curb inflation to 11 percent and 8 percent in 1977 and 1978, 
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respectively, the high inflation in the previous years had disadvantaged Indonesian 
exporters since their cost of production rose while their revenues stayed constant due to 
the fixed exchange rate. To overcome the problem of the exports sector and to anticipate 
the decline in international oil price, the Rupiah was devalued in November 1978 to 1 
U.S. dollar = 625 Rupiah. Many economists assert that this devaluation was unnecessary 
due to the strong position of the balance of payments. Furthermore, prior to the 
devaluation, the inflation rate was low and the government conducted tight fiscal and 
monetary policies. The anticipated decline in international oil price did not occur due to 
the Gulf War in 1978-1979. The war skyrocketed the oil price, bringing the Indonesian 
economy to the second oil boom period, followed by an expansion of monetary 
aggregates. The tight fiscal policy, the 1978 devaluation, and the sudden increase in 
international oil price generated the first period of current account surplus (see Figure 
13). However, the positive impact of devaluation quickly faded away during the second 
period of oil boom. During the oil boom periods, the government debt remained sizable; 
however, its relative importance in financing government expenditures diminished. The 
role of foreign aid in financing development expenditures increased again after the 
decline in the oil price during 1982-1986. During this period, the government cut some 
expenditures and conducted cautious fiscal policy. Reforms in tax, customs, and banking 
sectors were also conducted (Hill 2000). 
 
 
 
 
       
175
Figure 11. Oil Price (Index of Unit Values in U.S. Dollar) 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, CDs July 2004 and July 2005. 
 
From 1983, Indonesia experienced an increase in competitiveness reflected in real 
effective depreciation. The Rupiah was further devalued in March 1983 to 1 U.S. dollar = 
Rp 970 and in September 1986 to 1 U.S. dollar = Rp 1641. Oil price declined sharply in 
1986-1987, resulted partly in low growth of monetary aggregates. Both 1983 and 1986 
devaluation measures generated low inflationary impact due to the low growth of 
monetary aggregates, which partly resulted from the decline in the oil price. The 1986 
devaluation was primarily implemented due to the decrease in foreign exchange revenues 
generated by the oil exports. 
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Figure 12. Inflation Rate (%) 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, CDs July 2004 and July 2005. 
 
The decline in oil price led the government to shift the gear to the manufacturing 
sector as exports-generating revenues. Starting from the mid 1980s, a series of trade 
reforms were launched, leading to the booming of the labor-intensive manufacturing 
sector. This characterized the end of the second oil boom period. Indeed, during 1971-
1986, Indonesia was an oil-dependent economy. After the 1986 devaluation, the fixed 
exchange rate system was replaced by the managed floating exchange rate system. The 
Rupiah was depreciated at 5 percent rate against the U.S. dollar to maintain a constant 
real effective exchange rate in order to avoid further major devaluation. In 1990, the 
managed floating system incorporated a basket of currencies. The exchange rate was not 
actually floated in terms of being “marketly-determined”; rather, it was 
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“administratively-determined” within a certain range of bands. During 1994-1997, the 
intervention bands were widened five times. Prior to the economic crisis that hit East 
Asia in 1997, the exchange rate was being relaxed gradually by widening the bands. In 
July 1997, the exchange rate was freely floated. The nominal exchange rate was 400 
percent depreciated compared to the pre-crisis level. Hill (2000) argued that the 
macroeconomic management prior to the crisis was sound. However, the exchange rate 
management was the major deficiency. The problem was the attempt to implement a 
quasi-fixed exchange rate under the condition of a high level of mobile capital. The 
monetary policy was set to maintain the exchange rate within the intervention bands, 
which led to rapidly rising capital inflows. If the capital inflows were modest and 
government debt constituted the major proportion of the capital inflows, the strategy 
deficiency was limited. However, the private proportion of capital inflows that 
outweighed the government’s proportion destabilized the setting of exchange rate and 
monetary policy. 
The conventional wisdom suggests that the capital account should be liberalized 
last. The first step is to liberalize the current account. The current account should be 
liberalized along with the macroeconomic stability and exchange rate adjustment. The 
objective of current account liberalization is to improve resource allocation by 
eliminating distortions created by trade barriers. The next step is to liberalize the real 
sector by reforming industrial, transportation, foreign investment regulations, and 
domestic regulations. Capital account liberalization should be conducted last because of 
the concern that capital flight during the liberalization of trade and industrial sectors can 
retard the liberalization process. In addition, liberalization of the capital account and 
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financial market prior to the liberalization of current account and industrial sector may 
enable the capital to flow to the preferable distorted sector. Indonesia conducted policies 
that were the opposite of conventional wisdom: liberalizing the capital account, which 
was followed by financial sector deregulation, and finally followed by reforms in the 
industrial sector. The rationale to liberalize the capital account first was to attract foreign 
capital (Soesastro 1999). However, economists view the Indonesian step to liberalize the 
capital account that precedes the liberalization of the industrial sector as a success story, 
at least prior to the 1997 crisis. 
 Figure 13 shows the current account and capital account balances during 1969-
2003. The figure shows that the capital account had always been positive since 1969 until 
the economic crisis hit in 1997. Capital account balance was high in 1990s and reached 
its peak in 1995-1996, with the balance around 12000 million U.S. dollar. The figure 
dropped dramatically to around 7600 U.S. dollar in 1997. In 1998, the capital account 
was positive, but then in 1999-2003 it went back to a negative balance. High capital 
inflows in the 1990s can also be seen from Figure 14, which shows the development of 
debt securities during 1981-2003.  
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Figure 13. Current Account and Capital Account Balances (Millions of U.S. Dollar)  
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Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, Financial Notes, various issues. 
  
The current account balance was always negative, except during the second oil 
boom period in 1979-1980 and during the post-crisis period in 1999-2003. Current 
account deficits and large capital inflows have characterized the pattern of the balance of 
payments. Most of the current account transactions have been financed by oil and gas 
exports. During the first oil boom, the current account remained in deficit due to the rise 
in non-oil imports. The sudden increase in oil price in 1979 and the 1978 devaluation led 
to the current account surpluses in 1979 and 1980. However, these surpluses did not last 
long. The delayed increase in non-oil imports, as responses to the 1979 increase in oil 
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price, together with the softening in international oil market brought the current account 
to a large deficit in 1982. As a response to this current account deterioration, the 
government took some remedial measures by relaxing exports taxes and trade restrictions 
in 1982. These measures resulted in a decrease in deficits in 1984-1985. However, the 
collapse of oil price in 1986 resulted in another large current account deficit. Again, the 
government was able to curb the deficit by controlling inflation and credibly managing 
the current account. A substantial trade liberalization package, which addressed the issue 
of non-tariff barriers, was undertaken in October 1986 and contributed to the surge in 
manufactured exports. However, imports on services (e.g., such as shipping services and 
interest payment on foreign debt) remained large, keeping the deficit current account 
throughout the late 1980s and up to the 1997 crisis. High economic growth in the 1990s 
led to large current account deficits, which, again, declined quickly. During the crisis, the 
current account turned to surpluses due to the decline in imports (Hill, 2000).   
From the late 1960s to the late 1980s, the capital account responded the 
movements in the current account because the capital transactions were mostly conducted 
by the government. Large foreign aid constituted the capital inflows. During the first oil 
boom, foreign aid remained large, although it was not needed for the balance of payments 
support.  Up to the late 1980s, government sector debt comprised 80 percent of total 
foreign debt. Private sector foreign debt began to increase steeply in the late 1980s due to 
the high domestic interest rate and international connections established by major 
domestic conglomerates. During the economic crisis, the capital account continued to 
mirror the current account. For the first time, the capital account recorded a negative 
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balance in 1997. In 1998, the capital account turned positive again due to the large 
official inflows.  
Figure 14 shows that portfolio investment was large in during 1990s due to the 
liberalization of the stock market in 1988. Prior to the crisis, there was an accumulation 
of short-term foreign debt and portfolio investment. Hill (2000) observes that both a high 
level of portfolio investment and short-term external debt contributed to the economic 
vulnerability, which worsened the economic crisis since portfolio investment and short-
term debt are regarded as mobile capital, which can leave Indonesia at short notice. The 
government was not well-equipped to handle the high mobility of the mobile capital. The 
level of mobile capital in Indonesia was the most vulnerable in Southeast Asia. The level 
of short-term debt almost doubled from the one of international reserves. Hill (2000) 
argues that one of the implications of the accumulating short-term debt is that the 
conventional way of viewing the international reserves in a current account context was 
flawed and the international reserves should be viewed as a capital account context. 
After the crisis, the IMF published a memorandum of understanding with the 
government of Indonesia to support deregulation and privatization. To expand the export 
sector, the government prohibited local taxes on export goods. Trade in agricultural 
products, cement, paper, and plywood was deregulated. Punitive export taxes on a wide 
range of products such as leather, cork, ores, and waste aluminum products were 
abolished. Export taxes on logs, sawn timber, rattan, and minerals were reduced. Imports 
restrictions on ships were phased out. Tariffs on food items and non-food agricultural 
products were reduced. Other export restrictions such as quota were also eliminated, 
except the ones imposed for health and security reasons (Fund 1998). Hill (2000) argues 
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that the IMF should have focused more on the problems related to financial and foreign 
exchange crisis.  
 
Figure 14. Portfolio Investment Liabilities: Debt Securities (Millions of U.S. Dollar) 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, CDs July 2004 and July 2005. 
 
Methodology, Model, and Data 
 
Time Series Properties: Unit Roots, Cointegration, and Error Correction Model 
This study uses time series data. The most common assumption with time series 
regressions is that the series are stationary. Regressions involving the levels of non-
stationary data—called spurious regressions by Granger and Newbold (1974)—may yield 
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misleading standard significance tests. Conventional linear regression, ignoring serial 
correlation, suggests a significant relationship even if the series are uncorrelated. 
Spurious regression emerges if the two series in the regression show strong trends, i.e. 
sustained upward or downward movements and the residual sequence contains a 
stochastic trend. Such regression yields high values of R2 and significant t-statistics that 
are the results of the presence of the trend, instead of the correlation between the two 
series. The estimates of spurious regressions have no economic meaning. The least 
squares estimates are inconsistent, and the usual statistical inferences do not hold  
(Enders 1995). Therefore, it is essential to conduct a test for stationarity of the data.                                  
A stochastic process is said to be covariance stationary if the mean is independent 
of time; the variance is a finite, positive constant, independent of time; and the covariance 
between two observations is a finite function of the distance between the two 
observations but not of the observations themselves. A test for the unit root will be 
utilized to test for the stationarity of the series. For series Y, for instance, the unit root test 
constitutes a regression of (Greene 2000; Gujarati 1995): 
ttt uYY += −1ρ  ,         (4.59) 
where ut = white noise error term, i.e. non-autocorrelated stochastic error term with zero  
                  mean and constant variance σ2. 
The null hypothesis for the unit root is ρ = 1. If the null cannot be rejected, then Y is a 
random walk time series. Substracting Yt-1 from Equation (4.59) yields: 
( ) ttttt uYuYY +=+−=Δ −− 111 δρ ,       (4.60) 
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where ( )1−= ρδ ,  
           1−−=Δ ttt YYY  . 
Now, the null is δ = 0. The null cannot be rejected if the absolute value t-statistics, which 
is called the Dickey-Fuller (DF) statistic, exceeds the DF or MacKinnon critical value. If 
the null cannot be rejected, then the above equation can be written as: 
tttt uYYY =−=Δ −1 .         (4.61) 
 
Therefore, the first difference of a non-stationary time series is stationary because ut is 
assumed to be random. If the first difference of a random walk series is stationary, then 
the series is said to be integrated of order one, or I(1). If the series needs to be differenced 
d times to achieve stationarity, then it is said to be integrated of order d, or, I(d).  Other 
forms of the DF test are as the following: 
ttt uYY ++=Δ −11 δβ ,         (4.62) 
ttt uYtY +++=Δ −121 δββ ,        (4.63) 
where t = the time trend.  
The null of unit root is δ = 0. In the case of autocorrelated error term, the above equations 
can be generalized into the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test: 
t
m
i
ititt YYtY εαδββ ∑
=
−− +Δ+++=Δ
1
121 .      (4.64) 
The null of unit root test is δ = 0 or ρ = 1.  
If two series (for instance, Y and X) that are integrated of order one form a 
stationary linear combination, then Y and X are said to be cointegrated. Suppose Y is 
regressed on X: 
ttt uXY ++= 21 ββ .         (4.65) 
 
 
 
       
185
Equation (4.65) can be written as: 
ttt XYu 21 ββ +−= .         (4.66) 
If ut, the linear combination of Yt and  Xt, is I(0), then Y and X are on the same 
wavelength or cointegrated. Non-stationary ut will not decay, and the sequence has a 
stochastic trend. Consequently, any deviation from the equilibrium model (Equation 
(4.66)) will occur permanently. An economic model with a permanent error will not 
inherently possess economic importance (Enders 1995).  
There may be a linear combination of the integrated stationary variables. If such a 
linear combination exists, the trends in Yt and Xt cancel out, and the variables are said to 
be cointegrated. Two series that possess the same order of integration may be 
cointegrated. Generally, if Y is I(d) and so is X, then Y and X can be cointegrated. 
Regression involving cointegrated variables will yield meaningful, non-spurious results 
and will provide long-run information. In other words, if Y and X are cointegrated, then it 
can be said that there is a long run equilibrium relationship between them. In this case, 
Equation (4.66) is called the cointegrating regression equation, and the coefficients βs are 
called the cointegrating parameters. Disequilibrium may exist in the short run. The 
residuals, ut in the above equation, can be thought of as the equilibrium error and can be 
utilized to tie the short run behavior of Y to its long run equilibrium. The mechanism of 
adjustment from short run disequilibrium to the long run solution exists because 
individuals are assumed to be able to recognize deviations between their current position 
and the desired long run position. The motivation to adjust from the short run 
disequilibrium to the long run equilibrium value is transmitted to a dynamic reaction 
function. This mechanism is known as the error correction model (ECM) popularized by 
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Engle and Granger (1987). Therefore, ECM is a dynamic vehicle to bridge the short run 
disequilibrium with its long run equilibrium solution and also to tie the econometric 
method with the time series procedure. The following illustrates the ECM of Y and X: 
tttt uXY εββ +Δ+Δ+=Δ −121 ,       (4.67) 
where ∆ut-1 = the lagged value of the first difference of ut from Equation (4.65)  
               εt  = the white noise error term. 
The estimation of Equations (4.65) and (4.67) is called the two steps Engle-Granger ECM 
(Engle and Granger 1987). In this essay, the model that depicts the fiscal-current account 
balances relationship will be estimated by using the specific form of Equations (4.65) and 
(4.67).  
Model  
The estimated model in this essay is constructed based on variables that are most 
commonly used by existing literature in explaining the behavior of the current account. 
The model also takes into account the institutional history of the Indonesian current 
account, for instance the exchange rate regime and the devaluation events that are 
captured in the construction of dummy variables. Oil has dominated the Indonesian 
economy, especially during the period 1971-1986. The dominant resource aspect of the 
country is considered by incorporating oil price. The basic model is as follows: 
tt
ttttt
uDEBTSECINFL
MPOILBUDGETXRCA
+++
++++=
76
54321 2
αα
ααααα
    (4.68) 
where 
CA = exports minus imports of goods and services divided by trend GDP, multiplied by  
         100,  
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XR = real exchange rate (2000 constant price, Rupiah/U.S. dollar), 
BUDGET = government budget balance divided by trend GDP, multiplied by 100, 
POIL = oil export price (2000=100, indices of unit values in U.S. dollar),  
M2 = broad money divided by trend GDP, multiplied by 100,  
INFL = inflation rate, 
DEBTSEC = debt securities divided by trend GDP, multiplied by 100, 
ut = error term. 
Hypothesis 
Null hypothesis:  
Under Ricardian equivalence, α3 = 0. 
Alternative hypothesis: 
 α3 ≠ 0. 
To get the error correction representation, the following equation is estimated: 
ttt
ttttt
uECDDEBTSECDINFL
DMDPOILDBUDGETDXRDCA
++++
++++=
−1876
54321 2
ααα
ααααα
   (4.69) 
 
where D denotes the first-difference operator and ECt-1 denotes the error correction term 
that is the first lag of the estimated error term from Equation (4.68). 
Data 
 Data are taken from International Financial Statistics, CDs July 2004, July 2005 
and June 2006. Oil price is official price of crude petroleum export price (2000=100). 
The inflation rate is obtained by dividing the difference form of the consumer price index 
(CPI) by the lagged value of CPI. The government budget balance is calculated as the 
difference between revenue plus grants received and expenditures plus lending minus 
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repayments. A negative sign indicates a deficit, and a positive sign indicates a surplus. 
Lending minus repayments consists of government lending for public policy purposes 
minus repayments to government and government acquisition of equity participation for 
public policy purposes minus any sales of such equities by government. Broad money is 
the sum of narrow money (M1) plus quasi money (QM). Narrow money is the sum of 
currency outside deposit money banks and demand deposits other than those of the 
central government. Quasi money is the sum of time and saving deposits plus the foreign 
currency deposit of resident sectors other than central government. The current account 
balance is obtained by subtracting the imports of goods and services from exports of 
goods and services.  The real exchange rate is computed by dividing the nominal value of 
Rupiah per U.S. dollar by foreign consumer price index (U.S. CPI) over domestic 
consumer price index. The real values of goods and services balances, broad money, and 
government budget balance are obtained by deflating the nominal values with the GDP 
deflator. The trend value of GDP is obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott filter procedure.5 
 The model is estimated over the period 1969-2003, except for the estimation 
involving the debt securities variable, which covers the period 1981-2003 due to debt 
securities data availability. The institutional history of the current account shows that 
Indonesia experienced a surge of capital inflows in the 1990s. Debt securities, as a proxy 
for capital inflows, are expected to explain the behavior of current account balances. 
However, debt securities data are only available from 1981. Hence, the inclusion of debt 
                                                 
5 The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is a smoothing procedure with a two-sided linear filter that computes the   
   smoothed series s of y by minimizing the variance of y around s, subject to a penalty that constrains the   
   second difference of s:  
  ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]21
2
11
2
1
∑∑ −
=
−+
=
−−−+−
T
t
tttt
T
t
tt sssssy λ  
   The penalty parameter λ controls the smoothness of the series. The larger is the value of λ, the smoother   
   the series. As λ→∞, the series approaches a linear trend (EViews 5.1 Program Applications Help Topics). 
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securities in the estimated model is conducted for 1981-2003 period of estimation. To 
capture the effect of the Indonesian exchange rate regime and the economic crisis, the 
model also includes a set of dummy variables: (i) D78, which represents the fixed 
exchange rate regime, taking the value of 0 prior to 1978 and 1 otherwise; (ii) DEV78, 
which represents devaluation in 1978, taking the value of 1 for year 1978 and 0 
otherwise; (iii) DEV86, which represents devaluation in 1986, taking the value of 1 for 
year 1986 and 0 otherwise; (iv) CRISIS, which represents economic crisis, taking the 
value of 1 for the years 1997-1999 and 0 otherwise. Table 23 presents the descriptive 
statistics. 
 
Table 23. Data Descriptive Statistics 
 
    Mean  Median       Max.     Min.   Std. Dev.       Skewness  Kurtosis 
Bal. on Goods&Serv. 2.85 2.27 17.91 -18.40 5.75 -0.76 7.10 
Govt. Budget -1.79 -1.99 1.84 -8.90 2.07 -0.79 5.27 
Real Exchange Rate 4407.16 3643.05 11845.63 1807.92 2264.03 1.44 4.92 
Oil Price 61.98 61.68 122.67 5.85 34.58 -0.14 2.18 
Broad Money 31.46 30.73 58.15 11.26 14.77 0.20 1.81 
Inflation 16.51 10.09 128.57 3.72 21.97 4.05 20.35 
Debt Securities 0.27 0.00 2.54 -0.68 0.70 1.51 5.89 
 
 
 
 
       
190
 
Analysis 
 
The variables of interest in this essay are the exports minus imports of goods and 
services and the balance of the government budget. Figure 15 shows the trend of the two 
series as percentages of GDP during 1969-2003. The two series seem to move in the 
same direction during the periods of 1970-1973, 1975-1978, 1984-1987, 1991-1992, 
1993-1994, and 2000-2002. Beyond those periods, they either move in the opposite 
direction or show no clear pattern. The balance on goods and services show huge 
surpluses during the oil booms in 1974-1975 and 1978-1981 and during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. The government budget balance series does not show a lot of 
fluctuations.  
Figure 15 shows that goods and services balance and government budget balance 
move closely together during the years 1984-1987, suggesting the presence of twin 
deficits. This is the period during which fiscal severity was implemented. The economy 
was adjusting to the decline in oil price. The government cut back some development 
projects, and some portion of foreign debt maturity was due. The government had to pay 
an increasing amount of foreign debt principal repayment. During this period of 
adjustment to the lower oil price, the debt retirement measures partly explain the twin 
deficits movement. This phenomenon confirms Giavazzi, Sheen, and Wyplosz (1988) 
argument that when the government retires its debt, fiscal policy will matter to the 
economy, invalidating the Ricardian equivalence. However, beyond 1987, the movement 
of goods and services balance and government budget balance is less clear. Even if the 
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two series seem to move in the same direction, their movement is not as close as those 
during 1984-1987.  Hence, this method of casual empirics should be accompanied by 
regression analysis. 
 
Figure 15. Government Budget Balance and Goods and Services Balance 
(% of GDP) 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, CDs July 2004 and July 2005. 
 
The classical linear regression assumes that all series (balance on goods and 
services, government budget balance, exchange rate, oil price, broad money, inflation, 
and debt securities) in Equation (4.67) are stationary and the error term ut has a zero 
mean and time-invariant finite variance. To test the stationarity properties of the series, 
ADF unit root tests as in Equation (4.65) are conducted. Table 24 summarizes the 
estimates for unit root tests. The ADF statistics show that all series are non-stationary and 
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achieve stationarity after being differenced once, or are integrated of order one, I(1). 
Since all series are integrated of the same order, they will be on the same wavelength and 
can be cointegrated.  A test on stationarity property proceeds with the unit root test for 
the residual sequence of Equation (4.69). 
 
Table 24. Unit Root Test Estimates 
 
Variables ADF statistic  
for Level 
ADF statistic  
for First Difference 
Order of Integrity 
Balance on Goods and Services -1.67091 -4.82270 I(1)*** 
 (0.73630) (0.00270)  
Government Budget -1.69407 -3.83061 I(1)*** 
 (0.72370) (0.02920)  
Exchange Rate -2.60546 -7.87330 I(1)*** 
 (0.28030) (0.00000)  
Oil Price -1.68735 -4.68727 I(1)*** 
 (0.73620) (0.00330)  
Broad Money -1.39980 -6.01346 I(1)*** 
 (0.83580) (0.00010)  
Inflation -2.32485 -6.13382 I(1)*** 
 (0.40910) (0.00010)  
Debt Securities 0.21410 -3.36073 I(1)* 
 (0.99480) (0.10030)  
 
          Note: Numbers in parentheses are probability values. 
          ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
Table 25 presents the estimates of Equation (4.69). Despite the unit root test 
results that all variables are nonstationary, the linear combination among them may be 
stationary. If the residual term ut of Equation (4.69), which constitutes the linear 
combination among the variables in question, is stationary or I(0), then the variables are 
cointegrated. If this is the case, then the regression is not spurious and is referred to as 
cointegrating regression.  
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Table 25. The Cointegrating Regressions Estimates: Long-run Information 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Current Account 
(1) 
1969-2003 
(2) 
1981-2003 
(3) 
1969-2003 
(4) 
1981-2003 
Constant -2.09539 -5.51703 -3.59135 -6.41033 
Standard error (2.15089) (3.05000) (2.21925) (3.24106) 
t-statistic [-0.97420] [-1.80886] [-1.61827] [-1.97785] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.33770} {0.08820}* {0.11640} {0.06540}* 
     
Government Budget 1.01489 0.46941 1.06518 0.45457 
Standard error (0.34461) (0.28359) (0.33244) (0.28621) 
t-statistic [2.94502] [1.65526] [3.20412] [1.58825] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.00620}*** {0.11620} {0.00330}*** {0.13180} 
     
Exchange Rate 0.00296 0.00254 0.00243 0.00222 
Standard error (0.00067) (0.00052) (0.00070) (0.00064) 
t-statistic [4.44227] [4.88558] [3.48603] [3.43783] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.00010}*** {0.00010}*** {0.00160}*** {0.00340}*** 
     
Oil Price 0.10060 0.05827 0.10398 0.06154 
Standard error (0.02314) (0.01893) (0.02232) (0.01944) 
t-statistic [4.34712] [3.07803] [4.65791] [3.16527] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.00010}*** {0.00680}*** {0.00010}*** {0.00600}*** 
     
Broad Money -0.42780 -0.22022 -0.36113 -0.17374 
Standard error (0.11493) (0.11080) (0.11619) (0.12385) 
t-statistic [-3.72214] [-1.98755] [-3.10815] [-1.40285] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.00080}*** {0.06320}* {0.00420}*** {0.1798} 
     
Inflation   0.11994 0.05463 
Standard error   (0.06455) (0.06306) 
t-statistic   [1.85795] [0.86628] 
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.07340}* {0.39910} 
     
Debt Securities  -1.61782  -1.95930 
Standard error  (0.57043)  (0.69688) 
t-statistic  [-2.83612]  [-2.81155] 
Prob. (t-statistic)  {0.01140}**  {0.01250}** 
     
R-squared 0.58054 0.83804 0.62516 0.84529 
F-statistic 10.37995 17.59257 9.67305 14.57033 
Prob (F-statistic) {0.00002}*** {0.00000}*** {0.00002}*** {0.00001}*** 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.77929 1.68408 0.85813 1.72706 
 
        Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 26 summarizes the stationarity test results of the Equation (4.69) residuals 
sequence.  The ADF statistics show that the null hypothesis that the series has a unit root 
can be rejected. The linear combination of nonstationary variables (goods and services 
balance, government budget balance, real exchange rates, oil price, broad money, 
inflation, and debt securities) is stationary or I(0). Since all variables are integrated of the 
same order and the sequence of the residual term is stationary, then the variables are said 
to be cointegrated. The stationary nature of the residual enables any deviation from 
balance of goods and services equilibrium to be temporary and to be eradicated, so that 
equilibrium or long-run relationship is restored. As a consequence, the estimates of 
Equation (4.69) are meaningful. The presence of cointegration implies long-run 
equilibrium among the variables. Hence, the cointegrating parameters presented in Table 
25 provide meaningful long-run information. 
 
Table 26. Cointegration Test Estimates 
 
Residuals ADF statistic for Level Order of Integrity 
EC1 -3.10373 I(0)** 
 (0.03570)  
EC2 -4.37652 I(0)*** 
 (0.00300)  
EC3 -3.30222 I(0)** 
 (0.02260)  
EC4 -5.42272 I(0)*** 
 (0.00030)  
 
  Note:  1). Numbers in parentheses are probability values. 
                                             2). EC1, EC2, EC3, and EC4, are residuals terms 
                                                   from the regressions in columns (1), (2), (3),  
                                                   and (4) of Table 25, respectively. 
                                             3). ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent,  
                  5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Any deviation from the long-run equilibrium influences the path of a cointegrated 
system and the short-run dynamics of the variables. The linkage among the trends of the 
variables in the system conveys an association between the dynamics paths of the 
variables and the disequilibrium. In a cointegrated system, there exists a correction 
mechanism toward equilibrium. The movement toward equilibrium acts in response to 
the magnitude of the disequilibrium. The presence of the cointegration enables the 
residuals from the cointegrating regression to be utilized to estimate the error correction 
representation.  
Table 27 presents the results for the error correction models that provide short-run 
information: Equation (4.65). In this mechanism, the short-run dynamics of the variables 
are affected by the deviation from the equilibrium. All of the error correction terms EC1, 
EC2, EC3, and EC4 are significantly different from zero, indicating the existence of error 
correction mechanism, and implying that the D(CA), D(BUDGET), D(XR), D(POIL), 
D(M2), D(INFL), and D(DEBTSEC) converge to the long-run equilibrium relationship. 
The coefficients of the error correction terms provide information on the speed of 
adjustment to long-run equilibrium. The speed of adjustment of the equilibrium error 
terms is better fit by EC1 and EC3 than EC2 and EC4, since the values of the formers are 
smaller than unity while the values of the latter variables are larger than unity in absolute 
values. The presence of cointegrating regressions and the significance of the error 
correction terms provide the empirical validity of the Granger Representation Theorem 
that cointegration and error correction mechanism are equivalent.  
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Table 27. The Error Correction Estimates: Short-run Information 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Current Account  
(1A) 
1970-2003 
(1B) 
1970-2003 
(2A) 
1982-2003 
(2B) 
1982-2003 
(3A) 
1970-2003 
(3B) 
1970-2003 
(4A) 
1982-2003 
(4B) 
1982-2003 
Constant 0.1847 1.3949 -0.2075 -0.1022 0.3316 -0.0340 -0.2181 -0.0713 
Standard error (0.5028) (0.9297) (0.3391) (0.3599) (0.4775) (0.4588) (0.4193) (0.4002) 
t-statistic [0.3673] [1.5004] [-0.6118] [-0.2840] [0.6944] [-0.0740] [-0.5202] [-0.1782] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.7161} {0.1456} {0.5498} {0.7809} {0.4934} {0.9416} {0.6110} {0.8613} 
         
D(Govt. Budget) 0.7326 0.7302 0.4885 0.4136 0.7200 0.7918 0.4611 0.3719 
Standard error (0.2676) (0.2566) (0.1673) (0.1748) (0.2507) (0.2312) (0.1795) (0.1751) 
t-statistic [2.7376] [2.8462] [2.9198] [2.3658] [2.8723] [3.4249] [2.5681] [2.1236] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0106}** {0.0085}*** {0.0106}** {0.0342}** {0.0078} {0.0021} {0.0223}** {0.0535}* 
         
D(Exchange Rate) 0.0025 0.0024 0.0024 0.0023 0.0020 0.0019 0.0022 0.0022 
Standard error (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
t-statistic [5.0888] [4.9928] [4.8968] [4.6891] [3.5080] [3.6213] [4.0973] [4.3450] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0002}*** {0.0004}*** {0.0016}*** {0.0013}*** {0.0011}*** {0.0008}*** 
         
D(Oil Price) 0.1318 0.1251 0.0868 0.0882 0.1294 0.1371 0.0827 0.0856 
Standard error (0.0413) (0.0398) (0.0284) (0.0276) (0.0380) (0.0351) (0.0354) (0.0330) 
t-statistic [3.1949] [3.1445] [3.0617] [3.2001] [3.4026] [3.9071] [2.3383] [2.5921] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0034}*** {0.0041}*** {0.0079}*** {0.0070}*** {0.0021}*** {0.0006}*** {0.0347}** {0.0223}** 
         
D(Broad Money) -0.3772 -0.3471 -0.1463 -0.1586 -0.4642 -0.4951 -0.1124 -0.1224 
Standard error (0.1599) (0.1633) (0.1523) (0.1464) (0.1538) (0.1477) (0.1968) (0.1838) 
t-statistic [-2.3589] [-2.1260] [-0.9605] [-1.0828] [-3.0173] [-3.3524] [-0.5710] [-0.6661] 
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0255}** {0.0432}** {0.3520} {0.2986} {0.0055}*** {0.0026}*** {0.5771} {0.5170} 
         
D(Debt Securities)   -1.6090 -1.4417   -1.5863 -1.5533 
Standard error   (0.5648) (0.6850)   (0.8518) (0.7952) 
t-statistic   [-2.8488] [-2.1045]   [-1.8623] [-1.9534] 
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.0122}** {0.0554}*   {0.0837}* {0.0726}* 
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Table 27. Continued 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Current Account  
(1A) 
1970-2003 
(1B) 
1970-2003 
(2A) 
1982-2003 
(2B) 
1982-2003 
(3A) 
1970-2003 
(3B) 
1970-2003 
(4A) 
1982-2003 
(4B) 
1982-2003 
D(Inflation)     0.1130 0.1280 0.0252 0.0270 
Standard error     (0.0519) (0.0486) (0.0799) (0.0746) 
t-statistic     [2.1750] [2.6346] [0.3156] [0.3614] 
Prob. (t-statistic)     {0.0386}** {0.0143}** {0.7569} {0.7236} 
         
EC1(-1) -0.5340 -0.4995       
Standard error (0.1664) (0.1609)       
t-statistic [-3.2095] [-3.1055]       
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0033}*** {0.0045}***       
         
EC2(-1)   -1.2097 -1.2152     
Standard error   (0.2633) (0.2522)     
t-statistic   [-4.5938] [-4.8194]     
Prob. (t-statistic)   {0.0004}*** {0.0003}***     
         
EC3(-1)     -0.5173 -0.5366   
Standard error     (0.1624) (0.1596)   
t-statistic     [-3.1851] [-3.3632]   
Prob. (t-statistic)     {0.0036}*** {0.0025***}   
         
EC4(-1)       -1.2212 -1.2272 
Standard error       (0.2873) (0.2682) 
t-statistic       [-4.2506] [-4.5763] 
Prob. (t-statistic)       {0.0008***} {0.0005}*** 
         
CRISIS 2.3876   0.3497  2.1518   
Standard error (1.7176)   (1.2106)  (1.6087)   
t-statistic [1.3901]   [0.2889]  [1.3375]   
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.1763}   {0.7772}  {0.1931}   
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Table 27. Continued 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Current Account  
(1A) 
1970-2003 
(1B) 
1970-2003 
(2A) 
1982-2003 
(2B) 
1982-2003 
(3A) 
1970-2003 
(3B) 
1970-2003 
(4A) 
1982-2003 
(4B) 
1982-2003 
D78 -1.9105        
Standard error (1.0981)        
t-statistic [-1.7398]        
Prob. (t-statistic) {0.0937}*        
         
DEV78      5.8085   
Standard error      (2.5000)   
t-statistic      [2.3234]   
Prob. (t-statistic)      {0.0286}**   
         
DEV86    -2.7253    -2.7379 
Standard error    (1.5319)    (1.5620) 
t-statistic    [-1.7790]    [-1.7528] 
Prob. (t-statistic)    {0.0986}*    {0.1032}* 
         
R-squared 0.6137 0.6707 0.8437 0.8761 0.6732 0.7464 0.8387 0.8696 
F-statistic 8.8982 7.5661 13.4902 11.4917 9.2680 9.1991 10.4026 10.8338 
Prob(F-statistic) {0.0000}*** {0.0001}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0001}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0000}*** {0.0001}*** {0.0001}*** 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.5933 1.7939 1.6166 1.6832 1.4882 1.6361 1.5485 1.5934 
 
         Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
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The short-run estimates in Table 27 show that there is a positive association 
between government budget deficits and trade deficits, as predicted by the conventional 
view. This association is statistically significant for all estimated equations. An increase 
in government spending will decrease national saving and will induce a trade deficit due 
to the need of investment financing from abroad. Specifically, if government budget 
balance increases by 1 percent of GDP, the trade balance will improve by around 0.72-
0.79 percent of GDP for the period 1970-2003. The magnitude of the association 
diminishes when debt securities are included in the estimation during 1982-2003. If the 
budget balance rises by 1 percent of GDP, trade balance will raise by around 0.41-0.46 
percent of GDP for the period 1982-2003. Depreciation in exchange rate will statistically 
improve the trade balance. If the real exchange rate increases (or the Rupiah depreciates) 
by Rp1000 per U.S. dollar, trade balance will improve by around 19-25 percent of GDP. 
This relationship holds in all estimated equations. The trade balance was slightly lower 
by 2 percent of GDP during the fixed exchange rate regime. The devaluation in 1978 
improved the trade balance by 5.8 percent of GDP in the short-run. The dummy variable 
for devaluation in 1986 seems to worsen the trade balance. However, 1986 was also the 
year when oil price collapsed, which generated a large trade deficit. Therefore, the effect 
of the devaluation to the trade balance cannot be separated from the effect of oil price 
collapse that occurred in the same year. 
The long-run estimates presented in Table 25 provide similar stories to the short-
run ones. When exchange rate depreciates, the current account improves. If the Rupiah 
depreciates by Rp 1000 per U.S. dollar, current account balance increases by 22-29 
percent of GDP. This relationship holds in all estimated periods and equations. As is 
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indicated by the short-run estimates, the long-run estimates of inflation rate do not seem 
to explain the behavior trade balance during 1981-2003, and they explain only marginally 
but with diminutive impact during 1969-2003.   
An increase in government budget balance or a decrease in budget deficit will 
statistically significantly increase the trade balance with the magnitude of about one-to-
one during 1969-2003. Thus, one percent of GDP increase in the budget balance will 
improve trade balance by one percent of GDP. This result confirms the twin deficits 
hypothesis. However, when the debt securities variable is included for the estimation 
period 1981-2003, the government budget no longer affects the balance of goods and 
services, suggesting support for Ricardian equivalence. Debt securities seem to take over 
the explanatory power of the government budget in influencing the trade balance. If debt 
securities increase by 1 percent of GDP, trade balance will worsen by 1.4-1.6 percent of 
GDP in the short-run and 1.6-1.9 percent of GDP in the long-run. An increase in the 
balance of the capital account is accompanied by a decrease in the balance of the current 
account.  
Similar to the short-run dynamics, the long-run estimates suggest that an increase 
in oil price significantly improves the trade balance. An increase in oil price indices by 1 
U.S. dollar will improve the trade balance by 8-13 percent of GDP in the short run and 5-
10 percent of GDP in the long-run. The oil price explains the behavior of trade balance in 
all estimated equations and periods. Ricardian results emerge in the 1981-2003 period, 
when Indonesia no longer experienced an oil bonanza. It seems that, since the 
government no longer had windfall funds to retire its debt, it appropriated the oil revenue 
to finance government spending. The Ricardian results seem to stem from the use of oil 
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revenue to finance government expenditures. Before and after the oil boom periods, 
foreign debt constituted an important source of budget financing. Although the 
government did not appropriate majority of windfall revenues from oil to retire its debt, 
the importance of foreign debt in financing development budget diminished during the oil 
booms. During the oil booms, the government had more flexible choices in allocating the 
resource revenue between retiring its debt and increasing government spending. Although 
a huge proportion of oil revenue during the oil boom was allocated to finance huge 
government projects, the allocation was recorded ”off-budget.” The government did 
indeed increase the level of development expenditures, especially for defense, health, 
education, and transmigration sectors; however, the declining proportion of foreign debt 
in the budget shows that the government also utilized some of the oil revenues to retire its 
debt.  This may partly explain the results that fiscal policy matters during the period 
where both oil boom periods (1973-1974 and 1978-1979) are included in the estimation.   
Empirical evidences seem to lend support for twin deficits hypothesis rather than 
Ricardian equivalence. The way the government finances its expenditures matters to the 
current account balance. Therefore, the government cannot just implement fiscal deficits 
without considering its consequences to the economy. Alternative measure of financing 
such as taxation should be emphasized. If Ricardian equivalence were to hold, increasing 
taxes without changing the level of government expenditures would not affect the current 
account balance. In the Ricardian case, given the level of government expenditures, an 
increase in tax will decrease the deficits in government budget, but the current account 
deficits will remain. This is not the case with Indonesia. Raising taxes will have a 
positive impact on the current account balance through expenditure switching. An 
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increase in tax collection will lower the fiscal deficits, and in turn, will improve the 
current account balance. In addition, if Ricardian equivalence were to hold, the 
government budget deficit would not necessarily create a burden for future generations. 
Unfortunately, this notion is not supported by Indonesian data. Unless the excess of 
government outlays is spent in such a way that the return is greater than the cost (which is 
hard to measure), it will be better for the macroeconomy if the government can reduce 
fiscal deficits. Moreover, fiscal deficits may discourage capital formation through the 
crowding-out mechanism, as is evident in the previous chapter. Therefore, emphasis on 
taxation is essential. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
  
 Overall, it can be concluded that the Ricardian equivalence proposition is not 
supported by the data. Around 80 percent of the estimation results provide support for the 
conventional view. The trade and government budget balances show behavior that is 
consistent with the twin deficits hypothesis. The long-run estimates indicate an almost 
one-to-one relationship between government budget and trade balance over the period 
1969-2003, whereas the short-run estimates show a smaller magnitude. When a variable 
representing capital inflows is included, the twin deficits phenomenon is less pronounced 
in the short-run and disappears in the long-run. During 1981-2003, the long-run estimates 
show that fiscal policy has no impact on the trade balance as is predicted by the Ricardian 
paradigm.  An increase in oil price significantly improves the trade balance in the short- 
and long-run and in both periods of 1969-2003 and 1982-2003. The oil price significance 
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in the latter period is surprising since Indonesia was an oil-dependent economy during the 
period 1971-1987.  
 Since Ricardian equivalence does not hold, fiscal deficits will retard capital 
formation. The empirics show that fiscal deficits lead to trade deficits by an almost one-
to-one magnitude of association. Hence, by curtailing fiscal deficits, trade deficits will 
also be contained. The policy prescription is to raise tax collection. An increase in 
taxation will constitute a counter deficits policy that will lower the current account 
deficits via the reduction of imports induced by the decline of individuals’ after-tax 
income. In order to do so, buoyancy and efficiency in the taxation system need to be 
achieved.  
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CHAPTER V 
 ESSAY FOUR: TESTING RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE UNDER 
DISTORTIONARY TAXATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
 
 The theoretical predictions of the effect of deficit spending on the economy are 
not clear. The Keynesian view, assuming under-employment, predicts the expansionary 
effect of deficit spending. Treating the deficit spending as an increase in disposable 
income, individuals will raise consumption, which in turn, will increase the aggregate 
demand throughout the economy. The Neoclassical view, on the other hand, predicts that 
deficit spending will have an adverse effect on the economy. Government debt will 
increase the rate of interest, crowd out private investment, and retard economic growth. 
Government bonds issued in the current period are, therefore, established at the expense 
of future generations. In his seminal paper, Barro (1974) argues that the expense-shifting 
from current to future generation does not need to happen in the presence of 
intergenerational transfers. Knowing that the debt will have to be repaid by his/her 
children, altruistic bondholders will not regard the government debt as net wealth. As a 
result, instead of raising consumption, bondholders will increase their savings as 
anticipation for an increase in future taxation. Financing government expenditures with 
taxes will have an effect equivalent to that of financing government expenditures with 
debt. This proposition is referred to as the Ricardian equivalence. Ricardian equivalence 
assumes perfect capital market, infinite horizon, certainty on future income, rationality 
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and perfect foresight, and non-distortionary taxation. In Barro’s scheme, altruistic, 
rational and farsighted agents will operate intergenerational transfers to offset the burden 
of government debt that is supposed to be borne by their children (Bernheim 1989; Seater 
1993).      
 The unclear nature of the theoretical predictions leads to the conduct of empirical 
studies on the effect of deficit spending on the economy. Most previous studies utilize the 
econometric approach. There have been only a few studies that use an experimental 
approach to examine the effect of deficit spending on consumption expenditures (Cadsby 
and Frank 1991; Ricciuti and Di Laurea 2003; Slate 1995). The experimental method has 
the advantage of allowing a more direct test of behavioral assumptions (Davis and Holt 
1993). In this framework, the effectiveness of government financing policy depends on 
individuals’ behaviour. Specifically, it depends on whether individuals recognize 
intertemporal trade-offs: whether individuals recognize the increase in future debt 
repayment liabilities, whether individuals are altruistic, whether individuals will operate 
intergenerational transfers (Davis and Holt 1993). These issues can be inquired by setting 
a laboratory. 
Previous experimental studies on Ricardian equivalence have not taken into 
account the effect of distortionary taxation on the prevalence of Ricardian equivalence. 
This study is expected to contribute to the existing literature of Ricardian equivalence by 
implementing distortionary taxes in a Ricardian institution. Distortionary taxes are 
induced by levying taxes on savings in an intertemporal individual consumption-savings 
decision making laboratory experiments. The results show that with distortionary taxes, 
individuals no longer equate their interperiodal consumption. The change in bequest is 
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not equal to the change in deficit spending, invalidating Ricardian equivalence. In 
addition, bequest does not respond positively to the increase in tax rate on savings.  
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. Section Two summarizes the 
literature review. Section Three describes the experimental design. Section Four presents 
the hypothesis and the numerical predictions. Section Five presents the analysis and 
Section Six concludes. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Cadsby and Frank (1991) pioneer the experimental test of Ricardian equivalence 
by creating Barro’s environment: operative intergenerational transfer is set under the 
mechanism of intergenerational utility functions within an overlapping generation 
structure. Their results show that when the equilibrium solution of intergenerational 
transfer is greater than zero, individuals’ decision making shows a Ricardian pattern. 
When the transfer is imposed to be greater or equal to zero, Neoclassical results occur. 
When agents are myopic, a change in deficit spending is not fully offset by a change in 
transfer, implying Keynesian prediction.  
 Slate, McKee, Beck, and Alm (1995) test Ricardian equivalence with uncertainty. 
Within the framework of intergenerational utility function with the imposition of a non-
negativity constraint on intergenerational transfer, they relax the assumption of certainty 
on future income by setting the probability of government bonds retirement as 20 percent, 
40 percent, 80 percent, and 100 percent. The results show that as the probability of bonds 
retirement increases, intergenerational transfer increases as is expected by the Ricardian 
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equivalence proposition. An increase in consumption occurs when the probability of 
bonds retirement is low, confirming Keynesian prediction. Consumption decisions seem 
to depend on the probability of bonds repayment.  
 Ricciuti and DiLaurea (2003) examine the prevalence of Ricardian equivalence 
under the presence of liquidity constraints and uncertainty. Utilizing Cadsby and Frank’s 
setting, Ricciuti and DiLaurea allow the relaxation of the perfect capital market 
assumption in one treatment and the assumption of certainty on the current generation’s 
income in the other treatment. In the baseline treatment where the environment is set to 
represent Ricardian economy, the results support the Ricardian prediction. Individuals 
equate consumption allocations over periods. In the liquidity constraints treatment, 
individuals no longer equate consumption across periods. However, partial support for 
the Ricardian prediction is found. In the uncertainty treatment, the results provide no 
evidence for Ricardian equivalence. 
 Previous experimental tests have focused on relaxing the Ricardian equivalence 
assumptions of perfect capital market, perfect foresight, and certainty of future income. 
There have been no studies that inquire about the effect of distortionary taxes on the 
prevalence of Ricardian equivalence. This study aims at examining the Ricardian 
equivalence under distortionary taxation. The experimental design utilizes the 
overlapping generation setting where the utility of future generation enters the utility of 
the current generation as is pioneered by Cadsby and Frank (1991). The levy of non-
distortionary taxation is expected to generate a different impact from the levy of 
distortionary taxation. In the second treatment, consumption taxes as a representative of 
non-distortionary taxes will be levied. In the third treatment, taxes on savings will be 
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levied to represent implementation of distortionary taxes. The derivations of the 
individuals’ optimization problem show that the Ricardian equivalence will hold in the 
baseline and in the non-distortionary taxation treatments while the Ricardian equivalence 
is predicted to fail in the presence of distortionary taxation. The experiments were 
programmed and conducted using software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999). We build our 
code based on the code created by Ricciuti and DiLaurea (2003).6      
  
Experimental Design 
 
Following Cadsby and Frank (1991), Slate, McKee, Beck, and Alm (1995), and 
Ricciuti and DiLaurea (2003), the design of the experiment utilizes an intergenerational 
utility function in an overlapping generation model setting. Two groups of players, the 
older generation and the younger generation, will represent the overlapping generation 
model. The older generation’s utility function depends on the younger generation’s 
utility, creating intergenerational utility scheme. The inclusion of the younger 
generation’s utility into the older generation’s utility characterizes the altruism motive of 
the older generation, acting as an operative chain between generations, as is illustrated by 
Barro (1974). This operative chain expands the planning horizon into an infinite one, 
facilitating the Ricardian equivalence scheme.   
There are two experiments: one is conducted in the morning, and the other one is 
conducted in the afternoon. Each experiment consists of two treatments: (i) the baseline 
                                                 
6 We are indebted to Roberto Ricciuti for the provision of his experimental code upon which our code was 
developed. We are also indebted to Krawee Ackaramongkolrotn, Senior Research Associate at the 
Experimental Center Georgia State University for his immeasurable help on the programming.  
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treatment, and (ii) the savings taxes treatment. In the morning experiment, Experiment 1, 
the baseline treatment is conducted before the savings taxes treatment. On the other hand, 
in the afternoon experiment, Experiment 2, to control for the ordering effect, the baseline 
treatment is conducted after the savings taxes treatment. The baseline treatment consists 
of 12 rounds and the savings taxes treatment consists of 18 rounds. Every 6 rounds, the 
parameter set changes. Each round consists of 3 periods: Period 1, Period 2, and Period 3. 
The older generation lives in Period 1 and Period 2 while the younger generation lives in 
Period 2 and Period 3, creating an overlapping generation scheme. At the beginning of 
Period 1, the computer displays Private Information containing the parameters’ values. At 
the end of Period 3, the computer displays the scores and a new round begins. There is no 
linkage across the rounds. Before each of paying treatment, 6 practice rounds are 
conducted to give some learning process to subjects. After the instructions are read, the 
subjects are allowed to ask questions and the practice questions are conducted to ensure 
that subjects understand the game in the experiment.   
The subjects are drawn from a subjects’ pool of the Experimental Center, 
Department of Economics, Georgia State University. There are two experiments with 16 
subjects participating in each experiment. The participants, called “players,” are 
randomly divided into two groups, called Group A and Group B. We will refer to players 
in Group A as Players A and players in Group B as Players B. Each player is in the same 
group throughout the experiment.  
Each player from Group A is randomly paired with another player from Group B. 
This pairing changes in every round. Each subject is not paired with the same person in 
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two consecutive rounds and will not be paired with the same person more than twice in a 
session/treatment.  
The currency used throughout the experiment is franks. At the end of the 
experiment, the franks that the subjects earn are converted into U.S. dollars at the 
following exchange rates: 1 frank = 0.00000025 U.S. dollar when a player is in Group A; 
1 frank = 0.0005 U.S. dollar when a player is a member of Group B. The exchange rates 
between players in Group A and players in Group B differ so that earnings will be similar 
for players who make good decisions. 
Subjects in Group A will play the older generation, referred to as the Giver, while 
subjects in Group B will play the younger generation, referred to as the Receiver. The 
Giver will receive an endowment (income) of ωG1 franks at the beginning of Period 1 of 
which he/she has to decide how much to allocate for consumption, CG1, and how much 
for savings, SG1. Savings that are made in Period 1 will be carried over to Period 2. The 
Giver will also receive an extra endowment or loan of ωG2 franks at the beginning of 
Period 2. Again, in Period 2, the Giver has to decide how much to allocate for 
consumption, CG2, and how much for savings, SG2. The extra endowment, ωG2, is a 
transfer payment from the government to the Giver that is financed by a deficit spending 
or a tax cut-financed government bonds issuance. The government bonds will be retired 
after the Giver’s lifetime. Therefore, the government debt has to be paid by the 
descendants (the Receiver) at the beginning of Period 3. The Giver will give his/her 
savings in Period 2, SG2, to his/her descendant as bequest at the beginning of Period 3.  
Similarly, an endowment or income of ωR2 franks will be given to the Receiver at the 
beginning of Period 2, and the Receiver must decide how much to allocate for 
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consumption, CR2, and how much for savings, SR2, in Period 2. Savings that are made in 
Period 2 will be carried over to Period 3. As is stated before, at the beginning of Period 3, 
the Receiver will receive a bequest in the form of saving that the Giver has made in 
Period 2. The Receiver will be given information on the amount of the extra endowment 
(ωG2) that the Giver has received in Period 2. As is mentioned previously, at the 
beginning of Period 3, the extra endowment or loan that is given to the Giver in Period 2 
will be subtracted from the available funds of the Receiver. If the Receiver is not able to 
pay back the government debt, his/her score is set to zero. In Period 3, the Receiver has 
no choice: all the available funds have to be allocated for consumption, CR3. In making 
their decisions, the subjects are constrained by non-negativity values both on 
consumption and savings allocations. The experiment uses multiplicative utility function 
as is used by Cadsby and Frank (1991), Slate, McKee, Beck, and Alm (1995), and 
Ricciuti and DiLaurea (2003). The rationales for using this kind of utility function are 
simplicity and the costly nature of multiplicative utility functions to be deviated from 
equilibrium predictions. Under the assumption of a free resource thinking, Cadsby and 
Frank describe multiplicative utility function as “quite punitive to deviations from the 
theoretical equilibrium,” and it generates “less noisy behavior”.  
The score (utility) of the Giver, UG, is a multiplicative function of his/her 
consumption in Period 1, his/her consumption in Period 2, and the Receiver’s scores. The 
Receiver’s score, UR, is a multiplicative function of his/her consumption in Period 2 and 
his/her consumption in Period 3. For simplicity, both the rate of interest and the discount 
rate are assumed to be zero. 
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The following time line of a typical round summarizes the events in a round: 
 
Period 1: Period 2: Period 3: 
   
The Giver: The Giver: The Giver: 
   
• Receive Period 1 Income 
• Choose Consumption  
• Franks not Consumed 
are Saved for Period 2 
 
• Receive Period 2 Loan 
• Receive Period 1 
Savings 
• Choose Consumption  
• Franks not Consumed 
are Saved  for Player B 
in Period 3 
• Does not play 
   
The Receiver: The Receiver: The Receiver: 
   
• Does not play • Receive Period 2 Income 
• Choose Consumption  
• Franks not Consumed 
are Saved  for Period 3 
• Receive Period 2 
Savings 
• Receive Player A’s 
Period 2 Savings 
• Pay Player A’s Period 2 
Loan 
• Consume remaining 
franks 
 
At the end of Period 3, the Giver will get the payoffs: 
00000025.0**** 3221 RRGGG CCCCU =  and the Receiver will get the payoffs: 
0005.0** 32 RRR CCU = . 
The second treatment is identical to the first treatment, except that a different tax 
(tS) will be levied, which decreases the savings amount from S to S(1 – tS). All other 
settings are similar to those in the first treatment. In this treatment, the tax rate will be 
0.25 (twenty five percent) for some rounds and 0.50 (fifty percent) for some other rounds.  
 After the experiments, the subjects are asked to fill out anonymous questionnaire 
about some basic demographic information and about what factors motivated their 
decisions. The subjects are paid in cash at the end of the experiment confidentially. 
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Hypothesis 
 
 Under Ricardian equivalence, it is expected that the older generation, the Giver, 
will bequeath the whole amount of the debt to the younger generation, the Receiver. The 
Ricardian equivalence also predicts that consumption decisions will be equated across 
agents and across periods. In the baseline treatment, Ricardian equivalence is predicted to 
hold: the Giver will save the full amount of the deficit spending in Period 2 and give it to 
the Receiver in Period 3. When distortionary taxes—represented by savings taxes—are 
levied, Ricardian equivalence is predicted to fail. Consumption will decrease over the 
period and the equivalence between debt and bequest will no longer hold. 
 The design of the experiment requires the older generation, the Giver, to move 
first. However, in making his/her decision, the Giver needs to take into account the 
decision that his/her descendants, the Receiver, will make. More formally, assuming 
agents are farsighted and rational, the utility maximization problem of the Receiver is 
stated as the following: 
32
3,2
RRRCC
CCUMax
RR
=           (5.1) 
s.t. (assume binding by local non-satiation and monotonicity) 
222 RRR SC −= ω , 
2223 GRGR SSC ω−+=  , 
02 >RC , 03 >RC . 
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The objective function of the Receiver’s problem is given by: 
( )( )2222232
2
GRGRRRRS
SSSCC
R
ωω −+−==l .     (5.2) 
Differentiating the objective function with respect to 2RS  will yield the following 
reaction function: 
( )222212 GRGR SS −+= ωω .          (5.3) 
Substituting the reaction function into 2RC  and 3RC  constraints will generate the 
following equilibrium consumption allocations: 
( )2222132 RGGRR SCC ωω +−== .       (5.4)       
Substituting the Receiver’s consumption allocations into the Receiver’s utility function 
yields the following Receiver’s payoffs: 
( )[ ]222221 GGRR SU +−= ωω .        (5.5)  
Assuming rationality and perfect foresight, the Giver will incorporate the 
equilibrium solutions of the Receiver in solving his/her optimization problem. The utility 
maximization problem of the Giver is stated as the following: 
3221
2,1
RRGGGCC
CCCCUMax
GG
=          (5.6) 
 
s.t. (assume binding by local non-satiation and monotonicity) 
 
111 GGG SC −= ω , 
2122 GGGG SSC −+= ω , 
222 RRR SC −= ω , 
2223 GRGR SSC ω−+= , 
01 >GC , 02 >GC , 02 >RC , 03 >RC , 
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The Receiver’s reaction function ( )222212 GRGR SS −+= ωω . 
The objective function of the Giver’s problem is given by: 
( )( )
( ) ( )2222122221
212113221
2,1
RGGGGR
GGGGGRRGGSS
SS
SSSCCCC
GG
ωωωω
ωω
+−+−
−+−==l
    (5.7) 
Taking the derivatives of the objective function with respect to 1GS  and 2GS  yields: 
0241241121141
1
=+−−=∂
∂
GGGG
G
SS
S
ωωl ,      (5.8)                    
 
0241243121243
2
=−−+=∂
∂
RGGG
G
SS
S
ωωl .      (5.9)        
 
Equating Equations (5.8) and  (5.9) yields the following savings functions of the Giver: 
( )221212 2 RGGGS ωωω −+= ,        (5.10) 
24
1
14
3
1 RGGS ωω −= .              (5.11)        
 
Substituting equation (5.10) into 1GC  and equation (5.11) into 2GC  yields the Giver’s 
equilibrium consumption allocations: 
( )214121 RGGG CC ωω +== .        (5.12) 
Substituting the bequest function, i.e. Equation (5.10) into the Receiver’s consumption 
allocations, i.e. Equation (5.2) generates: 
( ) 21214132 GGRGRR CCCC ==+== ωω .      (5.13) 
Substituting equation (5.13) into the Giver’s utility function generates the Giver’s 
payoffs:  
( )[ ]42141 RGGU ωω += .        (5.14)         
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Equation (5.13) shows that under the assumptions of altruistic, rational, and foresighted 
agents, consumption allocations will be equated across periods and across individuals. 
The issuance of government bonds that has to be repaid by the descendants of the bonds 
holders will have no impact in increasing the aggregate demand. Consumption stays 
constant since bond holders will not regard the deficit spending or the tax cut as net 
wealth (Barro 1974).  Bond holders view the extra endowments that they receive as 
liabilities that their descendants have to pay. As a consequence, instead of increasing 
consumption—as is expected by the Keynesian view—bond holders will increase savings 
and bequeath it to their descendants. More formally, the effect of deficit spending on 
bequest can be shown by taking the derivative of the Giver’s bequest function, i.e. 
Equation (5.10) with respect to the deficit spending 2Gω :     
1
2
2 =∂
∂
G
GS
ω .            (5.15)        
Equation (5.15) shows that the change in deficit spending equals to the change in bequest, 
implying Ricardian Equivalence. There is a one-to-one effect of deficit spending on 
bequest, implying Ricardian Equivalence. This prediction proves the proposition that 
under the assumption of a perfect capital market, certainty, finite horizons, rationality and 
perfect foresight, and non-distortionary taxation, the individuals’ decision choices will   
generate Ricardian economy.  
The following paragraphs illustrate the consequences of the implementation of 
lump sum taxes on the prevalence of Ricardian equivalence. In this design, lump sum 
taxes are represented by taxes on consumption. The levy of consumption taxes will 
increase the cost of consumption from 1 to (1 + t). Hence, the utility maximization 
problem of the Receiver is: 
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32
3,2
RRRCC
CCUMax
RR
=           (5.16) 
s.t. (assume binding by local non-satiation and monotonicity): 
( ) 222 1 RRR StC −=+ ω ,  
( ) 2223 1 GRGR SStC ω−+=+  ( ) 012 >+ tCR , ( ) 013 >+ tCR . 
The objective function of the Receiver becomes: 
( )
( )
( )
( )t
SS
t
SCC GRGRRRRSR +
−+
+
−==
11
22222
32
2
ωωl .     (5.17) 
By conducting the similar steps as in the case of no taxes, the following equations are 
obtained: 
( )222212 GRGR SS −+= ωω   =  the reaction function,    (5.18)            
( )22232 )1(2
1
RGGRR St
CC ωω +−+== .                                    (5.19)            
Hence, the payoffs of the Receiver:  
( ) ( )
2
22212
1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+= GGRR StU ωω .            (5.20) 
Meanwhile, in the presence of consumption taxes, the utility maximization problem of 
the Giver is given by: 
3221
2,1
RRGGCC
CCCCMax
GG
          (5.21) 
s.t. (assume binding by local non-satiation and monotonicity) 
( ) 111 1 GGG StC −=+ ω , 
( ) 2122 1 GGGG SStC −+=+ ω , 
( ) 222 1 RRR StC −=+ ω , 
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( ) 2223 1 GRGR SStC ω−+=+ , 
( ) 011 >+ tCG , ( ) 012 >+ tCG , ( ) 012 >+ tCR , ( ) 013 >+ tCR ,  
The Receiver’s reaction function ( )222212 GRGR SS −+= ωω . 
The objective function of the Giver’s problem is: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )( )( )222221211441
222
2
1
222
2
121211
3221
1
1
1111
2,1
GGRGGGGG
RGGGGRGGGGG
RRGGSS
SSSS
t
t
S
t
S
t
SS
t
S
CCCC
GG
+−−+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+=
+
+−
+
+−
+
−+
+
−=
=
ωωωω
ωωωωωω
l
  (5.22) 
The Giver’s savings functions are: 
( )221212 2 RGGGS ωωω −+= ,        (5.23)                    
24
1
14
3
1 RGGS ωω −= .         (5.24)                    
The Giver’s consumption allocations under consumption taxes are:  
( ) ( )2121 14
1
RGGG t
CC ωω ++== .       (5.25)                  
Substituting Equation (5.23) into Equation (5.19) yields: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 212122232 14 112 1 GGRGGGRRR CCtStCC ==++=+−+== ωωωω .  (5.26)               
The payoffs of the Giver: ( ) ( )
4
2114
1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++= RGG tU ωω .    (5.27) 
In the presence of consumption taxes, the effect of deficit spending on bequest: 
1
2
2 =∂
∂
G
GS
ω .                  (5.28)           
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The effect of consumption taxes on bequest: 
02 =∂
∂
t
SG .                     (5.29)    
As in the case of no taxes, under consumption taxes, allocations of consumption remain 
to be equated across individuals and across periods. Compared to consumption 
allocations in the no taxes case, in the presence of consumption taxes, the consumption 
expenditure decreases by 1/(1 + t). Furthermore, Equation (5.30) shows that the levy of 
consumption taxes will have no effect on bequest. In the absence of labor-leisure choice, 
taxes on consumption will yield non-distortionary effect.  Equation (5.29) shows that 
there is a one-to-one effect of deficit spending on bequest, implying Ricardian 
equivalence. This prediction provides support for the proposition that under the 
assumption of non-distortionary taxation (along with the other assumptions of a perfect 
capital market, certainty, finite horizons, rationality and perfect foresight), the economy 
will generate Ricardian consumers.  
When savings taxes are levied in the second treatment, the Receiver’s 
optimization problem becomes: 
32
3,2
RRRCC
CCUMax
RR
=           (5.30) 
s.t. (assume binding by local non-satiation and monotonicity 
222 RRR SC −=ω ,  
( ) ( ) 2223 11 GRGR tStSC ω−−+−=  , 
02 >RC , 03 >RC . 
The objective function of the Receiver becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )2222232 11
2
GRGRRRRS
tStSSCC
R
ωω −−+−−==l .    (5.31) 
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The Receiver’s reaction function under savings taxes is: 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−+= 2
2
22
1
2 1 G
G
RR St
S
ωω .        (5.32)       
Under distortionary savings taxes, the Receiver will not equate his/her consumption 
across periods: 
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−+−= tStC
G
GRR 1
1 222213
ωω ,       (5.33) 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−+= tSC
G
GRR 1
2
222
1
2
ωω .        (5.34)    
Equations (5.33) and (5.34) show that the Receiver will decrease his/her consumption 
from Period 2 to Period 3 by (1 – t). 
The Receiver’s payoffs are:  
( ) 222241 11 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−+−= tStU
G
GRR
ωω .       (5.35)  
The Giver’s optimization problem is stated as the following:  
3221
2,1
RRGGGCC
CCCCUMax
GG
=          (5.36) 
s.t. (assume binding by local non-satiation and monotonicity) 
111 GGG SC −=ω , 
( ) 2122 1 GGGG StSC −−+= ω , 
222 RRR SC −=ω , 
( ) ( ) 2223 11 GRGR tStSC ω−−+−= , 
01 >GC , 02 >GC , 02 >RC , 03 >RC ,  
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The Receiver’s reaction function ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−+= 2
2
22
1
2 1 G
G
RR St
S
ωω . 
The objective function of the Giver becomes: 
3221
2,1
RRGGSS
CCCC
GG
=l  
( )( ) ( )( ) 22222121141 111 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−+−−+−−= tSStSSt
G
GRGGGGG
ωωωω    (5.37) 
The first order conditions are stated as the following: 
( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+−−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−+−−= t
tt
t
tS GRGGRGG 1
211
1
11 22121221212 ωωωωωω , (5.38) 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−+−−= t
t
tt
S GRGG 111
2
4
12
4
1
14
3
1
ωωω .      (5.39)  
The Giver’s consumption allocations are: 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−+= 22
2
14
1
1 11 t
t
t
C GRGG ωωω ,      (5.40) 
( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−+−= 22
2
14
1
2 11
1
t
t
t
tC GRGG ωωω .      (5.41) 
Substituting the Giver’s bequest function into the Receiver’s consumption allocations 
yields: 
( ) ( ) 22221412 111 GGRGR Ct
t
t
tC =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−+−= ω
ωω ,     (5.42)  
( ) ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−+−= 22
2
1
2
4
1
3 11
1
t
t
t
tC GRGR ωωω .     (5.43) 
Note that under savings taxes, agents decrease their consumption expenditures over the 
period by (1- t). Consumption of the Giver in Period 2 will be equivalent to consumption 
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of the Receiver in Period 2 that is less than consumption of the Giver in Period 1 by the 
amount of taxes. Similarly, consumption of the Receiver in Period 3 is less than 
consumption of the Receiver in Period 2 by the amount of taxes or: 
3221 RRGG CCCC >=> . The decrease in consumption shows that the levy of taxes on 
savings is distortionary to the economy. Under savings taxes, the Giver’s payoffs are: 
( ) ( )
4
22
2
1
4
4 11
1
4
1
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−+−= t
t
t
tU GRGG ωωω .     (5.44) 
 Distortionary taxes give a different story than the one under no taxes. The effect 
of deficit spending on bequest in the presence of savings taxes is: 
1
22
2
2
2 ≠−
−=∂
∂
t
tS
G
G
ω .           (5.45)  
The one-to-one relationship between changes in deficit spending and bequest disappears 
in the presence of savings taxes. It is interesting to note that the effect of taxes on bequest 
is ambiguous under savings taxes: 
( ) 22211212 1 −−+−=∂
∂
t
t
S
GG
G ωω ,       (5.46) 
which is < 0 if ( ) 221 1 −−> tGG ωω ,  > 0 if ( ) 221 1 −−< tGG ωω ,  and = 0 if ( ) 221 1 −−= tGG ωω . 
Intuitively, this ambiguity stems from the following opposing effects. The levy of taxes 
on savings will make savings more expensive relative to consumption. Consequently, 
individuals will decrease savings. Meanwhile, since the extra endowment given to the 
Giver 2Gω  is not taxed while the bequest 2GS  is taxed, the Giver will realize that the 
Receiver will have to pay back the debt in an amount that is more than the bequest 
received if the Giver does not increase the bequest. Realizing this, the farsighted Giver 
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will increase his/her bequest under the presence of savings taxes. Therefore, 2GS  can 
decrease or increase, depending on which effect dominates the other.  
 Due to time and cash constraints, this study only conducts two treatments, i.e. the 
baseline treatment and the savings taxes treatment. This study utilizes some of the 
experimental parameters used by Slate, McKee, Beck, and Alm (1995). Tables 28 and 29 
present the experimental parameters and numerical (equilibrium) predictions under the 
baseline and the savings taxes treatments, respectively. The experimental parameter 
changes every 6 rounds. The deficit spending doubles after period 6 in both baseline and 
savings taxes treatment. In the savings taxes treatment, the tax rate doubles after Round 
12. This change in parameters are conducted to examine the impact of the change in 
deficit spending to the change in bequest and to investigate the effect of the change in tax 
rate to the change in bequest. 
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Table 28. The Baseline Treatment: Experimental Parameters and Numerical (Equilibrium) Predictions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 29. Taxes on Savings Treatment: Experimental Parameters and Numerical (Equilibrium) Predictions 
 
 
 
Round ωG1 ωG2 ωR2 CG1 = CG2 = CR2 = CR3 SG1 SG2 SR2 
 
1-6 100 50 100 50 50 50 50
 
7-12 100 100 100 50 50 100 50
Round ωG1 ωG2 ωR2 T CG1  CG2 = CR2 CR3 SG1 SG2 SR2 SG1(1-t) SG2(1-t) SR2(1-t) 
1-6 100 50 100 0.25 52.78 39.58 29.69 47.22 45.83 60.48 35.42 34.38 45.31
7-12 100 100 100 0.25 47.22 35.42 26.56 52.78 104.17 64.58 39.58 78.13 48.44
13-18 100 100 100 0.50 25.00 12.50 6.25 75.00 125.00 87.50 37.50 62.50 43.75
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Analysis 
 
Each experiment lasts for two hours and on average each subject earns 24.53 U.S. 
dollar for Experiment 1 and 23.81 U.S. dollar for Experiment 2. The subjects’ payments 
are funded by Faculty of Economics, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. 
The subjects are undergraduate students with various majors at Georgia State University. 
Most students have taken 2-3 economic courses. Table 30 presents the comparison 
between the equilibrium predicted values and the average values of the experimental 
results. The average values are computed from the last two rounds and the last round of a 
parameter regime. The null hypothesis tested is whether the average values of the 
experimental results (of CG1, SG1, CR2, SR2, CG2, SG2, and CR3) equal the equilibrium 
values. The results from the last round are closer to the equilibrium prediction than the 
results from the last two rounds. It shows that there is some learning process along the 
rounds. The learning process is especially more pronounced in the savings taxes 
treatment. In the last round, Round 8, all but one of the decision choices are equal to the 
equilibrium values.   
 In the baseline treatment, for Round 5 and Round 6, the older generation seems to 
apply a discount rate between consumption decisions in Period 1 and Period 2. Period 2 
consumption level is significantly different from the numerical prediction and is slightly 
lower than that of Period 1, although the experimental design does not allow for a 
discount rate. However, the younger generation does not apply a similar fashion. Their 
consumption decisions are equal to the equilibrium values. For Round 11 and Round 12, 
the results show that the average observed values are equal to the equilibrium predictions.  
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The observations from Round 6 show that t-statistics cannot reject the null that the 
average values equal to the equilibrium values, as is predicted by the theory. These 
results consistently occur when the magnitude of the deficit spending doubled, as is 
showed by the t-statistics of the last round, i.e. Round 12.  From the baseline treatment 
observations, it can be concluded that for the last rounds of a regime, in 100 percent of 
the cases, the average values of the decisions are consistent with the Ricardian 
predictions. In the post-experiment questionnaire, when subjects who play as older 
generation are asked whether they consume their Period 2 loan, most of them answered 
no because they want to leave enough money for the younger generation to pay off their 
loan.       
 Subjects’ behavior is entirely in line with the theoretical equilibrium prediction in 
the baseline treatment. The design of the savings taxes treatment is more complicated 
than the one of the baseline treatment. Subjects’ decisions converge to the equilibrium 
prediction in the last rounds of a parameter regime. Furthermore, the equality between the 
observed average values and the equilibrium values are better achieved in Round 18 than 
in Round 12 and than in Round 6. In Round 18, 85.71 percent of the decision choices are 
consistent with the equilibrium predictions, compared to 71.43 percent in Round 12 and 
only 28.57 percent in Round 6. It seems that subjects learn along the rounds. 
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Table 30. Equilibrium and Average Values of CG1, CG2, CR2, CR3, SG1, SG2, and SR2 
 
 
Treatment Parameter Set 
[ωG1; ωG2; ωR2; t] 
 
Rounds CG1 CG2 CR2 CR3 SG1 SG2 SR2 
Baseline [100; 50; 100; 0] Equilibrium 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 
Rounds (5- 6)  Average Values 48.91 43.66** 49.03 59.19 51.09 57.44 50.97 
n = 32  Std. Deviation 20.76 16.28 19.43 39.08 20.76 31.17 19.43 
t0.05 = 2.042  Std. Error 3.67 2.88 3.43 6.91 3.67 5.51 3.43 
  t-statistic -0.30 -2.20 -0.28 1.33 0.30 1.35 0.28 
          
Baseline [100; 100; 100; 0] Equilibrium 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 100.00 50.00 
Rounds (11-12)  Average Values 48.81 46.75 47.25 57.97 51.19 104.44 52.75 
n = 32  Std. Deviation 19.78 20.67 16.92 35.55 19.78 35.68 16.92 
t0.05 = 2.042  Std. Error 3.50 3.65 2.99 6.29 3.50 6.31 2.99 
  t-statistic -0.34 -0.89 -0.92 1.27 0.34 0.70 0.92 
          
Baseline [100; 50; 100; 0] Equilibrium 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 
Round (6)  Average Values 49.25 44.81 50.63 55.94 50.75 55.94 49.38 
n = 16  Std. Deviation 22.15 13.79 19.23 41.27 22.15 32.47 19.23 
t0.05 = 2.131  Std. Error 5.54 3.45 4.81 10.32 5.54 8.12 4.81 
  t-statistic -0.14 -1.50 0.13 0.58 0.14 0.73 -0.13 
          
Baseline [100; 100; 100; 0] Equilibrium 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 100.00 50.00 
Round (12)  Average Values 49.69 47.44 48.31 56.13 50.31 102.88 51.69 
n = 16  Std. Deviation 19.46 23.32 17.30 42.11 19.46 36.93 17.30 
t0.05 = 2.131  Std. Error 4.86 5.83 4.33 10.53 4.86 9.23 4.33 
  t-statistic -0.06 -0.44 -0.39 0.58 0.06 0.31 0.39 
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Table 30. Continued 
 
 
Treatment Parameter Set 
[ωG1; ωG2; ωR2; t] 
 
Rounds CG1 CG2 CR2 CR3 SG1 SG2 SR2 
Savings Taxes [100; 50; 100; 0.25] Equilibrium 52.78 39.58 39.58 29.69 35.42 34.38 45.31 
Rounds (5-6)  Average Values 41.07** 31.41** 46.95** 37.85 44.20** 47.09** 39.79** 
n = 32  Std. Deviation 21.66 13.96 16.29 23.51 16.24 18.39 12.22 
t0.05 = 2.042  Std. Error 3.83 2.47 2.88 4.16 2.87 3.25 2.16 
  t-statistic -3.06 -3.31 2.56 1.96 3.06 3.91 -2.56 
          
Savings Taxes [100; 100; 100; 0.25] Equilibrium 47.22 35.42 35.42 26.56 39.58 78.13 48.44 
Rounds (11-12)  Average Values 36.63** 40.03 44.14** 26.53 47.53** 80.63 43.11** 
n = 32  Std. Deviation 13.67 25.09 16.39 20.60 10.25 22.00 12.99 
t0.05 = 2.042  Std. Error 2.42 4.43 2.90 3.64 1.81 3.89 2.30 
  t-statistic -4.39 1.04 3.01 -0.01 4.39 0.64 -2.32 
          
Savings Taxes [100; 100; 100; 0.5] Equilibrium 25.00 12.50 12.50 6.25 37.50 62.50 43.75 
Rounds (17-18)  Average Values 36.48** 29.27** 33.39** 6.25 31.76** 51.25** 38.73 
n = 32  Std. Deviation 28.26 30.05 21.08 12.11 14.13 20.01 17.24 
t0.05 = 2.042  Std. Error 5.00 5.31 3.73 2.14 2.50 3.54 3.05 
  t-statistic 2.30 3.16 5.61 0.00 -2.30 -3.18 -1.65 
          
Savings Taxes [100; 50; 100; 0.25] Equilibrium 52.78 39.58 39.58 29.69 35.42 34.38 45.31 
Round (6)  Average Values 37.38** 34.69 48.41** 35.58 46.97** 46.71** 38.70** 
n = 16  Std. Deviation 17.54 12.97 10.07 18.56 13.15 18.10 7.55 
t0.05 = 2.131  Std. Error 4.38 3.24 2.52 4.64 3.29 4.53 1.89 
  t-statistic -3.51 -1.51 3.51 1.27 3.51 2.72 -3.50 
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Table 30. Continued 
 
 
Treatment Parameter Set 
[ωG1; ωG2; ωR2; t] 
 
Rounds CG1 CG2 CR2 CR3 SG1 SG2 SR2 
Savings Taxes [100; 100; 100; 0.25] Equilibrium 47.22 35.42 35.42 26.56 39.58 78.13 48.44 
Round (12)  Average Values 36.63** 37.16 42.86 26.38 47.53** 82.78 42.86 
n = 16  Std. Deviation 14.31 13.93 17.62 20.08 10.74 16.71 13.21 
t0.05 = 2.131  Std. Error 3.58 3.48 4.40 5.02 2.68 4.18 3.30 
  t-statistic -2.96 0.50 1.69 -0.03 2.96 1.11 -1.69 
          
Savings Taxes [100; 100; 100; 0.5] Equilibrium 25.00 12.50 12.50 6.25 37.50 62.50 43.75 
Round (18)  Average Values 33.22 25.00 33.16** 7.82 33.39 54.19 40.06 
n = 16  Std. Deviation 28.27 24.59 24.89 12.66 14.13 17.27 19.80 
t0.05 = 2.131  Std. Error 7.07 6.15 6.22 3.16 3.53 4.32 4.95 
  t-statistic 1.16 2.03 3.32 0.50 -1.16 -1.92 -0.74 
          
 
                                             Note: 1). ** denotes rejection of the null that the Average Value equals to Equilibrium at 5 percent level. 
                                                       2). t-statistic is computed as t = (Average Value – Equilibrium ) / (Std. Error) and  
                                                       3). Std. Error is computed as Std Deviation / (√n) where n is the number of observations.
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Table 31 summarizes the respond of bequest with respect to the change in deficit 
spending from Round 6 to Round 12.  As is predicted by the Ricardian equivalence 
proposition, the change in bequest equals to the change in deficit spending in the baseline 
treatment. The null that 1
2
2 =∂
∂
G
GS
ω , as is predicted by Equation (5.16), cannot be rejected. 
From Round 6 to Round 12, Period 2 loan for the older generation increased by 50. The 
average value of the change in bequest is 46.94. The equality between the increase in 
loan and the change in bequest cannot be rejected at 5 percent level. On contrary under 
savings taxes, the null is rejected, invalidating Ricardian equivalence. The average value 
of the change in bequest is 36.07. The levy of taxes on savings distorts individuals’ 
consumption-savings decisions, leaving deficit spending unmatched by bequest. 
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Table 31. The Change in Bequest with respect to the Change in Deficit Spending 
 
Treatment ∆ωG2 Null Individual Values 
of ∆ SG2 
Average ∆ SG2, 
Std. Deviation, 
Std. Error, 
t-statistic 
Decision 
    Baseline 50 ∆SG2 = ∆ωG2 80,54,55,85,51,50,18,50, 
57,38,50,17,30,55,11,50 
Average =                46.94 
Std. Deviation =      20.44 
Std. Error =                5.11 
t-statistic =                -0.60 
t0.05 =                          2.13 
Do Not Reject Null 
Savings Taxes 50 
 
 
 
 
 
∆SG2 = ∆ωG2 
 
 
 
 
 
26.99, 39.38, 40.13, 
53.24, 38.25, 39.38, 
41.25, 30.94 
39.00, 63.75, 37.50, 
32.44, 37.50, 36.56, 
-4.11, 24.94, 
Average =                36.07 
Std. Deviation =      14.15 
Std. Error =               3.54 
t-statistic =               -3.94 
t0.05 =                         2.13 
     
Reject Null 
   
                            Note: ∆ represents the change from Round 6 to Round 12. 
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Table 32 delivers the individual and average values of the change in bequest with 
respect to the change in the tax rate from 0.25 to 0.50 in the savings taxes treatment. The 
theoretical derivation in Section 4 shows that the effect of the tax rate on bequest is 
ambiguous, i.e. < 0 if ( ) 221 1 −−> tGG ωω , > 0 if ( ) 221 1 −−< tGG ωω , and = 0 if 
( ) 221 1 −−= tGG ωω . The t-statistics show that the null is rejected. The average value of the 
change in bequest is -28.59.  Individuals do not increase bequest as a response to the 
increase in the tax rate. It seems that subjects realize that with the increase of the tax rate, 
savings become more expensive than consumption. As a consequence subjects do not 
increase their bequests, although they may realize that with the increase in the tax rate, their 
partners will have to pay back the loan in an amount that is more than the bequest received.  
 
 
 
       
233
Table 32. The Change in Bequest with respect to the Change in Tax Rate 
 
Treatment ∆t Null Individual Values 
of ∆ SG2 
Average ∆ SG2, 
Std. Deviation, 
Std. Error, 
t-statistic 
Decision 
Savings Taxes     0.25 
   
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∆SG2/∆t = 0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-46.36, -13.88, -24.00, 
-35.61, -71.19, -42.25, 
 -16.56, -15.31, 
-22.13, -25.00, -28.13, -
38.00, -21.13, -28.44, 
2.33, -31.75 
Average =                -28.59 
Std. Deviation =        16.51 
Std. Error =                 4.13 
t-statistic =                 -6.92 
t0.05 =                           2.13 
 
 
 
 
     
Reject Null 
    
                                             Note: ∆ represents the change from Round 12 to Round 18. 
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Table 33 shows the t-test results for the equality of interperiodal consumption. 
Consumption decisions are equated across the period in the baseline treatment in all 
cases, providing strong support for Ricardian equivalence to hold. The null that Period 
1 consumption equals to Period 2 consumption for the older generation and that Period 
2 consumption equals to Period 3 consumption for the younger generation can be 
rejected under savings taxes treatment, invalidating Ricardian equivalence.  
 
Table 33. t-test for Equality of Interperiodal Consumption in a Treatment 
 
Treatment Null: CG1 = CG2, 
Decision, 
Probability of t-statistic 
Null: CR2 = CR3, 
Decision, 
Probability of t-statistic 
Baseline Do Not Reject Null  
(0.1044) 
Do Not Reject Null  
(0.6187) 
Savings Taxes Reject Null  
(0.0323) 
Reject Null  
(0.0000) 
   
                 Note: 1). Number in parentheses is the probability of t-statistic. 
                           2). The observations are those from the last round of a regime, i.e. Rounds 6 and 12 for 
                                 the Baseline treatment and Rounds 6, 12, and 18 for the Savings Taxes treatment. 
 
Table 34 summarizes the results of Friedman statistics for testing the equality of 
consumption for the whole four consumption decision choices. The null is whether CG1 = 
CG2 = CR2 = CR3  in each treatment.  As is predicted by the Ricardian paradigm, in the 
baseline treatment, equality of consumption is achieved across periods and across 
generations. This is not the case when taxes are applied on savings. 
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Table 34. Friedman Statistics for K-Related Samples Non-Parametric Tests 
for Equality of Interperiodal Consumption in a Treatment 
 
Treatment Null: CG1 = CG2 = CR2 = CR3, 
Decision, 
Probability of Friedman Statistic 
Baseline Do Not Reject Null  
(0.5656) 
Savings Taxes Reject Null  
(0.0000) 
   
                                   Note: 1). Number in parentheses is the asymptotic significance. 
                                             2). The observations are those from the last round of a regime,  
                                                  i.e. Rounds 6 and 12 for the Baseline treatment and  
                                                  Rounds 6, 12, and 18 for the Savings Taxes treatment. 
 
Table 35 presents t-statistics for test of equality of consumption between the 
baseline treatments and the savings taxes treatment, i.e. whether CG1 in Baseline = CG1 in 
Savings Taxes; CG2 in Baseline = CG2 in Savings Taxes; CR2 in Baseline = CR2 in Savings 
Taxes; and CR3 in Baseline = CR3 in Savings Taxes. Each of the t-statistics rejects the 
corresponding null. Consumption decisions are not equal between treatments. The average 
values of the consumption decisions show that consumption levels are lower under savings 
taxes treatment. In the post-experiment questionnaire, when subjects are asked whether 
their consumption decision differs from the case when there is no tax, most subjects 
respond that they consume less under savings taxes.  
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Table 35.  t-test for Equality of Consumption between Treatments 
 
Null:  
CG1 in Baseline = 
CG1 in Savings Taxes  
 
Null:  
CG2 in Baseline = 
CG2 in Savings Taxes  
 
Null:  
CR2 in Baseline = 
CR2 in Savings Taxes  
 
Null:  
CR3 in Baseline = 
CR3 in Savings Taxes  
 
Reject Null  
(0.0000) 
Reject Null  
(0.0001) 
Reject Null at 10 percent, 
Do Not Reject Null at 5 percent 
(0.0876) 
Reject Null  
(0.0000) 
Average Value of CG1: Average Value of CG2: Average Value of CR2: Average Value of CR3: 
Baseline:                 49.69 
Savings Taxes:       36.38 
Baseline:                  47.44 
Savings Taxes:         35.15 
Baseline:                             48.31 
Savings Taxes:                   45.27 
Baseline:              56.13 
Savings Taxes:     29.98 
   
                                    Note: 1). Number in parentheses is the probability of t-statistic. 
                                              2). The observations are those from the last round of a regime, i.e. Rounds 6 and 12. 
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Figures 16-19 show the bequest in all rounds for the baseline treatment and the 
savings taxes treatment in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The amount of bequest 
seems to converge in the last round of a parameter regime. 
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Figure 16. Experiment 1: Baseline 
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Figure 17. Experiment 1: Savings Taxes 
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Figure 18. Experiment 2: Baseline 
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Figure 19. Experiment 2: Savings Taxes 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The Ricardian equivalence proposition is strongly supported by the data in the 
baseline treatment. Equality across consumption as predicted by Ricardian equivalence is 
achieved in its entirety in the baseline treatment, and not in the savings taxes treatment. 
In the baseline treatment, subjects fully anticipate an increase in future taxation by 
increasing the amount bequeathed in one-to-one correspondence to the increase in deficit 
spending as predicted by Ricardian setting. Conversely, the distorting nature of taxes on 
savings alters subjects’ consumption-savings decisions. The equality of the change in 
bequest and the change in deficit spending is not attained under savings taxes treatment, 
invalidating Ricardian equivalence. 
This study has examined a simplified version of Barro’s (1974) overlapping 
generation model of Ricardian institution in a laboratory setting as has been utilized by 
Cadsby and Frank (1991), Slate, McKee, Beck, and Alm (1995), and Ricciuti and 
DiLaurea (2003), with the contribution of distortionary taxes treatment. For further 
agenda, Ricardian equivalence experimental design, which is different from the existing 
literature, is worth inquiring about. We think that the future design of Ricardian 
equivalence experiment will address the questions of:(i) do people care about other 
generation’s consumption or whether people have other-regarding preferences; (ii) are 
market institutions functioning such that intergenerational transfers become operative?  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
The effect of government debt on the economy has been an important issue and 
has been continuously debated in economic literature. The Neoclassical view predicts the 
negative effect of government debt to the economy via its crowding-out hypothesis; the 
Keynesian view predicts the positive effect of government debt if the economy is in 
under-employment level; and the Ricardian paradigm views that government debt is 
irrelevant to the level of aggregate demand throughout the economy, assuming that 
individuals do not regard public debt as net wealth. Neither theoretical derivation nor 
empirical analysis provides converging results. How public debt affects the economy, 
therefore, should be inquired about on a case by case basis. This dissertation has 
examined the effect of government debt on: private consumption expenditures (Chapter 
II), interest rates (Chapter III), balance on goods and services (Chapter IV) in Indonesia, 
and individual intertemporal decision making (Chapter V). Chapters II, III, and IV utilize 
an econometric approach, while Chapter V uses laboratory experiments.  
In Chapter II, the ad hoc approach of the aggregate consumption function and the 
rational expectations approach of the Euler equation consumption function are estimated. 
The aggregate consumption function has the advantage of being less restrictive, while the 
Euler equation consumption function has the advantage of being derived from the 
individual utility optimization problem. Both types of consumption function estimates 
show that Indonesian consumers regard public spending as complements to private 
consumption. An increase in government expenditures will lead to an increase in private 
consumption. An increase in government expenditures will increase the marginal utility 
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of private consumption expenditures. Hence, an increase in the level of government 
spending will not crowd out private consumption. This implies the effectiveness of 
expansionary fiscal policy. This result contradicts the Ricardian prediction that public 
expenditures will substitute private spending. The phenomenon of complementarity 
between private and public spending perhaps can be explained by the allocation of 
government subsidy to basic goods and services such as electricity, fuel, fertilizer, health 
centers, and primary education. These types of publicly-provided goods have 
complemented private consumption. Therefore, an increase in government expenditures 
will have an expansionary effect on the aggregate demand. The estimation results show 
that net government debt significantly affects private consumption, invalidating Ricardian 
equivalence. The results also show that taxes do not affect private consumption. 
Consumers’ behavior is insensitive to tax enactment. This tax insensitivity perhaps can be 
explained by the observable fact that tax enactment is not explicitly revealed in 
Indonesia. For instance, price tags in the supermarket include the sales tax. Another 
example is that employees are only informed about their after-tax net wage, not their 
gross wage. Tax compliance level is still low. Besides, a large proportion of the 
population has not yet paid taxes or paid the amount that is lower than they should pay. 
Therefore, improvement of the taxation system is essential. The estimates also show the 
presence of excess sensitivity of private consumption to changes in gross domestic 
product. The high ratio of public debt to gross domestic product might be the cause of 
this excess sensitivity. High public debt may also affect the prevalence of liquidity 
constraints. A higher public debt induces private debtors to put stricter credit 
requirements, which will in turn raise liquidity constraints. Private credit is used as a 
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proxy for liquidity constraints. Estimates on private credit show its insignificant effect in 
explaining private consumption, although a positive sign is obtained as expected. Perhaps 
most loans are made for investment rather than consumption.  
 In Chapter III, the issue of whether the public debt and budget raise the interest 
rate is examined. Ricardian equivalence predicts that debt and deficits will have no 
impact on the interest rate. This chapter contributes to the literature on the interest rate 
test of Ricardian equivalence by incorporating the dominant resource aspect of the 
country. As is with public debt, the oil price has played a dominant role in Indonesian 
economy. The notion whether windfall revenues generated from oil price shocks has had 
a permanent effect on the economy is examined. In the estimates that exclude the oil 
price, public debt and deficits significantly raise the real interest rate, providing support 
for the Neoclassical prediction and invalidating the Ricardian prediction. It implies that 
debt and deficit are likely to crowd out private investment through their effects on the 
interest rate. In turn, capital formation and economic growth will be impeded. The results 
also show some preference for debt and deficit variables over government consumption 
expenditures as determinants of the interest rate. In the estimates that include the oil 
price, the Neoclassical results are weakened, providing more support for Ricardian 
prediction. An increase in the oil price significantly decreases the real interest rate. 
Government budget deficits no longer raise the interest rate. On the other hand, as is the 
case with the estimates where the oil price is excluded, public debt still significantly 
increases the real interest rate. Fiscal policy will matter if the government appropriates 
the windfall revenue of an increase in the oil price to retire debt. The government did not 
utilize the momentum of the increase in the oil price to reduce its dependency on public 
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debt. The government could have used the windfall foreign exchange reserves to pay off 
the debt. Instead, the government allocated the oil windfall on development projects. 
During the oil bonanza, routine and development budget relied on oil windfall. 
Meanwhile, although the direction of the effect is ambiguous, economic crisis 
significantly affects real interest.  The crisis increased the real rate of interest in 1997-
1998 and lowered it in 1998-1999 due to the skyrocketing inflation. Financial 
liberalization proves to have a positive effect on the real rate of interest. The non-
stationary nature of the stock of debt implies the failure of the intertemporal budget 
balance to hold, indicating the unsustainable nature of debt-financed deficit.  
The problem with the interest rate test of Ricardian equivalence as is investigated 
in Chapter III is the role of international capital flows. The occurrence of interest rate 
neutrality might be caused by the prevalence of Ricardian equivalence or the presence of 
a perfect international capital market. Under a perfect capital market, capital flows may 
prevent the interest rate from rising. Hence, interest rate neutrality stems from capital 
flows, whether or not Ricardian equivalence prevails. Capital inflows will appreciate the 
domestic currency and deteriorate the current account balance. Ricardian equivalence 
implies that the deficit will have no effect on the current account balance. On the other 
hand, the Neoclassical view predicts that a budget deficit will lead to a current account 
deficit—the twin deficits hypothesis. In Chapter IV, the question of whether the 
government budget deficit led to the current account deficit is investigated. The role of 
capital inflow was taken into account by incorporating the debt securities variable. In 
addition, the dominant role of oil was considered by examining the effect of oil price in 
the current account test of Ricardian equivalence. The estimates provide support for the 
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twin deficits hypothesis. The long-run estimates indicate an almost one-to-one 
relationship between the government budget and the current account balance over the 
period 1969-2003, whereas the short-run estimates show a smaller magnitude of 
relationship. When a variable representing capital inflows is included, the twin deficits 
phenomenon is less pronounced in the short-run and disappears in the long-run. An 
increase in the oil price significantly improves the current account balance in the short- 
and long-run and in both periods 1969-2003 and 1982-2003. The oil price significance in 
the latter period is surprising, for Indonesia was an oil-dependent economy during the 
period 1971-1987.  
 The estimates in Chapter II, III, and IV provide more support for the Neoclassical 
prediction rather than for the Ricardian prediction. The non-stationary nature of the 
public debt also suggests that debt is unsustainable. The government needs to shift its 
gears to taxation as an alternative way of financing. The government should not roll over 
the public debt without caution, for debt-financed deficit may retard capital formation 
and economic growth. The policy prescription is to raise tax collections. In order to do so, 
buoyancy and efficiency in the taxation system needs to be achieved.  
Most previous empirical studies on Ricardian equivalence utilized the 
econometric approach. Only a few studies use an experimental approach. Laboratory 
experiments have the advantage of allowing more direct test of behavioral assumptions. 
The effectiveness of fiscal policy depends on individuals’ behavior: whether individuals 
recognize the increase in future debt repayment liabilities, whether individuals are 
altruistic, whether individuals will operate intergenerational transfers. In Chapter V, a 
specific aspect of Ricardian equivalence is tested in laboratory experiments. Ricardian 
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equivalence assumes a perfect capital market, infinite horizon, certainty of future income, 
rationality, perfect foresight, and non-distortionary taxation. Previous experimental tests 
of Ricardian equivalence have focused on relaxing the assumptions of certainty, non-
liquidity constraints, and perfect foresight. The assumption of lump sum taxation has 
never been relaxed in laboratory tests of Ricardian equivalence. Chapter V tests the effect 
of government debt on individual intertemporal decision making when there is 
distortionary taxation in the Ricardian institution. Distortionary taxes are induced by 
charging taxes on savings. The experimental results show that under the levy of 
distortionary taxes, individuals no longer equate their interperiodal consumption. The 
change in bequests is not equal to the change in deficit spending, failing Ricardian 
equivalence. Bequests do not respond positively to the increase in the tax rate on savings. 
As is expected, Ricardian equivalence is strongly supported in the baseline treatment. 
Individuals equate interperiodal consumption in the baseline treatment. This does not 
happen in the savings taxes treatment. In the baseline treatment, individuals raise the 
bequest in a one-to-one relationship with the increase in deficit spending, as is predicted 
by the Ricardian paradigm. Under the savings taxes treatment, the change in bequest does 
not equal to the change in deficit spending, providing no support for Ricardian 
equivalence. Even under the Ricardian institution, the distorting nature of taxes on 
savings alters individuals’ consumption-savings decisions. In line with the results of 
Chapters II, III, and IV, which suggest the vital need for the government to enhance the 
taxation system, the results of Chapter VI entail the importance of taxes on interest 
income in Indonesia.  
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
Table A1. Summary of Theoretical Studies  
(√ denotes support of RE; X denotes rejection of RE) 
 
Assumptions Author Theme Conclusion 
Infinite Horizons Barro (1974)  Altruism and intergenerational transfers serve 
as operative chain to transform individual’s 
finite planning horizons into the infinite ones 
√ 
Infinite Horizons Barro (1989)  Intergenerational transfers can be in the forms 
of bequests, gifts to children, other kinds of 
fund transfers. 
Network of intergenerational transfers makes 
individuals as parrt of an extended family that 
goes on indefinetly 
√ 
Infinite Horizons Seater (1993)  Despite altruism, bequests can also arise due to 
strategic behavior by donors, mutual insurance 
by family members, and simple accident arising 
from uncertain lifetimes 
√ 
Infinite Horizons Kotlikoff and 
Spivak (1981) 
Risk-sharing behavior of selfish family 
members can substitute for complete annuity 
market. 
√ 
Infinite Horizons Abel (1985)  In the presence of accidental bequests motive, 
the individuals’ holding of wealth is passed on 
the descendants when death occurs.  
X 
Infinite Horizons Bernheim, 
Shleifer, and 
Summers (1985)  
Bequests are often used as compensation 
services rendered by beneficiaries. Testators use 
bequests to influence the behavior of potential 
beneficiaries by conditioning the division of 
bequests 
X 
Infinite Horizons Andreoni (1989)  Bequests can arise due to the presence of joy of 
giving or warm glow. If people enjoy giving 
bequests, the warm glow effects dominate 
altruism, bonds will have positive effect on 
aggregate demand 
X 
Infinite Horizons Kotlikoff, Razin, 
and Rosenthal 
(1990) 
Although parents and children are altruistic 
toward each other (strategic behavior between 
recipients and donor), they do not usually agree 
on the exact amount of transfers, negating RE. 
X 
Infinite Horizons Barro (1989)  Although there is strategic bequests as is 
presented by Kotlikoff, Razin, and Rosenthal 
(1990), RE still holds if credible threat 
involving bequests is large enough to influence 
children’s behavior 
√ 
Infinite Horizons Rebelein (1998) In the presence of strategic interactions such as 
in Kotlikoff, Razin, and Rosenthal (1990)   , RE 
still holds if in choosing the amount of transfer, 
parents also consider children’s wealth besides 
their own wealth. 
√ 
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Table A1. Continued 
 
Assumptions Author Theme Conclusion 
Infinite Horizons Bailey (1993)  If bequest exists in individual’s utility function 
and if there is capitalization of property taxes, 
the aggregate value of existing businesses will 
adjust by less than special assessment on land if 
debt is financed by flat tax rate on all income, 
failing RE. 
X 
Infinite Horizons Weil (1989)  If there is constant instantaneous death 
probability (where nobody is ever born but 
individuals die over time), RE will holds 
despite the finite horizons since there is 
cancellation of positive effect of wealth (which 
occurs if individuals are dead when future 
taxation increases) by the negative effect 
(which arises if individuals are survive and 
have to pay higher taxes in the future due to the 
decreased number of taxpayers).  
√ 
Perfect Capital 
Markets 
Woodford 
(1990) 
RE fails because of imperfect capital market. 
Liquidity-constrained model is preferable to 
neoclassical model because it is not vulnerable 
to Barro’s critique where altruistic bequests 
eliminate the nonneutralities associated with the 
neoclassical model. 
X 
Perfect Capital 
Markets 
Hayford (1989)  RE can still hold even in the case of imperfect 
capital market, as long as the amount of the 
lenders are wiling to lend is a function of the 
borrower’s future tax liability.  Debt financed 
by tax cut will decrease the amount the lenders 
are willing to lend by the same amount as the 
tax cut, leaving the budget constraint unaltered. 
√ 
Perfect Capital 
Markets 
Barro (1989)  RE fails because of imperfect capital market 
only if the government does things in the 
capital market that are different from and better 
than the private sector. 
√ 
Perfect Capital 
Markets 
Seater (1993)  Whether or not RE fails in the presence of 
imperfect capital market depends on the reasons 
why the constraint exists. RE fails if the 
increase in public debt introduces an element 
that private markets could not introduce on their 
own. RE fails if the transaction cost is lower for 
the government. If credit rationing due to 
uncertainty of future income and issuance of 
debt leads to substitutin of govenmetn loans for 
private loans, RE holds.   
Mixed 
Rational and 
Farsighted 
Consumers 
Bernheim (1988) If consumers choose their consumption decision 
based only on current disposable income and 
are not able to associate future taxation with the 
level of public debt, RE fails. 
X 
Rational and 
Farsighted 
Consumers 
Seater (1993)  
and Ricciuti 
(2003)  
Bounded rationality may lead to departure from 
RE. Certain portion of population is not well-
equipped with the ability to predict and 
information is not sufficiently available for 
consumers to do so. 
X 
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Table A1. Continued 
 
Assumptions Author Theme Conclusion 
Rational and 
Farsighted 
Consumers 
Reiter (1998)  Information about government debt decreases 
the uncertainty about resources and helps 
allocating intertemporal consumption to 
decrease the variance of consumption and 
increases the utility of a risk-averse consumer. 
Under insufficient information, Ricardian 
equivalence can hold only if individuals can 
predict the pattern of public debt from other 
variables that are perfectly correlated with 
public debt. 
X 
Rational and 
Farsighted 
Consumers 
Elmendorf and 
Mankiw (1998)  
In models with short-sighted individuals, 
Ricardian equivalence can still hold since 
consumers still face standard intertemporal 
budget constraints despite their time-
inconsistent behavior -due to their decision of 
putting heavier weight to current utility. In this 
case, consumers can be made better-off by a 
binding commitment to increased saving. 
√ 
Certainty Chan (1983)  Ignoring insurance scheme, uncertainty on 
future tax and, hence, income generates a 
wealth redistribution risk and increases saving. 
Meanwhile, taxes that vary with income 
increase consumption.  The net effect is 
ambiguous, depending on the magnitude of 
income redistribution effect and income 
insurance effect. 
Mixed 
Certainty Feldstein (1988)  Uncertainty about future income implies 
uncertainty on bequests. As a result, individuals 
will be indifferent between receiving an 
additional dollar of income in current period 
and having their descendants receive a present 
value of one dollar in future period. An increase 
of disposable income by one dollar will 
increase individuals’ consumption spending by 
more than an increase of their children’s 
income by a present value of one dollar. 
Therefore, a deficit-financed tax cut serviced by 
future generation will increase current 
consumption. 
X 
Certainty Kimball and 
Mankiw (1989) 
Anticipated changes in taxes cause anticipated 
changes in consumption. Public debt has 
substantial effect and depends on the length of 
time until the debt is repaid. 
X 
Certainty Barsky, Mankiw, 
and Zeldes 
(1986) 
The marginal propensity to consume out of a 
tax cut is likely to be large and behave in a 
Keynesian way that incorporate the life-cycle 
permanent income hypothesis and ignore the 
future tax liabilities implied by a current tax 
cut. 
X 
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Table A1. Continued 
 
Assumptions Author Theme Conclusion 
Certainty Croushore 
(1996) 
Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes’ conclusion that 
Ricardian consumers have Keynesian 
propensity under income uncertainty is not true 
under fixed or elastic labour supply when taxes 
are set optimally. He concluded that at the 
optimal tax rate, income uncertainty alone is 
not enough to create Keynesian propensity. 
√ 
Certainty Barro (1989)  The effect of uncertainty on future income and 
tax liability depend on the net effect of higher 
average of future tax collections upon 
uncertainty on individuals’ future disposable 
income. National saving will increase along 
with deficit if there is increased uncertainty and 
it will decrease if uncertainty declines. 
Mixed 
Certainty Strawczynski 
(1995) 
The answer to the question of whether 
consumers behave more Keynesian or 
Ricardian depends on the characteristics of the 
corner solutions. Consumers behave in a 
Keynesian way when the corner solution has to 
do with parental poverty where marginal utility 
is sensitive to extra consumption since the 
increase in disposable income due to ta tax cut 
allows for a reduction in precautionary savings. 
Consumers behave in Ricardian way when the 
corner solution has to do with chidlren’s wealth 
where marginal utility is less sensitive to extra 
consumption.   
Mixed 
Certainty Basu (1996)  To re-examines Barsky, Mankiw and Zeldes 
(1986) hypothesis on risk-sharing effect, he 
utilizes a hybrid non-expected utility preference 
that enables to decompose the effect of a 
deficit-financed tax cut into income effect and 
information effect. The magnitude of risk- 
sharing effect depends on the strength of 
income and information effects. He shows that 
the risk-sharing effect is small and the marginal 
propensity to consume out of a deficit-financed 
tax cut is lower than the one suggested by 
Barksky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1986). 
Therefore, the Ricardian equivalence may be a 
good approximation even when income tax is 
proportional.  
√ 
Nondistortionary 
Taxation 
Bernheim (1988) The timing of taxation may be important if 
taxes are distortionary and if marginal future 
taxes depend on decisions other than marginal 
current tax rate. Government bonds issuance 
accompanied by a reduction in current marginal 
tax rates and an expectation of an increase in 
future marginal tax rates will alter behavior, 
and hence, leads to departure from Ricardian 
equivalence. 
X 
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Table A1. Continued 
 
Assumptions Author Theme Conclusion 
Nondistortionary 
Taxation 
Abel (1986)  Nonlinearity in taxes on inheritances, bequests, 
wealth, or property income leads to violation of 
Ricardian equivalence. If Ricardian equivalence 
were to hold, a lump sum tax increase would 
decrease contemporaneous savings. The decline 
in savings implies a decrease in the individuals’ 
estate and the marginal estate tax rate, which 
will, in turn, reduce the price of the individuals’ 
heir’s consumption relative to the price of 
individuals’ own consumption. Therefore, 
individuals are induced to increase the bequest 
at the expense of reducing their own 
consumption. 
X 
Nondistortionary 
Taxation 
Trostel (1993)  With distortionary taxation, an increase in debt 
changes the time walk of the net wage and 
interest rate and raises consumption, hours 
work, and output in the short run. In the long 
run, an increase in debt decreases consumption, 
hours work, investment, and output through its 
effect in raising the tax rates.   
X 
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Table A2. Summary of Empirical Studies: Indirect Evidence  
                   (√ denotes support of RE; X denotes rejection of RE) 
 
Assumptions Author Theme Conclusion 
Infinite Horizons Evans (1988)  If wealth has significant effect on consumption, 
then consumers possess finite horizons and treat 
government bonds as net wealth. 
√ 
Infinite Horizons Evans (1991)  RE may be a good approximation even if 
individuals possess finite horizons. 
Furthermore, the approximation is closer to 
reality, the closer the annuity markets to 
imperfection. He also finds that a portion of 
individuals are liquidity-constrained.  He shows 
that the equivalence still holds in Blanchard’s 
model with liquidity constraints and without 
annuity market.  
√ 
Infinite Horizons Graham and 
Himarios (1996) 
Using different measures of wealth by taking 
into account the available information on the 
market value of corporate equity held by 
households, conclusions that are contrary to 
those of Evans (1988) are found. Strong non-
Ricardian results are found and are consistent 
with a model of finite horizons.  
X 
Infinite Horizons Evans (1993)  RE and Blanchard’s (1985) model are nested. 
The results show weak evidence against 
Ricardian equivalence when individual 
countries are estimated separately and strong 
evidence when pooled estimation is conducted. 
The estimated deviation from Ricardian 
equivalence is like what is expected in the 
presence of perfect capital market and in the 
absence of altruistic bequest motive. 
X 
Infinite Horizons Kotlikoff and 
Summers (1981) 
The role of intergenerational transfers in 
aggregate capital accumulation is estimated. 
Intergenerational transfers account constitute 
vast majority of US aggregate capital 
formation. In a framework of steady state 
growth model, a decrease of one dollar in stock 
of transfer will decrease total wealth by less 
than a dollar if the steady state rate of interest is 
greater than the steady state growth rate. 
X 
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Table A2. Continued 
 
Assumptions Author Theme Conclusion 
Infinite Horizons Lord and 
Rangazas (1993) 
The situation where households are bequest-
constrained but where generations are linked by 
altruistically motivated human capital 
investment are estimated. Deficits can have real 
effects by shifting the consumption possibility 
frontier outward for bequest-constrained 
families. The wealth effect will increase 
consumption. On the other hand, the 
substitution effect -due to diminishing returns 
to human capital investment- will decrease the 
return on investment of parental consumption 
since greater investment is required to maintain 
a given level of after tax wealth for the children. 
The net effect depends on the magnitude of the 
two opposing effects. The calibrated model of 
bequest-constrained households shows that 
deficit will reduce the children’s after tax 
wealth, despite the presence of altruistic human 
capital transfers. 
Mixed 
Perfect Capital 
Markets 
Rockerbie 
(1997)  
A modified form of Evans’ (1988) test for 
Ricardian equivalence to incorporate liquidity-
constrained consumers is estimated. The results 
support strongly the presence of liquidity-
constrained consumers, i.e. 40 percent. 
However, its presence does not affect the 
Ricardian results for US annual data 1946-
1991.  
√ 
Perfect Capital 
Markets 
Zeldes (1989)  In general, liquidity constraint affects food 
consumption behavior in US. Borrowing 
constraint is positive for the low income group. 
Borrowing constraint causes annual food 
consumption growth to be 1.7 percentage points 
higher for low income group than it would be in 
the absence of such constraint. 
X 
Perfect Capital 
Markets 
Heathcote (1999) Capital market imperfections can increase the 
possibility of departures from Ricardian 
equivalence. Liquidity constraints accompanied 
with the absence of insurance markets imply 
large short-run real effects from temporary tax 
changes, even in the presence of lump sum 
taxation and infinite horizons. Low income 
individuals are highly sensitive to changes in 
the tax level since their ability to smooth out 
consumption is limited by borrowing 
constraints. Meanwhile, high income 
individuals behave in a more Ricardian way, 
adjusting their savings due to changes in 
temporary taxes.   
Mixed 
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Table A2. Continued 
 
Assumptions Author Theme Conclusion 
Rational and 
Farsighted 
Consumers 
Poterba (1988)  Consumption responds to temporary income tax 
shocks by more than the permanent income and 
life-cycle hypothesis suggest. The 1975 tax 
rebate suggested that a one dollar increase in 
transitory income will increase spending by 
about 20 cents. Meanwhile, when there is tax 
announcement, consumers do not adjust 
consumption in anticipation of tax changes. The 
rationale for this result is that perhaps a portion 
of the population is myopic or facing liquidity 
constraints that prevent them from adjusting 
consumption.  
X 
Rational and 
Farsighted 
Consumers 
Wilcox (1989)  An increase in social security benefits implies 
an increase in future tax liabilities, therefore, 
individuals will not change their spending 
behavior. 
√ 
Rational and 
Farsighted 
Consumers 
Barro (1974)  Although the change in social security benefits 
constitutes a surprise, rational and farsighted 
individuals will not alter their consumption 
decision since they recognize that the increase 
in benefits implies an increase in future taxation 
that will be borne by the individuals in the 
future or their descendants. 
√ 
Certainty Slate, McKee, 
Beck, and Alm 
(1995) 
RE under uncertainty about the repayment of 
public debt is tested by conducting 
experimental methods. The results suggest that 
the equivalence is affected by the uncertainty. 
Ricardian equivalence does not hold when the 
probability of debt repayment is low and it 
tends to hold when the debt repayment 
probability is somewhere between moderate to 
high. Bequests from current to future generation 
increases with the increase of the debt 
repayment probability in order to enable future 
generation to pay the burden of the debt. The 
combination of debt and its probability of 
repayment determine individuals’ saving 
behavior.  
X 
Certainty Haug (1990)  RE is tested in a permanent income model with 
rational expectations under income uncertainty 
for US data. The model nests both Ricardian 
equivalence and its alternative where 
individuals regard government bonds as net 
wealth. The estimation yields mixed results. 
When the sample includes the World War II 
years, the joint hypothesis of permanent income 
and Ricardian equivalence is not rejected. He 
finds, however, that the World War II years 
should be excluded. In this case, generally the 
joint hypothesis is rejected. 
√ 
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Table A2. Continued 
 
Assumptions Author Theme Conclusion 
Certainty Pemberton 
(1994)  
Whether or not the combined assumptions of: 
(i) operative intergenerational transfers, (ii) 
pure altruism, instead of a mixture of altruistic 
and strategic motives of bequests, (iii) certainty 
on future income, are plausible.  Pure altruism 
alone can hold if there is a market for life-time 
annuities.  
Certainty alone can hold when individuals 
behave as if they were subjectively certain 
about future income. However, he concludes 
that combined assumptions are not plausible in 
terms of estimated values for relevant 
parameters. Since the observed values refer to 
the case where bequests explain an important 
portion of total wealth accumulation, it implies 
that bequests cannot be fully explained in a 
Ricardian way.  
Mixed 
Nondistortionary 
Taxation 
Cardia (1997) 
(1997) 
RE is tested using series generated from a 
model that nests the equivalence and an 
alternative model with a finite horizons and/or 
distortionary taxation. The results are 
inconclusive. Although she finds that 
distortionary taxation has effect on 
consumption, RE is difficult to reject. 
Meanwhile, in a model with finite horizons, 
changes in lump sum taxation do not have 
significant effect on consumption, however, 
Ricardian equivalence is easier to reject. 
Mixed 
Nondistortionary 
Taxation 
Abel (1986)  The presence of nonlinear tax on bequests will 
invalidate Ricardian equivalence. In particular, 
progressive wealth taxation leads to the failure 
of Ricardian equivalence. The breakdown from 
neutrality results stems from the nonlinearity in 
the wealth tax. With a constant marginal tax 
rate, Ricardian equivalence remains valid under 
the prevalence of a set of standard assumptions. 
In general, Ricardian equivalence will not hold 
when there is a nonlinear tax on savings, wealth 
or the income accruing to savings.  
X 
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Table A3. Summary of Direct Evidence: Aggregate Consumption Function 
                   (√ denotes support of RE; X denotes rejection of RE) 
 
Author Theme Issues Conclusion 
Feldstein 
(1982) 
The importance of specification and 
simultaneity.  Instruments: lagged 
one period of income and taxes. 
DW-statistics are in 
indeterminate range. 
X 
Seater and 
Mariano 
(1985) 
Repeat Feldstein’s regressions and 
test for exogeneity and find that the 
instruments employed by Feldstein 
are endogenous. 
Although transitory income has 
positive effect on consumption, 
liquidity constraints are not 
responsible for it. 
√ 
Kormendi 
(1983) 
Consolidated approach. Nests all 
previous test of RE. 
Difference versus level form X 
Barth, Iden, 
and Russek 
(1986) 
Replicate Kormendi’s specification 
with different data measurement and 
different time periods and partition 
of government debt into federal, 
state, and local levels. 
The partition of government debt 
provides less support for the 
consolidated approach. 
√ 
Modigliani 
and Sterling 
(1986; 
1990) 
Criticize Kormendi’s specification 
on difference form of the variables 
and the failure to include temporary 
tax. 
Inclusion of temporary tax 
without including temporary 
income and government 
expenditures. Distribution of test 
statistics for cointegration varies 
with the number of regressors. 
X 
Kormendi 
and Meguire 
(Kormendi 
and Meguire 
1986; 1990) 
Allow lag polynomial to derive 
nested specification for testing 
Modigliani and Sterling’s 
formulation. The inclusion of 
temporary taxes in Modigliani and 
Sterling’s specification does not 
have any effect since when the 
speicification is estimated in its 
unrestricted form, instead of the 
restricted form, the effect is large 
and positive. Non-Ricardian results 
of Feldstein and Elmendorf do not 
stem form the exclusion of WWII 
years but from the problems in their 
data construction. 
The use of differenced 
specification. 
√ 
Feldstein 
and 
Elmendorf 
(1990) 
Develop a model where the 
consolidated approach is only a 
special case. Exclude WW II years. 
Argue against differencing. 
Variables appear not to be 
cointegrated. 
X 
Graham 
(1992) 
Show the importance of 
measurement of consumption in 
tests of RE. 
 Mixed 
Kormendi 
and Meguire 
(1995) 
Asses the effect of broad-based 
specification search in the debate on 
the consolidated approach and show 
that the consolidated approach 
delivered in 1983 are fully robust to 
16 years data addition and to 
revisions of variable definitions. 
 √ 
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Table A.4. Summary of Survey Studies 
Author Conclusions 
Bernheim (1988)  Theoretical and empirical studies establish significant likelihood that 
deficits have large effects on consumption, and that this would increase 
interest rates. There is lack of evidence to dispute the view that deficits will 
impede capital accumulation in the long run. Theoretical work has been 
focusing on: linkages between generations, capital market imperfections, 
redistributional policy, distortionary taxation, permanent postponement of 
taxes, myopia, political processes. Meanwhile, empirical evidence has been 
focusing on: consumption function studies, Euler-equation consumption 
studies, studies on aggregate demand and GNP, studies of nominal 
variables: interest rates, exchange rates, money demand. A succession of 
studies shows consistency with Keynesian prediction that there is a short 
run relationship between deficits and consumption. Results for interest rate 
studies are mixed. In the context of theoretical reasoning and behavioral 
analysis, RE outcomes seem to be unlikely to hold.    
Barro (1989)  The main theoretical objections to RE: finiteness of life, imperfections of 
private credit markets, uncertainty about the incidence of future taxes, and 
the distortionary nature of taxation. The incorporation of these features 
tends to generate results that are not strictly Ricardian, although the 
conclusions usually also diverge from the standard analysis. The 
quantitative significance of these departures is unclear. Empirical findings 
on interest rates, consumption and savings, and the current account balance 
tend to support the RE, although the empirical analysis involves problems 
about data and identification, and the results are sometimes inconclusive. It 
would be useful to assemble further evidence, especially in an international 
context. Analysis that suggest the prevalence of RE does not mean to 
conclude that fiscal policy is irrelevant. Satisfactory analysis will feature 
explicit modeling of elements that lead to departures from RE, and the 
predicted consequences of fiscal policies will flow from these elements. RE 
approach will be the benchmark for assessing fiscal policy although the 
majority of economists will still lean toward the standard approach. Most 
macroeconomists now feel obligated to state the RE even if they argue that 
it is theoretically not right.  
Bernheim (1989)  The existing evidence on fiscal effects is difficult to interpret. Although no 
single paradigm of fiscal effects to the economy corresponds exactly to the 
real world, Neoclassical framework offers the most relevant insights. While 
the Ricardian exercise is an interesting thought experiment, it is predicted 
upon unrealistic assumptions. Meanwhile, the immediate impact of deficits 
on aggregate demand is much smaller than predicted by the Keynesian 
paradigm. The ability of policy makes to fine tune fiscal policy is also 
questionable. The empirical evidence on the l link between income and 
deficits is extremely weak. Policymakers should concern with the 
permanent component of the deficits and utilize it to stimulate saving. 
Seater (1993)  
 
Theoretically, it is almost impossible that RE holds exactly since it requires 
too many stringent assumptions, however, equivalence appears to be a good 
approximation. Empirical success and analytical simplicity make RE an 
attractive model of government debt’s effects on economic activity. 
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Table A4. Continued 
 
Author Conclusions 
Becker (1995): 
To link the theoretical 
predictions of RE to 
empirical tests. 
There are few, if any, well formulated empirical studies that reject the RE 
predictions, although the theoretical models generating RE predictions are 
burdened with unrealistic assumptions. The interpretations of the empirical 
evidence are: (i) the unrealistic assumptions cancel each other out, (ii) the 
RE proposition is a decent approximation of the real world. However, it 
seems less likely that the RE proposition would be a reasonable 
approximation in the cases of extremely high proportion of debt with 
respect to GDP since other mechanism might work, such as the exchange 
rate crisis. RE may be a fair description of the real world at moderate levels 
of debt. 
Barro (1996): 
To provide reflections 
on RE 
Rearrangement of the timing of taxes has no first order impact on the 
economy. Second order impact arise for various reasons, most importantly, 
the distorting effects of taxes. Non-equivalence results stem from the model 
rather than from an assumption that turns out to be inconsistent with the 
model. Although the assumptions of the theorem are thought to be 
unrealistic, the recognition of the constraints of the theorem forces analysis 
into internally consistent, productive modes.  
Elmendorf and 
Mankiw (1998) 
RE is important since: (i) it describes the world at least as a first 
approximation, (ii) it offers a theoretical benchmark for much further 
analysis. Theoretical debate over RE generally involves the following 
issues: intergenerational redistribution, capital market imperfections, 
permanent postponement of tax burden, distortionary taxes, income 
uncertainty, myopia. Meanwhile, the empirical debate over RE involves the 
following issues: testing assumptions on household behavior,  testing the 
implications for consumption, testing the implications for interest rates, and 
testing the implications for international variables. The results are 
inclonclusive. 
Stanley (1998): 
To provide a 
quantitative review, 
i.e. meta-analysis, 28 
empirical tests of RE 
conducted over the last 
two decades. 
The meta analysis result show that the testing record entails a strong 
empirical rejection of RE. A study’s degrees of freedom and its proper 
econometric specification increase the likelihood of rejection. Passing 
additional specification tests tends to strengthen the evidence against RE 
proposition. The strong statistical relationship between the size of the 
reported non-Ricardian effect and the test’s degrees of freedom is 
consistent only with the falsity of the null of RE.  
Ricciuti (2003): 
To review the 
literature on RE. 
Ricardian equivalence relies on the permanent income hypothesis and the 
fulfillment of the intertemporal government budget constraint. Even if it is 
difficult to believe that there is a one-to-one relationship between tax cut 
and the increase in the size of bequests, optimizing individuals appear to 
follow Ricardian equivalence, at least in an approximate way.  
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APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS  
 
Appendix B1. Experiment 1 Instructions 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Introduction 
This is an experimental study of individual decision making over time. The 
amount of money that you will earn will depend on the scores that you obtain in the 
experiment.  Your money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Your 
earnings will depend on the decisions that you make, and, at times, will also depend on 
the decisions of the person with whom you are paired; your scores are not affected by 
anyone else in the experiment, except the person with whom you are paired. During the 
experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. You should feel 
free to make as much money as possible. You can write on the instructions.  
 
Sessions and Periods 
The experiment will take approximately two hours. The experiment consists of 
two sessions: Session 1 and Session 2. Each session consists of several rounds and each 
round consists of three Periods: Period 1, Period 2, and Period 3. At the beginning of 
each session, instructions that are relevant to the session will be distributed. 
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Two Groups 
The participants, called “players,” will be randomly divided into two groups, 
called Group A and Group B. We will refer to players in Group A as Players A and 
players in Group B as Players B. You will be in the same group throughout the 
experiment. You will be told at the beginning of the experiment if you are Player A or 
Player B. 
 
Group A and Group B Pairing 
Each player from Group A will be randomly paired with another player from 
Group B. This pairing changes in every round. You will not be paired with the same 
person in a two consecutive rounds and you will not be paired with the same person more 
than twice in a session. You will never learn the identity of a person with whom you are 
paired, and they will never learn your identity.  
 
Currency 
The currency used throughout the experiment is franks. At the end of the 
experiment, the franks you earn will be converted into U.S. dollars at the following 
exchange rates: 1 frank = 0.00000025 U.S. dollar when you are in Group A; 1 frank = 
0.0005 U.S. dollar when you are a member of Group B. The exchange rates between 
players in Group A and players in Group B differ so that earnings will be similar for 
players who make good decisions. 
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Player A’s Decision Task 
Player A, Period 1: At the beginning of Period 1, Player A receives an income in franks. 
Player A must decide how much of this income to consume. Player A has 20 seconds to 
make this decision. The amount of income that is not consumed is automatically saved. 
Savings in Period 1 will be carried over to Period 2. 
Player A, Period 2:  Player A receives saved franks from Period 1 (if any were saved). 
Player A will also receive loan for Period 2 that can be used for consumption and for 
savings.  Player A must decide how much of the Period 1 savings and the Period 2 loan to 
consume. Player A has 20 seconds to make this decision. The amount of funds that is not 
consumed is automatically saved. 
Player A, Period 3:  Player A does not play in Period 3 (he or she makes no decision).  
Any savings by Player A in Period 2 will be given to Player B at the beginning of Period 
3. However, the loan received by Player A in Period 2 will be subtracted from Player B’s 
Period 3 available funds.  
 
Player B’s Decision Task 
Player B, Period 1:  Player B does not play in Period 1. 
Player B, Period 2: At the beginning of Period 2, Player B receives an income in franks. 
Player B must decide how much of this income to consume. Player B has 20 seconds to 
make this decision. The amount of income that is not consumed is automatically saved. 
Savings in Period 2 will be carried over to Period 3. 
Player B, Period 3:  Any Period 2 savings by Player B will be carried over to Period 3. At 
the beginning of Period 3, Player B will also receive any savings made by Player A in 
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Period 2. However, Player B will have to pay back the loan received by Player A in 
Period 2 (the amount will be announced to Player B). If Player B does not have sufficient 
franks to pay back this amount, his/her score is set to zero. Player B makes no decision in 
Period 3: all of the franks available to Player B are spent on consumption. Player B has 
10 seconds to review the summary of consumption and savings decisions. 
 
Summary 
The following timeline summarizes the events in a round: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Period 1: Period 2: Period 3: 
   
Player A: Player A: Player A: 
   
• Receive Period 1 Income 
• Choose Consumption  
• Franks not Consumed 
are Saved for Period 2 
 
• Receive Period 2 Loan 
• Receive Period 1 
Savings 
• Choose Consumption  
• Franks not Consumed 
are Saved  for Player B 
in Period 3 
• Does not play 
   
Player B: Player B: Player B: 
   
• Does not play • Receive Period 2 Income 
• Choose Consumption  
• Franks not Consumed 
are Saved  for Period 3 
• Receive Period 2 
Savings 
• Receive Player A’s 
Period 2 Savings 
• Pay Player A’s Period 2 
Loan 
• Consume remaining 
franks 
 
You will be anonymously paired with different people in subsequent rounds. 
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Scores 
Player A’s Score 
Player A’s score depends on his/her consumption in Period 1 and Period 2 and also 
depends on the score of the Player B with whom he or she was paired in the round. Player 
A’s income consumed in Period 1 is multiplied by Player A’s income consumed in Period 
2, which is then multiplied by Player B’s score (thus if any of these values are zero, you 
earn a score of zero).  The higher your score, the more money you earn. 
Player A’s Score = (Player A’s consumption in Period 1)  
                                  x (Player A’s consumption in Period 2) x (Player B’s Score) 
So, Player A’s score depends on Player B’s score, but Player B’s score does not depend 
on Player A’s score. However, Player A’s decisions do affect Player B’s score. 
Player A’s Payoffs 
Player A’s Payoffs = Player A’s Score x 0.00000025 
Player B’s Score 
The score of Player B depends on his/her consumption decisions. The higher your score 
the more money you earn. 
Player B’s Score =  
(Player B’s consumption in Period 2) x (Player B’s consumption in Period 3) 
Player B’s Payoffs 
Player B’s Payoffs = Player B’s Score x 0.0005 
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SESSION 1 INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This session consists of 12 rounds, and each round consists of three periods: 
Period 1, Period 2, and Period 3. Player A plays in Period 1 and 2, while Player B plays 
in Period 2 and 3. At the end of Period 3, your payoffs will be computed and a new round 
will begin. There will be 30 seconds of display of summary of the round and you are 
asked to record your score in U.S. dollar (the last line of the summary) on the Record 
Sheet. At the beginning of each round, the computer screen will present your “Private 
Information,” which will tell you your player type and any other relevant rules for the 
round. You are not allowed to reveal this Private Information to other players. We will 
have 6 practice rounds at the beginning of this session. 
In this session, to get 1 unit of consumption, each player has to commit 1 frank.  
Player A’s Period 2 loan will change (double) after Round 6.  Do you have any 
questions? 
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SESSION 2 INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This session consists of 18 rounds. Session 2 is identical to Session 1, except that 
a tax will be levied on savings. For Rounds 1 to 12, the tax rate will be 0.25 or twenty 
five percent. Therefore, when you save S franks, the amount of money transferred to the 
next Period will actually be S – 0.25S (example: if you save 100 franks, only 100 franks– 
0.25x100 franks = 75 franks will transfer to the next Period). In other words, to save 0.75 
unit of saving, a player has to commit 1 frank. All other rules are like those in Session 1. 
For Rounds 13 to 18, the tax rate will be 0.50 or fifty percent. Therefore, to save S units, 
one must commit S + 0.50S franks (example: to save 100 units, one must commit 100 
franks + 0.50x100 franks = 150 franks). In other words, to save 1 unit of saving, a player 
has to commit 1.50 franks. Therefore, when you save S franks, the amount of money 
transferred to the next Period will actually be S – 0.50S (example: if you save 100 franks, 
only 100 franks – 0.50x100 franks = 50 franks will transfer to the next Period). In other 
words, to save 0.50 unit of saving, a player has to commit 1 frank. We will have 6 
practice rounds at the beginning of this session. 
Player A’s Score = (Player A’s consumption in Period 1)  
                                 x (Player A’s consumption in Period 2)x (Player  B’s Score)                                     
Player B’s Score = (Player B’s consumption in Period 2)  
                                                  x (Player B’s consumption in Period 3) 
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Tax Rates and the Double of Player A’s Period 2 Loan for Session 2 
In this session, to get 1 unit of savings, each player has to commit 1.25 franks for 
Rounds 1 to 12 and 1.50 franks for Rounds 13 to 18. Player A’s Period 2 loan will change 
(double) after Round 6. Do you have any questions? 
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Appendix B2. Experiment 2 Instructions 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Introduction 
This is an experimental study of individual decision making over time. The 
amount of money that you will earn will depend on the scores that you obtain in the 
experiment.  Your money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Your 
earnings will depend on the decisions that you make, and, at times, will also depend on 
the decisions of the person with whom you are paired; your scores are not affected by 
anyone else in the experiment, except the person with whom you are paired. During the 
experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. You should feel 
free to make as much money as possible. You can write on the instructions.  
 
Sessions and Periods 
The experiment will take approximately two hours. The experiment consists of 
two sessions: Session 1 and Session 2. Each session consists of several rounds and each 
round consists of three Periods: Period 1, Period 2, and Period 3. At the beginning of 
each session, instructions that are relevant to the session will be distributed. 
 
Two Groups 
The participants, called “players,” will be randomly divided into two groups, 
called Group A and Group B. We will refer to players in Group A as Players A and 
players in Group B as Players B. You will be in the same group throughout the 
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experiment. You will be told at the beginning of the experiment if you are Player A or 
Player B. 
 
Group A and Group B Pairing 
Each player from Group A will be randomly paired with another player from 
Group B. This pairing changes in every round. You will not be paired with the same 
person in a two consecutive rounds and you will not be paired with the same person more 
than twice in a session. You will never learn the identity of a person with whom you are 
paired, and they will never learn your identity.  
 
Currency 
The currency used throughout the experiment is franks. At the end of the 
experiment, the franks you earn will be converted into US dollars at the following 
exchange rates: 1 frank = 0.00000025 US dollar when you are in Group A; 1 frank = 
0.0005 US dollar when you are a member of Group B. The exchange rates between 
players in Group A and players in Group B differ so that earnings will be similar for 
players who make good decisions. 
 
Player A’s Decision Task 
Player A, Period 1: At the beginning of Period 1, Player A receives an income in franks. 
Player A must decide how much of this income to consume. Player A has 20 seconds to 
make this decision. The amount of income that is not consumed is automatically saved. 
Savings in Period 1 will be carried over to Period 2. 
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Player A, Period 2:  Player A receives saved franks from Period 1 (if any were saved). 
Player A will also receive loan for Period 2 that can be used for consumption and for 
savings.  Player A must decide how much of the Period 1 savings and the Period 2 loan to 
consume. Player A has 20 seconds to make this decision. The amount of funds that is not 
consumed is automatically saved. 
Player A, Period 3:  Player A does not play in Period 3 (he or she makes no decision).  
Any savings by Player A in Period 2 will be given to Player B at the beginning of Period 
3. However, the loan received by Player A in Period 2 will be subtracted from Player B’s 
Period 3 available funds.  
 
Player B’s Decision Task 
Player B, Period 1:  Player B does not play in Period 1. 
Player B, Period 2: At the beginning of Period 2, Player B receives an income in franks. 
Player B must decide how much of this income to consume. Player B has 20 seconds to 
make this decision. The amount of income that is not consumed is automatically saved. 
Savings in Period 2 will be carried over to Period 3. 
Player B, Period 3:  Any Period 2 savings by Player B will be carried over to Period 3. At 
the beginning of Period 3, Player B will also receive any savings made by Player A in 
Period 2. However, Player B will have to pay back the loan received by Player A in 
Period 2 (the amount will be announced to Player B). If Player B does not have sufficient 
franks to pay back this amount, his/her score is set to zero. Player B makes no decision in 
Period 3: all of the franks available to Player B are spent on consumption. Player B has 
10 seconds to review the summary of consumption and savings decisions. 
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Summary 
The following timeline summarizes the events in a round: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Period 1: Period 2: Period 3: 
   
Player A: Player A: Player A: 
   
• Receive Period 1 Income 
• Choose Consumption  
• Franks not Consumed 
are Saved for Period 2 
 
• Receive Period 2 Loan 
• Receive Period 1 
Savings 
• Choose Consumption  
• Franks not Consumed 
are Saved  for Player B 
in Period 3 
• Does not play 
   
Player B: Player B: Player B: 
   
• Does not play • Receive Period 2 Income 
• Choose Consumption  
• Franks not Consumed 
are Saved  for Period 3 
• Receive Period 2 
Savings 
• Receive Player A’s 
Period 2 Savings 
• Pay Player A’s Period 2 
Loan 
• Consume remaining 
franks 
 
You will be anonymously paired with different people in subsequent rounds. 
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Scores 
Player A’s Score 
Player A’s score depends on his/her consumption in Period 1 and Period 2 and also 
depends on the score of the Player B with whom he or she was paired in the round. Player 
A’s income consumed in Period 1 is multiplied by Player A’s income consumed in Period 
2, which is then multiplied by Player B’s score (thus if any of these values are zero, you 
earn a score of zero).  The higher your score, the more money you earn. 
Player A’s Score = (Player A’s consumption in Period 1) 
                                  x (Player A’s consumption in Period 2) x (Player B’s Score) 
So, Player A’s score depends on Player B’s score, but Player B’s score does not depend 
on Player A’s score. However, Player A’s decisions do affect Player B’s score. 
Player A’s Payoffs 
Player A’s Payoffs = Player A’s Score x 0.00000025 
Player B’s Score 
The score of Player B depends on his/her consumption decisions. The higher your score 
the more money you earn. 
Player B’s Score =  (Player B’s consumption in Period 2)  
                                                   x (Player B’s consumption in Period 3) 
Player B’s Payoffs 
Player B’s Payoffs = Player B’s Score x 0.0005 
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SESSION 1 INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This session consists of 18 rounds, and each round consists of three periods: 
Period 1, Period 2, and Period 3. Player A plays in Period 1 and 2, while Player B plays 
in Period 2 and 3. At the end of Period 3, your payoffs will be computed and a new round 
will begin. There will be 30 seconds of display of summary of the round and you are 
asked to record your score in U.S. dollar (the last line of the summary) on the Record 
Sheet. At the beginning of each round, the computer screen will present your “Private 
Information” that tells you your palyer type and any other relevant rules for the round. 
You are not allowed to reveal this Private Information to other players. In this session, a 
tax will be levied on savings. For Rounds 1 to 12, the tax rate will be 0.25 or twenty five 
percent. Therefore, when you save S franks, the amount of money transferred to the next 
Period will actually be S – 0.25S (example: if you save 100 franks, only 100 franks– 
0.25x100 franks = 75 franks will transfer to the next Period). In other words, to save 0.75 
unit of saving, a player has to commit 1 frank. For Rounds 13 to 18, the tax rate will be 
0.50 or fifty percent. Therefore, to save S units, one must commit S + 0.50S franks 
(example: to save 100 units, one must commit 100 franks + 0.50x100 franks = 150 
franks). In other words, to save 1 unit of saving, a player has to commit 1.50 franks. 
Therefore, when you save S franks, the amount of money transferred to the next Period 
will actually be S – 0.50S (example: if you save 100 franks, only 100 franks – 0.50x100 
franks = 50 franks will transfer to the next Period). In other words, to save 0.50 unit of 
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saving, a player has to commit 1 frank. There will be 6 practice rounds at the beginning 
of this session. 
Player A’s Score = (Player A’s consumption in Period 1)  
                                 x (Player A’s consumption in Period 2) 
                                 x (Player  B’s Score)                                                                                                     
Player B’s Score = (Player B’s consumption in Period 2)  
                                                 x (Player B’s consumption in Period 3) 
 
Tax Rates and the Double of Player A’s Period 2 Loan) for Session 1 
In this session, to get 1 unit of savings, each player has to commit 1.25 franks for 
Rounds 1 to 12 and 1.50 franks for Rounds 13 to 18. Player A’s Period 2 loan will double 
after Round 6. Do you have any questions? 
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SESSION 2 INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This session consists of 12 rounds, and each round consists of three periods: 
Period 1, Period 2, and Period 3. Player A plays in Period 1 and 2, while Player B plays 
in Period 2 and 3. At the end of Period 3, your payoffs will be computed and a new round 
will begin. There will be 30 seconds of display of summary of the round and you are 
asked to record your score in U.S. dollar (the last line of the summary) on the Record 
Sheet. At the beginning of each round, the computer screen will present your “Private 
Information,” which will tell you your player type and any other relevant rules for the 
round. You are not allowed to reveal this Private Information to other players.  
In this session, to get 1 unit of consumption, each player has to commit 1 frank. 
Player A’s Period 2 loan will change (double) after Round 6. Do you have any questions? 
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APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENTAL PRACTICE QUESTIONS 
 
Appendix C1. Experiment 1 Practice Questions 
 
SESSION 1 PRACTICE QUESTIONS 
 
Session 1 Practice Question 1: Please fill in the blanks   
Please answer the following questions to ensure that you understand how your cash 
earnings in this experiment are calculated.  When you are done, please raise your hand 
and someone will come by to check your answers.  After everyone's answers have been 
checked, we will begin the experiment. The capital bold letters will guide you in 
calculating your answer. 
Suppose: 
Player A’s income in Period 1 is                                                                50 A)  
Player A’s loan in Period 2 is  
(which will be subtracted from Player B’s available funds in Period 3):  25 B) 
Player B’s income in Period 2 is                                                                50 C) 
Suppose you are Player A.  
Period 1: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 1 (Please remember 
that you cannot consume more than your Period 1 incomeA)):  _______ E) 
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Your savings in Period 1 = Your income in Period 1 - Your consumption in Period 1  
                                         =              _______ A)         -   _______ E)    
                                         =              _______ F). 
Period 2: 
Your available funds to consume in Period 2  
= Your loan in Period 2 + Your savings in Period 1  
=             _______  B)          +            _______ F)                  
=             _______ G). 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (Please remember 
that you cannot consume more than your Period 2 loanB) plus your Period 1 savingsF)): 
_______ H). 
Your savings in Period 2 (which will be given to Player B in Period 3) 
= Your loan in Period 2   +  Your savings in Period 1 – Your consumption in Period 2 
=             _______ B)       +             _______ F)                  –      _______ H)    
=             _______ I). 
Suppose, the person that you are paired with in this round, Player B, selects 25 J) franks 
as his/her Period 2 consumption.  
Player B’s Period 2 savings = his/her Period 2 income – his/her Period 2 consumption                               
                                             =           _______ C)                  –        25 J)     
                                             =           _______ K). 
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Player B’s available funds, which are automatically allocated for his/her Period 3 
consumption = 
his/her savings in Period 2 + Player A’s saving in Period 2 – Player A’s Period 2 loan 
 =      ________ K)                       +                 _______ I)               –            _______ B)      
=       ________L)  
Your Earnings  
= Your consumption in Period 1 x Your consumption in Period 2 
    x Player B’s consumption in Period 2 x Player B’s consumption in Period 3 
=  _______ E)  x  _______ H)  x  25 J)  x   _______ L)  
= _______M) 
Suppose you are Player B.  
Period 1:  
You do not play. 
Period 2: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (Please remember 
that you cannot consume more than your Period 2 income): _______ N).  
Your saving in Period 2 
 = Your income in Period 2 – Your consumption in Period 2 
 =              _______ C)          –                _______ N)              
=               _______ O). 
Period 3: 
Player A’s savings in Period 2, which are given to you in Period 3 is _______ I) franks.   
Your consumption in Period 3 = 
 
 
 
       
278
Your savings in Period 2 + Player A’s savings in Period 2 – Player A’s Period 2 loan  
=              _______ O)       +               ________ I)                –         _______ B)   
=              _______ P).  
Your Earnings 
= Your consumption in Period 2 x Your consumption in Period 3 
=                  _______ N)               x                    _______ P)                  
=                  _______ Q) 
 
Session 1 Practice Question 2:   
Now, suppose, Player A’s loan in Period 2 is increased, while Player A’s income in 
Period 1 and Player B’s income in Period 2 remain the same: 
Player A’s income in Period 1 is                                                                50 A)  
Player A’s loan in Period 2 is  
(which will be subtracted from Player B’s available funds in Period 3):  50 B’) 
Player B’s income in Period 2 is                                                                50 C) 
Suppose you are Player A.  
Period 1: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 1 (In this exercise 
please select the same number of franks as you have selected for your consumption in 
Period 1 previously on page 1)E) [In the experiment you are free to choose the number of 
franks you wish to consume]:  _______ E) 
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Your savings in Period 1 = Your income in Period 1 – Your consumption in Period 1 
                                         =  _______ A) –  _______ E)   
                                         =  _______ F). 
Period 2: 
Your available funds to consume in Period 2  
= Your loan in Period 2 + Your savings in Period 1  
=  _______  B’)  +  _______ F)   
=  _______ G’). 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (In this exercise 
please select the same number of franks as you have selected for your consumption in 
Period 2 previously on page 1)H) [In the experiment you are free to choose the number of 
franks you wish to consume]:  _______ H). 
Your savings in Period 2 (which will be given to Player B in Period 3) 
= Your loan in Period 2 + Your savings in Period 1 – Your consumption in Period 2 
=            _______ B’)          +                 _______  F)            –      _______ H)    
=            _______ I’). 
Suppose, the person that you are paired with in this round, Player B, again, selects 25 J) 
franks as his/her Period 2 consumption.  
Player B’s Period 2 savings = his/her Period 2 income – his/her Period 2 consumption                               
                                             =           _______ C)                  –              25 J)        
                                             =           _______ K) 
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Player B’s available funds, which are automatically allocated for his/her Period 3 
consumption =  
his/her savings in Period 2 + Player A’s saving in Period 2 – Player A’s Period 2 loan 
=              _______ K)              +                    _______ I’)           –                 _______ B’)   
=              _______ L)  
Your Earnings  
= Your consumption in Period 1 x Your consumption in Period 2 
    x Player B’s consumption in Period 2 x Player B’s consumption in Period 3 
=  _______ E)  x  _______ H)  x  25 J)  x  _______ L)  
=  ________ M) 
 
 
Suppose you are Player B.  
Period 1:  
You do not play. 
Period 2: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (In this exercise 
please select the same number of franks as you have selected for your consumption in 
Period 2 previously on page 2)N) [In the experiment you are free to choose the number of 
franks you wish to consume]:  _______ N). 
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Your savings in Period 2 
= Your income in Period 2 – Your consumption in Period 2 
=                  _______ C)     –      _______ N)   
=                  _______ O). 
Period 3: 
Player A’s savings in Period 2, which are given to you in Period 3 is _______I’) franks.   
Your consumption in Period 3 = 
Your savings in Period 2 + Player A’s savings in Period 2 – Player A’s Period 2 loan  
=               _______ O)     +                   _______ I’)              –  _______ B’)   
=               _______ P).  
Your Earnings 
= Your consumption in Period 2 x Your consumption in Period 3 
=             _______ N)                   x                 _______ P)  
=             _______Q). 
If you finish these questions before the others, we advise you to try different choices in 
the above examples to further familiarize yourself with the decision task. 
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SESSION 2 PRACTICE QUESTIONS 
 
Session 2 Practice Questions 1: Please fill in the blanks   
Session 2 is identical to Session 1, except that a tax will be levied on savings. 
Suppose we have the same set of information as in Session 1 Practice Questions, except 
that now there will be 25 percent tax levied on savings.  In other words, you have to 
commit 1.25 franks to get 1 unit of savings.  
Player A’s income in Period 1:                                                                  50 A)  
Player A’s income in Period 2  
(which will be subtracted from Player B’s available funds in Period 3):  25 B) 
Player B’s income in Period 2:                                                                   50 C) 
Tax: To get 1 unit of savings, you have to commit:                                   1.25 D) 
(The tax rate is 25 percent = 0.25) 
Suppose you are Player A.  
Period 1: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 1 (Please remember 
that you cannot consume more than your Period 1 incomeA)):  _______ E) 
Your savings in Period 1 plus tax payment 
 = Your income in Period 1 - Your consumption in Period 1  
 =              _______ A)         -   _______ E)   =  _______ F). 
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Your actual savings in Period 1 
=  Your savings in Period 1 plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
     commit to get 1 unit of savings 
=  _______F) / _______D) = ________FF). 
Period 2: 
Your available funds to consume in Period 2  
= Your loan in Period 2 + Your savings in Period 1  
=             _______  B)          +            _______ FF)                 =  _______ G). 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2  
(Please remember that you cannot consume more than your Period 2 loanB) plus your 
Period 1 savingsFF)): _______ H). 
Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment  
= Your loan in Period 2 + Your savings in Period 1 – Your consumption in Period 2 
=             _______ B)          +             _______ FF)                  –      _______ H)   =  _______ I). 
Your actual savings in Period 2 (which will be given to Player B in Period 3) 
=  Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
    commit to get 1 unit of savings 
=  _______I) / _______D) = ________II). 
Suppose, the person that you are paired with in this round, Player B, selects 25 J) franks 
as his/her Period 2 consumption.  
Player B’s Period 2 savings plus tax payment  
= his/her Period 2 income – his/her Period 2 consumption                                              
=           _______ C)                  –        25  J)    =      ________ K) 
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Player B’s Period 2 actual savings 
= his/her Period 2 savings plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
   commit to get 1 unit of savings 
= _______K) / _______D) = ________KK). 
Player B’s available funds, which are automatically allocated for his/her Period 3 
consumption = 
his/her savings in Period 2 + Player A’s saving in Period 2 – Player A’s Period 2 loan 
=          ______ KK)                       +                 _______ II)               –  _______ B)     =  _______L)  
Your Earnings  
= Your consumption in Period 1 x Your consumption in Period 2 
    x Player B’s consumption in Period 2 x Player B’s consumption in Period 3 
=  _______ E)  x  _______ H)  x  25 J)  x   _______ L)  
= _______M) 
Suppose you are Player B.  
Period 1:  
You do not play. 
Period 2: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (Please remember 
that you cannot consume more than your Period 2 income): _______ N).  
Your savings in Period 2 and tax payment 
 = Your income in Period 2 – Your consumption in Period 2 
 =              _______ C)          –                   _______ N)             = ________ O). 
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Your actual savings in Period 2 
=  Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
     commit to get 1 unit of savings 
=  _______O) / _______D) = ________OO). 
Period 3: 
Player A’s savings in Period 2, which are given to you in Period 3 is _______ II) franks.   
Your consumption in Period 3 = 
Your savings in Period 2 + Player A’s savings in Period 2 – Player A’s loan in  
                                                                                                 Period 2  
=              _______ OO)       +             ________ II)                –       _______ B)   
=              _______ P).  
Your Earnings 
= Your consumption in Period 2 x Your consumption in Period 3 
=                  _______ N)              x                  _______ P)                  
=                  _______ Q) 
 
Session 2 Practice Question 2:   
Now, suppose, Player A’s loan in Period 2 is increased, while Player A’s income in 
Period 1 and Player B’s income in Period 2 remain the same: 
Player A’s income in Period 1 is                                                                50 A)  
Player A’s income in Period 2 is  
(which will be subtracted from Player B’s available funds in Period 3):  50 B’) 
Player B’s income in Period 2 is                                                                50 C) 
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Tax: To get 1 unit of savings, you have to commit:                                   1.25 D) 
(The tax rate is 25 percent = 0.25) 
Suppose you are Player A.  
Period 1: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 1 (In this exercise 
please select the same number of franks as you have selected for your consumption in 
Period 1 previously on page 1)E) [In the experiment you are free to choose the number of 
franks you wish to consume]:  _______ E) 
Your savings in Period 1 plus tax payment 
 = Your income in Period 1 - Your consumption in Period 1  
 =              _______ A)         -   _______ E)   =  _______ F). 
Your actual savings in Period 1 
=  Your savings in Period 1 plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
    commit to get 1 unit of savings 
=  _______F) / _______D) = ________FF). 
Period 2: 
Your available funds to consume in Period 2  
= Your loan in Period 2  + Your savings in Period 1  
=              _______  B’)         +  _______ FF)      =  _______ G’). 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (In this exercise 
please select the same number of franks as you have selected for your consumption in 
Period 2 previously on page 1)H) [In the experiment you are free to choose the number of 
franks you wish to consume]:  _______ H). 
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Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment: 
= Your loan in Period 2 + Your savings in Period 1 – Your consumption in Period 2 
=              ________ B’)      +          _________  FF)               –     _________ H)    
=              _______ I’). 
Your actual savings in Period 2 (which will be given to Player B in Period 3)  
= Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
   commit to get 1 unit of savings 
=  _______I’) / _______D)  
= ________II). 
Suppose, the person that you are paired with in this round, Player B, again, selects 25 J) 
franks as his/her Period 2 consumption.  
Player B’s Period 2 savings plus tax payment  
=  his/her Period 2 income – his/her Period 2 consumption                                              
=           _______ C)                  –              25 J)        
=           _______ K) 
Player B’s Period 2 actual savings 
= Player B’s savings in Period 2 plus tax payment divided by the amount that Player        
   B has to commit to get 1 unit of savings                                                                      
=  _______K) / _______D)  
= ________KK). 
Player B’s available funds, which are automatically allocated for his/her Period 3 
consumption =  
his/her savings in Period 2 + Player A’s saving in Period 2 – Player A’s Period 2 income 
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=          _________ KK)          +                    _______ II)           –              _______ B’)   
=          _______ L)  
Your Earnings  
= Your consumption in Period 1 x Your consumption in Period 2 
    x Player B’s consumption in Period 2 x Player B’s consumption in Period 3 
=  _______ E)  x  _______ H)  x  25 J)  x  _______ L)   
=  ________ M) 
Suppose you are Player B.  
Period 1:  
You do not play. 
Period 2: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (In this exercise 
please select the same number of franks as you have selected for your consumption in 
Period 2 previously on page 2)N) [In the experiment you are free to choose the number of 
franks you wish to consume]:  _______ N). 
Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment 
= Your income in Period 2 – Your consumption in Period 2 
=                  _______ C)     –      _______ N)   
=                  _______ O). 
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Your actual savings in Period 2 
= Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
   commit to get 1 unit of savings                                                                      
=  _______O) / _______D)  
= ________OO). 
Period 3: 
Player A’s savings in Period 2, which are given to you in Period 3 is _______II) franks.   
Your consumption in Period 3 = 
Your savings in Period 2 + Player A’s savings in Period 2 – Player A’s loan  
                                                                                                 in Period 2  
=               _______ OO)     +                   _______ II)              –  _______ B’)   
=               _______ P).  
Your Earnings 
= Your consumption in Period 2 x Your consumption in Period 3 
=             _______ N)                   x                 _______ P)  
=             _______Q). 
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Appendix C2. Experiment 2 Practice Questions 
 
SESSION 1 PRACTICE QUESTIONS 
 
Session 1 Practice Questions 1: Please fill in the blanks   
Please answer the following questions to ensure that you understand how your cash 
earnings in this experiment are calculated.  When you are done, please raise your hand 
and someone will come by to check your answers.  After everyone's answers have been 
checked, we will begin the experiment. The capital bold letters will guide you in 
calculating your answer. In this session, a tax will be levied on savings. 
Suppose, there is 25 percent tax levied on savings.   
In other words, you have to commit 1.25 franks to get 1 unit of savings.  
Player A’s income in Period 1:                                                                  50 A)  
Player A’s loan in Period 2  
(which will be subtracted from Player B’s available funds in Period 3):  25 B) 
Player B’s income in Period 2:                                                                   50 C) 
Tax: To get 1 unit of savings, you have to commit:                                   1.25 D) 
(The tax rate is 25 percent = 0.25) 
Suppose you are Player A.  
Period 1: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 1 (Please remember 
that you cannot consume more than your Period 1 incomeA)):  _______ E) 
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Your savings in Period 1 plus tax payment 
 = Your income in Period 1 - Your consumption in Period 1  
 =              _______ A)         -   _______ E)   =  _______ F). 
Your actual savings in Period 1 
=  Your savings in Period 1 plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
commit to get 1 unit of savings 
=  _______F) / _______D) = ________FF). 
Period 2: 
Your available funds to consume in Period 2  
= Your loan in Period 2 + Your savings in Period 1  
=             _______  B)          +            _______ FF)                 =  _______ G). 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2  
(Please remember that you cannot consume more than your Period 2 loan B) plus your 
Period 1 savings FF)): _______ H). 
Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment  
= Your loan in Period 2 + Your savings in Period 1 – Your consumption in Period 2 
=             _______ B)          +             _______ FF)                  –      _______ H)   =  _______ I). 
Your actual savings in Period 2 (which will be given to Player B in Period 3) 
=  Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
     commit to get 1 unit of savings 
=  _______I) / _______D) = ________II). 
Suppose, the person that you are paired with in this round, Player B, selects 25 J) franks 
as his/her Period 2 consumption.  
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Player B’s Period 2 savings plus tax payment  
= his/her Period 2 income – his/her Period 2 consumption                                              
=           _______ C)                  –        25 J)    =      ________ K) 
Player B’s Period 2 actual savings 
= his/her Period 2 savings plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
   commit to get 1 unit of savings 
= _______K) / _______D) = ________KK). 
Player B’s available funds, which are automatically allocated for his/her Period 3 
consumption = 
his/her savings in Period 2 + Player A’s saving in Period 2 – Player A’s Period 2 loan 
 =          ______ KK)                       +                 _______ II)               –  _______ B)     =  
_______L)  
Your Earnings  
= Your consumption in Period 1 x Your consumption in Period 2 
    x Player B’s consumption in Period 2 x Player B’s consumption in Period 3 
=  _______ E)  x  _______ H)  x  25 J)  x   _______ L)  
= _______M) 
Suppose you are Player B.  
Period 1:  
You do not play. 
Period 2: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (Please remember 
that you cannot consume more than your Period 2 income): _______ N).  
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Your savings in Period 2 and tax payment 
 = Your income in Period 2 – Your consumption in Period 2 
 =              _______ C)          –                   _______ N)             = ________ O). 
Your actual savings in Period 2 
=  Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
     commit to get 1 unit of savings 
=  _______O) / _______D) = ________OO). 
Period 3: 
Player A’s savings in Period 2, which are given to you in Period 3 is _______ II) franks.   
Your consumption in Period 3 = 
Your savings in Period 2 + Player A’s savings in Period 2 – Player A’s loan in  
                                                                                                 Period 2  
=              _______ OO)       +             ________ II)                –       _______ B)   
=              _______ P).  
Your Earnings 
= Your consumption in Period 2 x Your consumption in Period 3 
=                  _______ N)              x                  _______ P)                  
=                  _______ Q) 
Session 1 Practice Question 2:   
Now, suppose, Player A’s loan in Period 2 is doubled, while Player A’s income in Period 
1 and Player B’s income in Period 2 remain the same: 
Player A’s income in Period 1 is                                                                50 A)  
Player A’s income in Period 2 is  
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(which will be subtracted from Player B’s available funds in Period 3):  50 B’) 
Player B’s income in Period 2 is                                                                50 C) 
Tax: To get 1 unit of savings, you have to commit:                                   1.25 D) 
(The tax rate is 25 percent = 0.25) 
Suppose you are Player A.  
Period 1: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 1 (In this exercise 
please select the same number of franks as you have selected for your consumption in 
Period 1 previously on page 1)E) [In the experiment you are free to choose the number of 
franks you wish to consume]:  _______ E) 
Your savings in Period 1 plus tax payment 
 = Your income in Period 1 - Your consumption in Period 1  
 =              _______ A)         -   _______ E)   =  _______ F). 
Your actual savings in Period 1 
=  Your savings in Period 1 plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
     commit to get 1 unit of savings 
=  _______F) / _______D) = ________FF). 
Period 2: 
Your available funds to consume in Period 2  
= Your loan in Period 2  + Your savings in Period 1  
=              _______  B’)         +  _______ FF)      =  _______ G’). 
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Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (In this exercise 
please select the same number of franks as you have selected for your consumption in 
Period 2 previously on page 1)H) [In the experiment you are free to choose the number of 
franks you wish to consume]:  _______ H). 
Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment: 
= Your loan in Period 2 + Your savings in Period 1 – Your consumption in Period 2 
=              ________ B’)      +          _________  FF)               –     _________ H)    
=              _______ I’). 
Your actual savings in Period 2 (which will be given to Player B in Period 3)  
= Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
   commit to get 1 unit of savings 
=  _______I’) / _______D)  
= ________II). 
Suppose, the person that you are paired with in this round, Player B, again, selects 25 J) 
franks as his/her Period 2 consumption.  
Player B’s Period 2 savings plus tax payment  
=  his/her Period 2 income – his/her Period 2 consumption                                              
=           _______ C)                  –              25  J)        
=           _______ K) 
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Player B’s Period 2 actual savings 
= Player B’s savings in Period 2 plus tax payment divided by the amount that Player        
   B has to commit to get 1 unit of savings                                                                      
=  _______K) / _______D)  
= ________KK). 
Player B’s available funds, which are automatically allocated for his/her Period 3 
consumption =  
his/her savings in Period 2 + Player A’s saving in Period 2 – Player A’s Period 2 loan 
=          _________ KK)          +                    _______ II)           –              _______ B’)   
=          _______ L)  
Your Earnings  
= Your consumption in Period 1 x Your consumption in Period 2 
    x Player B’s consumption in Period 2 x Player B’s consumption in Period 3 
=  _______ E)  x  _______ H)  x  25 J)  x  _______ L)   
=  ________ M) 
Suppose you are Player B.  
Period 1:  
You do not play. 
Period 2: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (In this exercise 
please select the same number of franks as you have selected for your consumption in 
Period 2 previously on page 2)N) [In the experiment you are free to choose the number of 
franks you wish to consume]:  _______ N). 
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Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment 
= Your income in Period 2 – Your consumption in Period 2 
=                  _______ C)     –      _______ N)   
=                  _______ O). 
Your actual savings in Period 2 
= Your savings in Period 2 plus tax payment divided by the amount that you have to  
   commit to get 1 unit of savings                                                                      
=  _______O) / _______D)  
= ________OO). 
Period 3: 
Player A’s savings in Period 2, which are given to you in Period 3 is _______II) franks.   
Your consumption in Period 3 = 
Your savings in Period 2 + Player A’s savings in Period 2 – Player A’s loan 
                                                                                                 in Period 2  
=               _______ OO)     +                   _______ II)              –  _______ B’)   
=               _______ P).  
Your Earnings 
= Your consumption in Period 2 x Your consumption in Period 3 
=             _______ N)                   x                 _______ P)  
=             _______Q). 
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SESSION 2 PRACTICE QUESTIONS 
 
Session 2 Practice Question 1: Please fill in the blanks   
Please answer the following questions to ensure that you understand how your cash 
earnings in this experiment are calculated.  When you are done, please raise your hand 
and someone will come by to check your answers.  After everyone's answers have been 
checked, we will begin the experiment. The capital bold letters will guide you in 
calculating your answer. 
Suppose: 
Player A’s income in Period 1 is                                                                50 A)  
Player A’s loan in Period 2 is  
(which will be subtracted from Player B’s available funds in Period 3):  25 B) 
Player B’s income in Period 2 is                                                                50 C) 
Suppose you are Player A.  
Period 1: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 1 (Please remember 
that you cannot consume more than your Period 1 incomeA)):  _______ E) 
Your savings in Period 1 = Your income in Period 1 - Your consumption in Period 1  
                                         =              _______ A)         -   _______ E)    
                                         =              _______ F). 
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Period 2: 
Your available funds to consume in Period 2  
= Your loan in Period 2 + Your savings in Period 1  
=             _______  B)          +            _______ F)                  
=             _______ G). 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (Please remember 
that you cannot consume more than your Period 2 loanB) plus your Period 1 savingsF)): 
_______ H). 
Your savings in Period 2 (which will be given to Player B in Period 3) 
= Your loan in Period 2   +  Your savings in Period 1 – Your consumption in Period 2 
=             _______ B)       +             _______ F)                  –      _______ H)    
=             _______ I). 
Suppose, the person that you are paired with in this round, Player B, selects 25J) franks as 
his/her Period 2 consumption.  
Player B’s Period 2 savings = his/her Period 2 income – his/her Period 2 consumption                               
                                             =           _______ C)                  –        25 J)     
                                             =           _______ K). 
Player B’s available funds, which are automatically allocated for his/her Period 3 
consumption = 
his/her savings in Period 2 + Player A’s saving in Period 2 – Player A’s Period 2 loan 
 =      ________ K)                       +                 _______ I)               –            _______ B)      
=       ________L)  
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Your Earnings  
= Your consumption in Period 1 x Your consumption in Period 2 
    x Player B’s consumption in Period 2 x Player B’s consumption in Period 3 
=  _______ E)  x  _______ H)  x  25 J)  x   _______ L)  
= _______M) 
Suppose you are Player B.  
Period 1:  
You do not play. 
Period 2: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (Please remember 
that you cannot consume more than your Period 2 income): _______ N).  
Your saving in Period 2 
 = Your income in Period 2 – Your consumption in Period 2 
 =              _______ C)          –                _______ N)              
=               _______ O). 
Period 3: 
Player A’s savings in Period 2, which are given to you in Period 3 is _______ I) franks.   
Your consumption in Period 3 = 
Your savings in Period 2 + Player A’s savings in Period 2 – Player A’s Period 2 loan  
=              _______ O)       +               ________ I)                –         _______ B)   
=              _______ P).  
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Your Earnings 
= Your consumption in Period 2 x Your consumption in Period 3 
=                  _______ N)               x                    _______ P)                  
=                  _______ Q) 
 
Session 2 Practice Question 2:   
Now, suppose, Player A’s loan in Period 2 is doubled, while Player A’s income in Period 
1 and Player B’s income in Period 2 remain the same: 
Player A’s income in Period 1 is                                                                50 A)  
Player A’s loan in Period 2 is  
(which will be subtracted from Player B’s available funds in Period 3):  50 B’) 
Player B’s income in Period 2 is                                                                50 C) 
Suppose you are Player A.  
Period 1: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 1 (In this exercise 
please select the same number of franks as you have selected for your consumption in 
Period 1 previously on page 1)E) [In the experiment you are free to choose the number of 
franks you wish to consume]:  _______ E) 
Your savings in Period 1 = Your income in Period 1 – Your consumption in Period 1 
                                         =  _______ A) –  _______ E)   
                                         =  _______ F). 
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Period 2: 
Your available funds to consume in Period 2  
= Your loan in Period 2 + Your savings in Period 1  
=  _______  B’)  +  _______ F)   
=  _______ G’). 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (In this exercise 
please select the same number of franks as you have selected for your consumption in 
Period 2 previously on page 1)H) [In the experiment you are free to choose the number of 
franks you wish to consume]:  _______ H). 
Your savings in Period 2 (which will be given to Player B in Period 3) 
= Your loan in Period 2 + Your savings in Period 1 – Your consumption in Period 2 
=            _______ B’)          +                 _______  F)            –      _______ H)    
=            _______ I’). 
Suppose, the person that you are paired with in this round, Player B, again, selects 25 J) 
franks as his/her Period 2 consumption.  
Player B’s Period 2 savings = his/her Period 2 income – his/her Period 2 consumption                               
                                             =           _______ C)                  –              25 J)        
                                             =           _______ K) 
Player B’s available funds, which are automatically allocated for his/her Period 3 
consumption =  
his/her savings in Period 2 + Player A’s saving in Period 2 – Player A’s Period 2 loan 
=              _______ K)              +                    _______ I’)           –                 _______ B’)   
=              _______ L)  
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Your Earnings  
= Your consumption in Period 1 x Your consumption in Period 2 
    x Player B’s consumption in Period 2 x Player B’s consumption in Period 3 
=  _______ E)  x  _______ H)  x  25 J)  x  _______ L)  
=  ________ M) 
Suppose you are Player B.  
Period 1:  
You do not play. 
Period 2: 
Please select the number of franks you wish to consume in Period 2 (In this exercise 
please select the same number of franks as you have selected for your consumption in 
Period 2 previously on page 2)N) [In the experiment you are free to choose the number of 
franks you wish to consume]:  _______ N). 
Your savings in Period 2 
= Your income in Period 2 – Your consumption in Period 2 
=                  _______ C)     –      _______ N)   
=                  _______ O). 
Period 3: 
Player A’s savings in Period 2, which are given to you in Period 3 is _______I’) franks.   
Your consumption in Period 3 = 
Your savings in Period 2 + Player A’s savings in Period 2 – Player A’s Period 2 loan  
=               _______ O)     +                   _______ I’)              –  _______ B’)   
=               _______ P).  
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Your Earnings 
= Your consumption in Period 2 x Your consumption in Period 3 
=             _______ N)                   x                 _______ P)  
=             _______Q). 
If you finish these questions before the others, we advise you to try different choices in 
the above examples to further familiarize yourself with the decision task. 
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APPENDIX D. EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Questionnaire: Please fill in the blanks or tick (√ ) the relevant answer(s). You will 
get $5 if you fill this questionnaire completely. 
 
1. What is your age? ___________________ 
 
2. What is your sex? 
 
 Male 
 Female 
 
3. What is your racial or ethnic background? 
 
 White or Caucasian-American 
 Black or African-American 
 Hispanic-American 
 Asian-American  
 Native-American 
 Multi-Racial (please specify): _______________ 
 Foreigner (please specify): _________________ 
 Other (please specify): ____________________ 
 
4. Please specify the state and country where were you raised (if you moved several         
    times, name the state and country in which you spent the most time):  
 
    _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
5. What is your marital status? 
 
 Married 
 Single 
 Divorced/Separated 
 Widowed 
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6. How would you best describe your current employment situation? 
 
 Full-time employment outside the university 
 Part-time employment outside the university 
 Student only 
 Other (please specify): _________________ 
 
7. Please indicate the income category that best describes your own income from all   
    sources (salary, stipend, gifts, investment, etc.) before taxes in past year. Do not    
    include income from other household members. 
 
 $5,000 or less     $60,001 - $75,000 
 $5,001 - $15,000     $75,001 - $90,000 
 $15,001 - $30,000     $90,001 - $100,000 
 $30,001 - $45,000     $100,001 or more 
 $45,001 - $60,000 
 
8. How do you receive your income/stipend? 
 
 Fixed source (salary, pensions) 
 Hourly rate 
 Hourly rate + tips 
 Loans/Scholarships 
 Parents 
 Other (please specify): _______________________ 
 
9. What is your Major? 
 
 Already decided (please specify): _____________________ 
 Not decided 
 
10. What year are you classified as for the current semester? 
 
 Freshman 
 Sophomore 
 Junior 
 Master’s student 
 Doctoral student 
 Other (please specify): _______________________ 
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11. Who is primarily responsible for your tuition and living expense while you are  
      attending this university? 
 
 Self 
 Parents 
 Scholarships/grant 
 Loans 
 Other (please specify): __________________________ 
 
12. How many economics courses have you taken at the university level? _________ 
 
13. In yourr previous economics classes, have you studied about 
 
Taxes:            Yes      No 
Government Debt:   Yes      No 
 
14. Have you heard/studied about “Ricardian Equivalence”? 
 
 Yes      No 
 
15. In the experiment, how did you choose the amount you consumed and saved (in other    
      words, what factors motivated your decision?  
 
      _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
      _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
16. Did you consume more than you save? Why/why not? 
  
      _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
      _____________________________________________________________________ 
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17. For Player A: Did you consume your loan in Period 2? Why/why not          
       
      _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
      _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
       
      For Player A: When you selected your consumption in Period 2, did you care for     
      Player B so that he/she has enough franks to consume in Period 3? Why/why not? 
 
      _____________________________________________________________________ 
  
      _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
      For Player B: When you selected your consumption in Period 2, did you realize that    
      you should have enough franks in Period 3 to pay back Player A’s loan? Did you take   
      into account that consideration in selecting your consumption? 
 
      _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
      _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
18. How did you decide to consume in the session when there is no tax? Is it different   
      from in the session when there is tax? 
 
      _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
      _____________________________________________________________________ 
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19. Do you have credit cards?  
 
 Yes      No 
(If you use your parents’ credit cards, answer yes) 
 
 
20. If yes, how much is the average balance? 
 
 $0 (I always pay off the balance every month) 
 $1 - $500 
 $501 - $1,000 
 $1,001 -  $2,500 
 $2,501 - $5,000 
 > $5,000 
 
 
21. Do you have savings?  
 
 Yes      No (I consume all income/stipend) 
 
 
22. If yes, how much is the average balance? 
 
 $1 - $2,500 
 $2,501 - $5,000 
 $5,001 -  $7,500 
 $7,500 - $10,000 
 > $10,001 
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